Mentiras, Relevancia y Teoría de la Mente

Mentir intencionadamente es una de las características más salientes de nuestra especie. En este artículo discutimos cuáles son las herramientas cognitivas necesarias para el arte de mentir y manipular al otro. Concretamente argumentaremos que, además del módulo lingüístico, es necesario la capacidad de atribuir estados mentales al otro. Dicha capacidad sería el resultado de un módulo cognitivo complejo en el que están incluidos, entre otras habilidades, el principio de relevancia (Sperber y Wilson 1986/1995), la habilidad de asignar estados mentales a otros recursivamente (Perner y Wimmer, 1985) y el mecanismo de detección de tramposos (Cosmides, 1989; Tobby y Cosmides, 1989, 1992, 2000).Telling lies on purpose is one of the most prominent features of our species. In this article we discuss which cognitive tools we use to lie other people. Specifically, we will argue that, as well as language, we require the ability to attribute mental states to others. This capacity would be the result of a complex cognitive module where we include, among other abilities, the relevance principle (Sperber y Wilson 1986/1995), the capacity to ascribe recursively mental states to others (Perner y Wimmer, 1985) and the mechanism for detecting deception (Cosmides, 1989; Tobby y Cosmides, 1989, 1992, 2000).Mentir intentionnellement est l’une des caractéristiques les plus notoires de notre espèce. Dans cet article nous exposons quels sont les outils cognitifs nécessaires à l’art de mentir et de manipuler l’autre. D’une manière concrète, nous argumenterons que, en plus du module linguistique, la capacité d’attribuer des états mentaux à l’autre est nécessaire. Cette capacité serait le résultat d’un module cognitif complexe dans lequel sont inclus, parmi d’autres habiletés, le principe d’éminence (Sperber et Wilson 1986/1995), l’habileté d’attribuer des états mentaux à d’autres d’une façon réitérée (Perner y Wimmer, 1985) et le mécanisme de détection de tricheurs (Cosmides, 1989; Tobby y Cosmides, 1989, 1992, 2000)

The effects of cheating on deception detection during a social dilemma

Research by social psychologists and others consistently finds that people are poor at detecting attempted deception by others. However, Tooby and Cosmides (cognitive psychologists who favor evolutionary analyses of behavior) have argued and shown that humans have evolved a special “cognitive module” for detecting cheaters. Their research suggests that people are good at detecting cheating by group members. These two literatures seem to be at odds with one another. The hypothesis of this research was that when participants are told a lie by a fellow group member whose attempted deception involves cheating on a task that affects their outcomes, they will be good at detecting deception. In this experiment, participants played blackjack in groups using a social dilemma paradigm. Participants’ outcomes were either interdependent or independent with a confederate’s outcomes. It was predicted that participants whose outcomes were interdependent with the confederate would be better at detecting deception by the confederate than those participants whose outcomes were independent from the confederate’s outcomes. Results indicate that when judging other participants’ lies interdependent players were more successful at deception detection than independent players but were not more sensitive to the lies. This effect may be driven by the truth bias, people assume that their interaction partners are truthful which would explain why sensitivity measures (which remove response biases) did not show the hypothesized effect. Independent players were not more successful or sensitive when judging the confederate’s lies. The failure to find the hypothesized effect may be due to methodological factors. Both participants heard may have had their cheating detection modules activated when hearing the instructions for the experiment which implied that cheating could occur. Overall success rates support this idea because they were significantly higher than success rates reached by most deception detection research (50%) which may be indicative that both participants cheating detection modules were active. Results also indicate that as the number of lies told increases overall success decreases but success at detecting lies and sensitivity increase. Thus the more lies that are told the better people are at catching them

E-Motion: being moved by fiction and media? : Notes on fictional worlds, virtual contacts and the reality of emotions

Our response to fictional cues is often as emotional as to occurrences in real life. Such emotional responses do not mean that each time we mistake fiction for reality; rather they are affected by our innate social behaviors and by complex neural structures. Some responses, as for instance fright or pity, take place spontaneously, comparably to a reflex act. Furthermore, emotions can be evoked by means of thoughts: some specific sorts of texts rouse the reader´s ability to share in the emotional experiences of a fictional character. Other emotions can refer to a work of art as a whole or to some implicit components of meaning or allusions to facts of the case external to the text. Further ways of emotional engagement are pleasure and suspense, the affective basic processes of each reception of art or any media.Menschen reagieren auf fiktionale Ereignisse ebenso emotional wie auf das wirkliche Leben. Solche Gefühlsreaktionen bedeuten jedoch keine Verwechslung von Realität und Fiktion, sondern sind ein Produkt angeborener sozialer Verhaltensweisen und komplexer neuronaler Vorgänge. Reaktionen wie Schrecken und Mitleid zum Beispiel geschehen spontan, fast reflexartig. Aber auch über Gedanken lassen sich Emotionen hervorrufen: Bestimmte literarische Textsorten appellieren an das Einfühlungsvermögen des Lesers und lassen ihn an der Gefühlswelt fiktionaler Personen teilhaben. Andere Emotionen können sich auf ein künstlerisches Werk als ganzes oder auf werkexterne Bedeutungskomponenten beziehen. Weitere Formen emotionaler Beteiligung sind Lust und Spannung, die affektiven Basisprozesse jeder Kunst- und Medienrezeption

Proximate and ultimate factors in evolutionary thinking on art

Art is often described as an evolutionary adaptation, but not enough thought has been given to arguments in support of this claim. This can lead to a variety of explanatory issues, such as unjustly describing artmaking as an adaptation, not recognizing its complex nature, and its potentially even more complex evolutionary trajectory. This paper addresses one subject in particular, which is the conceptual distinction between ultimate and proximate levels of explanation. More specifically, this brief analysis investigates to what extent functional, adaptive explanations and proximate mechanisms might be confused, leading to strong adaptationist claims that may not be in accordance with the available evidence. In this paper, two hypotheses are discussed from this perspective, and it is argued that both of them, upon closer and more extensive analysis, might not stand the adaptationist test

Is the Mind Massively Modular?

