Cursed Equilibrium Revisited

Empirical as well as experimental evidence strongly suggests that bidders in common value auctions typically do not conform to the requirements of perfect rationality. Eyster and Rabin (2005) develop a theory and an equilibrium concept - x-cursed equilibrium - for bounded rational bidding in common value auctions (among other situations), and also present some experimental evidence supporting the theory. This paper comments on these findings of an experiment conducted at the University of Bergen. In the experiment, participants often demonstrate behaviour that is beyond the bounds set by the x-cursed equilibrium theory, and I present an alternative theory that better explains the experimental findings.common value auctions; winner's curse; bounded rationality; experiments.

Levelling the Field through Scoring Auctions

This paper considers how price auctions compare with two-dimensional bidding on price and quality, when bidders have comparative advantages. Two-dimensional bids are evaluated by a scoring rule decided by the auctioneer and three auction types are evaluated: a) a scoring auction reflecting the auctioneer's true preferences; b) a scoring auction with 'optimal' distortion of quality in the scoring rule; and c) a price-only auction with optimal quality threshold. The main findings are: 1) while the auctioneer always prefers the scoring auction, bidders may favour the price auction to the scoring auction and vice versa, depending on underlying conditions of the type space and cost parameters; and 2) the auctioneer can exploit firms' comparative advantages to level the field. An optimal scoring auction can, in some circumstances, extract all rent from bidders, leaving the auctioneer with all the e¢ ciency gain from the bidding process. There even exists a knife-edge situation where the auctioneer can extract all rent when using his true preferences as the scoring rule.scoring auctions; private values; comparative advantages.

Exclusivity and Bidding for Premium Broadcasting Rights

Often, we observe that some TV channels are distributed on several platforms, and by several distributors on the same platform, while others are distributed exclusively by one distributor. In this paper, we analyse a TV channelel's incentives for choosing exclusive distribution versus full distribution. We then proceed by studying if bidding for premium content (e.g., broadcasting rights to football) influences the incentives for choosing exclusive distribution. We show that absent of premium content, the channel has incentives to choose exclusive distribution, but the existence of premium con- tent dramatically reduces these incentives, and full distribution is the likely outcome.Exclusive dealing; auctions; football; media.

Vinnerens forbannelse

Rapportens fokus er rettet mot vinnerens forbannelse. Fremstillingen tar for seg auksjonsteori og spesielt den teori som omhandler vinnerens forbannelse. Videre presenteres en del historie for fagfeltet eksperimentell økonomi med fokus på de eksperimenter som kan knyttes til vinnerens forbannelse. I tilknytning til rapporten er det gjennomført et eksperiment på økonomistudenter ved Universitetet i Bergen. Eksperimentet brukes blant annet til å belyse en ny likevektsteori for en 1. pris lukket-bud auksjon som inkorporerer vinnerens forbannelse, en c-forbannet likevekt

Planck intermediate results: XLIII. Spectral energy distribution of dust in clusters of galaxies

Although infrared (IR) overall dust emission from clusters of galaxies has been statistically detected using data from the Infrared Astronomical Satellite (IRAS), it has not been possible to sample the spectral energy distribution (SED) of this emission over its peak, and thus to break the degeneracy between dust temperature and mass. By complementing the IRAS spectral coverage with Planck satellite data from 100 to 857 GHz, we provide new constraints on the IR spectrum of thermal dust emission in clusters of galaxies. We achieve this by using a stacking approach for a sample of several hundred objects from the Planck cluster sample. This procedure averages out fluctuations from the IR sky, allowing us to reach a significant detection of the faint cluster contribution. We also use the large frequency range probed by Planck, together with component-separation techniques, to remove the contamination from both cosmic microwave background anisotropies and the thermal Sunyaev-Zeldovich effect (tSZ) signal, which dominate at ν ≤ 353 GHz. By excluding dominant spurious signals or systematic effects, averaged detections are reported at frequencies 353 GHz ≤ ν ≤ 5000 GHz. We confirm the presence of dust in clusters of galaxies at low and intermediate redshifts, yielding an SED with a shape similar to that of the Milky Way. Planck’s resolution does not allow us to investigate the detailed spatial distribution of this emission (e.g. whether it comes from intergalactic dust or simply the dust content of the cluster galaxies), but the radial distribution of the emission appears to follow that of the stacked SZ signal, and thus the extent of the clusters. The recovered SED allows us to constrain the dust mass responsible for the signal and its temperature

Planck intermediate results: XXIX. All-sky dust modelling with Planck, IRAS, and WISE observations

Reproduced with permission from Astronomy & Astrophysics, © ESO, 201