Spatial Cournot Competition and Consumers’ Heterogeneity: A Note

We consider the standard model of spatial Cournot competition and show that a necessary condition for dispersion equilibria is that the distribution be not unimodal.Spatial Cournot competition, consumers’ distribution

Optimal Manipulation Rules in a Mixed Duopoly

We study the optimal manipulation rules of a public firm’s objective function in a mixed duopoly with imperfect product substitutability. We compare the solutions under quantity and price competition, and the way in which they are affected by the degree of product substitutability. This allows us to show that partial privatization, strategic delegation and other specific government’s commitments on the objective function of the public management can be looked at as special cases of these optimal rules, and to evaluate the viability of these policies under the two modes of competition. In this framework, we also discuss the equivalence between manipulation of the objective function and Stackelberg leadership.Mixed oligopoly, strategic manipulation, partial privatization

The Price Index Effect and Macroeconomic Inefficiency

In the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition the effects of individual pricing decisions on the aggregate price index are neglected. Tliis paper studies the implications of this approximation in terms of the efficiency of macroeconomic equilibria. We show that allowing for the price-index effect, makes the degree of inefficiency positively correiated with the number of agents; it also reduces the scope for New Keynesian outcomes, such as price rigidity and multiple equilibria.New Keynesian economies, aggregate demand externalities, nominal rididity

Spatial Discrimination with Quantity Competition and High Transportation Costs: a Note

In this paper we extend the analysis of the standard model of spatial discrimination with quantity competition along the linear city to the case in which the unit transportation cost is greater than one. We show that in such a case the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in locations is a dispersed symmetric equilibrium. Moreover, at this equilibrium firms' locations are not monotone in the transportation cost parameter.Market Coverage

Indexation Rules, Risk Aversion, and Imperfect Information

Nominal wage adjustment is modeled as resulting from bargaining between a risk neutral …rm and a risk averse worker, in an environment where the rate of in‡ation is a random variable. Risk aversion makes for endogenous indexation arrangements, which deliver partial indexation as they exploit imperfect in‡ation indices; risk aversion also generates a positive correlation between indexation and in‡ation variance. The model suggests a distinction between complete vs incomplete in‡ation adjustment on the one hand, and perfect vs imperfect adjustment on the other hand

Optimal Commodity Taxation and Income Distribution

We consider the interplay between income distribution and optimal commodity taxation, linking equity issues to optimal taxes through the effect of income distribution on market demand and its price elasticity. We find conditions to conciliate the equity and efficiency tradeoff and to assess the impact of inequality changes on the optimal taxation of necessity and luxury goods. We show that the regressivity or progressivity of the tax system is determined by the distribution of luxuries and necessities in the economy. If the tax system is regressive (progressive), a decrease (increase) of income inequality leads to an average decrease of the optimal tax rates, achieving welfare gains for society. Our analysis provides a framework to investigate the linkages between direct and indirect taxation