Intentional binding as Bayesian cue combination: testing predictions with trait individual differences

We investigated differences in intentional binding in high and low hypnotizable groups to explore two questions relating to (a) trait differences in the availability of motor intentions to metacognitive processes and (b) a proposed cue combination model of binding. An experience of involuntariness is central to hypnotic responding and may arise from strategically being unaware of one’s intentions. Trait differences in the ability to respond to hypnotic suggestion may reflect differing levels of access to motor intentions. Intentional binding refers to the subjective compression of the time between an action and its outcome, indicated by a forward shift in the judged time of an action toward its outcome (action binding) and the backward shift of an outcome toward a causal action (outcome binding). Intentional binding is sensitive to intentional action without requiring explicit reflection upon agency. One way of explaining the sensitivity of intentional binding is to see it as a simple case of multisensory cue combination in which awareness of intentions increases knowledge of the timing of actions. Here we present results consistent with such a mechanism. In a contingent presentation of action and outcome events, low hypnotizable had more precise timing judgments of actions and also showed weaker action binding than highs. These results support the theory that trait hypnotizability is related to access to information related to motor intentions, and that intentional binding reflects the Bayesian combination of cross-modal cues

Higher-order thoughts in action : Consciousness as an unconscious re-description process

Peer reviewedPostprin

Emergence of qualia from brain activity or from an interaction of proto-consciousness with the brain: which one is the weirder? Available evidence and a research agenda

This contribution to the science of consciousness aims at comparing how two different theories can explain the emergence of different qualia experiences, meta-awareness, meta-cognition, the placebo effect, out-of-body experiences, cognitive therapy and meditation-induced brain changes, etc. The first theory postulates that qualia experiences derive from specific neural patterns, the second one, that qualia experiences derive from the interaction of a proto-consciousness with the brain\u2019s neural activity. From this comparison it will be possible to judge which one seems to better explain the different qualia experiences and to offer a more promising research agenda

Development of intuitive rules: Evaluating the application of the dual-system framework to understanding children's intuitive reasoning

This is an author-created version of this article. The original source of publication is Psychon Bull Rev. 2006 Dec;13(6):935-53 The final publication is available at www.springerlink.com Published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/BF0321390

Binding binding: Departure points for a different version of the perceptual retouch theory

In the perceptual retouch theory, masking and related microgenetic phenomena were explained as a result of interaction between specific cortical representational systems and the non-specific sub-cortical modulation system. Masking appears as deprivation of sufficient modulation of the consciousness mechanism suffered by the target-specific signals because of the temporal delay of non-specific modulation (necessary for conscious representation), which explicates the later-coming mask information instead of the already decayed target information. The core of the model envisaged relative magnitudes of EPSPs of single cortical cells driven by target and mask signals at the moment when the nonspecific, presynaptic, excitatory input arrives from the thalamus. In the light of the current evidence about the importance of synchronised activity of specific and non-specific systems in generating consciousness, the retouch theory requires perhaps a different view. This article presents some premises for modification of the retouch theory, where instead of the cumulative presynaptic spike activities and EPSPs of single cells, the oscillatory activity in the gamma range of the participating systems is considered and shown to be consistent with the basic ideas of the retouch theory. In this conceptualisation, O-binding refers to specific encoding which is based on gamma-band synchronised oscillations in the activity of specific cortical sensory modules that represent features and objects; C-binding refers to the gamma-band oscillations in the activity of the non-specific thalamic systems, which is necessary for the O-binding based data to become consciously experienced

Evidence for the Re-Enactment of a Recently Learned Behavior during Sleepwalking

Animal studies have shown that sequenced patterns of neuronal activity may be replayed during sleep. However, the existence of such replay in humans has not yet been directly demonstrated. Here we studied patients who exhibit overt behaviors during sleep to test whether sequences of movements trained during the day may be spontaneously reenacted by the patients during sleep

Fleeting Perceptual Experience and the Possibility of Recalling Without Seeing

We explore an intensely debated problem in neuroscience, psychology and philosophy: the degree to which the “phenomenological consciousness” of the experience of a stimulus is separable from the “access consciousness” of its reportability. Specifically, it has been proposed that these two measures are dissociated from one another in one, or both directions. However, even if it was agreed that reportability and experience were doubly dissociated, the limits of dissociation logic mean we would not be able to conclusively separate the cognitive processes underlying the two. We take advantage of computational modelling and recent advances in state-trace analysis to assess this dissociation in an attentional/experiential blink paradigm. These advances in state-trace analysis make use of Bayesian statistics to quantify the evidence for and against a dissociation. Further evidence is obtained by linking our finding to a prominent model of the attentional blink – the Simultaneous Type/Serial Token model. Our results show evidence for a dissociation between experience and reportability, whereby participants appear able to encode stimuli into working memory with little, if any, conscious experience of them. This raises the possibility of a phenomenon that might be called sight-blind recall, which we discuss in the context of the current experience/reportability debate

Reactive Security for Smart Grids Using [email protected] Simulation and Reasoning

Smart grids leverage modern information and communication technology to offer new perspectives to electricity consumers, producers, and distributors. However, these new possibilities also increase the complexity of the grid and make it more prone to failures. Moreover, new advanced features like remotely disconnecting meters create new vulnerabilities and make smart grids an attractive target for cyber attackers. We claim that, due to the nature of smart grids, unforeseen attacks and failures cannot be effectively countered relying solely on proactive security techniques. We believe that a reactive and corrective approach can offer a long-term solution and is able to both minimize the impact of attacks and to deal with unforeseen failures. In this paper we present a novel approach combining a [email protected] simulation and reasoning engine with reactive security techniques to intelligently monitor and continuously adapt the smart grid to varying conditions in near real-time

Motor skill learning in the middle-aged: limited development of motor chunks and explicit sequence knowledge

The present study examined whether middle-aged participants, like young adults, learn movement patterns by preparing and executing integrated sequence representations (i.e., motor chunks) that eliminate the need for external guidance of individual movements. Twenty-four middle-aged participants (aged 55–62) practiced two fixed key press sequences, one including three and one including six key presses in the discrete sequence production task. Their performance was compared with that of 24 young adults (aged 18–28). In the middle-aged participants motor chunks as well as explicit sequence knowledge appeared to be less developed than in the young adults. This held especially with respect to the unstructured 6-key sequences in which most middle-aged did not develop independence of the key-specific stimuli and learning seems to have been based on associative learning. These results are in line with the notion that sequence learning involves several mechanisms and that aging affects the relative contribution of these mechanisms