Stackelberg equilibrium in a mixed duopoly

We investigate Stackelberg mixed duopoly models where a state-owned public firm maximizing domestic social surplus, and a foreign firm compete. We examine a desirable role (either leader or follower) of both firms. Under these conditions, the firms may have two different types of optimal reaction at the Cournot equilibrium: weak or strong. We compare the profits and domestic social surplus and compare the volume of commodities for various combinations of weak and strong leaders and followers

Cournot and stackelberg equilibrium in mixed duopoly models

We investigate Cournot and Stackelberg mixed duopoly models where a stateowned public firm maximizing domestic social surplus, and a foreign firm searching to maximize its own profit, compete. First, we establish the existence and uniqueness results for the Cournot scheme, and propose the agents’ classification as strong or weak according to the agent’s optimal reaction function properties at the Cournot equilibrium. Then we examine a desirable role (either leader or follower) of both firms in the Stackelberg schemes and compare the profits and domestic social surplus and the production volumes at each type of Stackelberg equilibrium

Stackelberg equilibrium in a mixed duopoly

We investigate Stackelberg mixed duopoly models where a state-owned public firm maximizing domestic social surplus, and a foreign firm compete. We examine a desirable role (either leader or follower) of both firms. Under these conditions, the firms may have two different types of optimal reaction at the Cournot equilibrium: weak or strong. We compare the profits and domestic social surplus and compare the volume of commodities for various combinations of weak and strong leaders and follower

Análisis de punto de cambio dentro del control estadístico de procesos

El Análisis de Punto de Cambio es una parte del Control Estadístico de Calidad que aparece por primera vez alrededor de 1954 y en las últimas tres décadas ha sido ampliamente estudiado por investigadores e ingenieros de diferentes áreas del conocimiento. En este artículo proveeremos una explicación que cubre: sus orígenes, las aportaciones más importantes, las áreas en que se ha aplicado, las líneas actuales de investigación, el futuro y un ejemplo basado en el caso de la función de distribución Gamma. El objetivo principal del presente artículo es familiarizar a los lectores con esta nueva tecnología

Solving the Bilevel Facility Location Problem under Preferences by a Stackelberg-Evolutionary Algorithm

This research highlights the use of game theory to solve the classical problem of the uncapacitated facility location optimization model with customer order preferences through a bilevel approach. The bilevel model provided herein consists of the classical facility location problem and an optimization of the customer preferences, which are the upper and lower level problems, respectively. Also, two reformulations of the bilevel model are presented, reducing it into a mixed-integer single-level problem. An evolutionary algorithm based on the equilibrium in a Stackelberg’s game is proposed to solve the bilevel model. Numerical experimentation is performed in this study and the results are compared to benchmarks from the existing literature on the subject in order to emphasize the benefits of the proposed approach in terms of solution quality and estimation time

Revista Temas Agrarios Volumen 26; Suplemento 1 de 2021

1st International and 2nd National Symposium of Agronomic Sciences: The rebirth of the scientific discussion space for the Colombian Agro.1 Simposio Intenacional y 2 Nacional de Ciencias Agronómicas: El renacer del espacio de discusión científica para el Agro colombiano

Erratum to: Guidelines for the use and interpretation of assays for monitoring autophagy (3rd edition) (Autophagy, 12, 1, 1-222, 10.1080/15548627.2015.1100356

non present