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Mother nature's tolerant ways: why non-genetic inheritance has nothing to do with evolution

Recently a number of theorists have suggested that evolution can use non-genetic or environmental inheritance to pass on adaptations (e.g. Mameli, 2004). Furthermore, it has been suggested that nongenetic, or environmental factors, can play a central role in the process of evolution that is not captured by the neo-Darwinian view which places natural selection centre-stage (e.g. Odling-Smee, Laland & Feldman, 2003). In this paper we present and clarify neo-Darwinian theory and then take issue with the notions of contemporary gene-centred selection and inheritance that non-genetic inheritance theorists have used. We claim that they have misunderstood the distinction and relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic inheritance and we clarify this with a number of examples from the behavioural and biological sciences. According to this analysis there is no such thing as biologically independent nongenetic inheritance, all extrinsic inheritance is a consequence of traits and dispositions that are intrinsic to an organism and intrinsic design can only be explained through neo-Darwinism. We point to the implications this view has for current conceptions of cultural evolution

Combat and Warfare in the Early Paleolithic and Medically Unexplained Musculo-Facial Pain in the 21st Century War Veterns and Active-Duty Military Personnel

In a series of recent articles, we suggest that family dentists, military dentists and psychiatrists with expertise in posttraumatic stress disorder (especially in the Veterans Health Administration) are likely to see an increased number of patients with symptomatic jaw-clenching and early stages of tooth- grinding (Bracha et al., 2005). Returning warfighters and other returnees from military deployment may be especially at risk for high rates of clenching- induced masticatory muscle disorders at early stages of incisor grinding. The literature we have recently reviewed strongly supports the conclusion that clenching and grinding may primarily be a manifestation of experiencing extreme fear or severe chronic distress (respectively). We have recently reviewed the clinical and paleoanthropological literature and have noted that ancestral warfare and ancestral combat, in the early Paleolithic Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness (EEA) may be a neglected factor explaining the conservation of the archaic trait of bite-muscle strengthening. We have hypothesized that among ancestral warriors, jaw clenching may have rapidly strengthened the two primary muscles involved in biting, the masseter muscles and the much larger temporalis muscles. The strengthening of these muscles may have served the purpose of enabling a stronger, deeper, and therefore more lethal, defensive bite for early Paleolithic humans. The neuroevolutionary perspective presented here may be novel to many dentists. However, it may be useful in patient education and in preventing progression from jaw-clenching to chronic facial pain

An evolved cognitive bias for social norms

Social norms are a widely used concept for explaining human behavior, but there are few studies exploring how we cognitively utilize them. We incorporate here an evolutionary approach to studying social norms, predicting that if norms have been critical to biological fitness, then individuals should have adaptive mechanisms to conform to, and avoid violating, norms. A cognitive bias toward norms is one specific means by which individuals could achieve this. To test this, we assessed whether individuals have greater recall for normative information than for nonnormative information. Three experiments were performed in which participants read a text and were then tested on their recall of behavioral content. The data suggest that individuals have superior recall for normative social information and that performance is not related to rated importance. We discuss how such a cognitive bias may ontogenetically develop and identify possible hypotheses that distinguish between alternative explanatory accounts for social norms

The evolution of leader-follower reciprocity: The theory of service-for-prestige

Copyright © 2014 Price and Van Vugt. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.This article has been made available through the Brunel Open Access Publishing Fund.We describe the service-for-prestige theory of leadership, which proposes that voluntary leader–follower relations evolved in humans via a process of reciprocal exchange that generated adaptive benefits for both leaders and followers. We propose that although leader–follower relations first emerged in the human lineage to solve problems related to information sharing and social coordination, they ultimately evolved into exchange relationships whereby followers could compensate leaders for services which would otherwise have been prohibitively costly for leaders to provide. In this exchange, leaders incur costs to provide followers with public goods, and in return, followers incur costs to provide leaders with prestige (and associated fitness benefits). Because whole groups of followers tend to gain from leader-provided public goods, and because prestige is costly for followers to produce, the provisioning of prestige to leaders requires solutions to the “free rider” problem of disrespectful followers (who benefit from leader services without sharing the costs of producing prestige). Thus service-for-prestige makes the unique prediction that disrespectful followers of beneficial leaders will be targeted by other followers for punitive sentiment and/or social exclusion. Leader–follower relations should be more reciprocal and mutually beneficial when leaders and followers have more equal social bargaining power. However, as leaders gain more relative power, and their high status becomes less dependent on their willingness to pay the costs of benefitting followers, service-for-prestige predicts that leader–follower relations will become based more on leaders’ ability to dominate and exploit rather than benefit followers. We review evidential support for a set of predictions made by service-for-prestige, and discuss how service-for-prestige relates to social neuroscience research on leadership