Is anthropocentrism really the problem?

Treves et al. (2019) highlight what they consider soft forms of anthropocentrism in the practice and philosophy of conservation, e.g., when even professed non-anthropocentrists assert the precedence of human over nonhuman interests. I consider a few philosophical cases for maintaining human precedence, but ultimately offer a more psychological explanation: our explanations for why humans take precedence serve to reduce dissonance and discomfort, which arise because the norms and institutions of society often compel us to act in ways that violate our moral responsibilities to nonhuman beings

Ethical Foundations for the Lethal Management of Double-crested Cormorants (Phalocrocorax auritus) in the Eastern United States: an Argument Analysis

Lethal management of Double-crested Cormorants (Phalocrocorax auritus) has been implemented in many areas of the United States. In this paper, the philosophical method of argument analysis is used to assess ethical premises underlying the proposition that Double-crested Cormorant populations should be culled to reduce pressures on wild fisheries in the Great Lakes region of the eastern USA. This influential argument has been used to justify the destruction of more than half a million Double-crested Cormorants and hundreds of thousands of their nests and eggs. Three versions of the argument are formulated and assessed. It is shown that each of the arguments presupposes some form of anthropocentrism, an ethical stance considered by many in the scholarly community to be philosophically untenable and ethically inappropriate. It is suggested, consequently, that the arguments analyzed do not constitute an ethically sound basis for lethal management of Double-crested Cormorants in the Great Lakes region of the eastern USA

Ecological Forestry : A Critical Analysis

Although science is widely accepted as a fundamental source of information underlying decisions about forest management and conservation, considerably less attention has been paid to the inevitable role that normative values and beliefs play in such decisions. This thesis highlights the normative dimensions of "ecological forestry," a strategy of forest management that uses silviculture to mimic the effects of non-anthropogenic processes of disturbance and succession in order to meet multiple objectives on a single piece of land. Although its scientific foundations and silvicultural applications are relatively well developed in the literature, a conceptual analysis of ecological forestry reveals that it fails to coalesce into a discrete philosophy of forest management due to persistent metaphysical, normative, and ethical ambiguities, which allow for problematic philosophical and practical inconsistencies. Even once it has been tailored to a specific context, e.g. current proposals to use ecological forestry to manage the O&C lands in western Oregon, without clear answers to normative and ultimately ethical questions about objectives, values, and beliefs, ecological forestry might still be applied in variable and potentially incommensurable ways. An analysis of the arguments made about ecological forestry, both broadly theoretical and pertaining specifically to western Oregon, shows that empirical uncertainties and normative gaps need to be addressed before we can make a clear, well-reasoned decision about whether ecological forestry is a viable and appropriate strategy for forest management and conservation

On Morality, Psychology, and Conservation: An Interdisciplinary Appraisal of Ethics in Context

Conservation is, among other things, the expression of a relationship between humans and nonhuman nature. This relationship can be described empirically using the methods of social science, but it can also be prescribed in the form of philosophical arguments. Scholars in the field of environmental ethics have discussed and debated how we should relate with nonhuman nature, formulating different accounts of an “environmental ethic.” While these accounts are highly variegated, many of them suggest humans have at least some direct moral obligations to at least some part(s) of nonhuman nature. Scholarship in environmental ethics is generally offered up with the presumption that, if people accepted and affirmed the tenets of an environmental ethic, they would then engage in more environmentally sustainable conduct. In this way, a clear link is presumed between ethical commitments and manifest behaviors. Recently, many in the conservation community have made a similar presumption, but in a radically different form. Proponents of “new conservation” or “ecosystem services” assume that 1) people are largely anthropocentric (i.e., ethically “human-centered”), and therefore 2) appealing to the human benefits of nonhuman nature will most effectively elicit support for conservation. This line of reasoning presupposes that support for conservation (a form of human behavior) is directly motivated by people’s ethical commitments. Each in their own ways, environmental ethicists and new conservationists/ecosystem services enthusiasts attribute a strong behavioral influence to morality, largely disregarding the complex tapestry of social, situational, and psychological factors that also shape human behavior. The overarching objective of this work is to appraise how this larger context affects not only the expression but also the content of our ethical commitments, specifically as they pertain to the human relationship with nonhuman nature. Chapter One tests the new conservationist claim directly. The chapter reports findings from an online survey investigating how the type of beneficiary (human, nonhuman, or both) depicted in conservation outreach messages affects two metrics of support for conservation: attitudes toward the message and donations for a conservation organization. Results suggest messages highlighting only humans as conservation beneficiaries may not most effectively generate social support for conservation, but that social and situational variables other than the value basis of persuasive appeals may also influence their effectiveness. Chapter Two assesses the ethic-behavior linkage more generally, drawing on psychological research to question whether or under what conditions an environmental ethic might engender pro-environmental behavior. The discussion in this chapter suggests that an ethic, and the influence it exerts over behavior, is likely to be strongly limited by psychological, social, and structural factors. Chapters One and Two situate ethical commitments alongside a host of other variables that may influence individual human behavior. Chapter Three, finally, situates (philosophical) ethical reasoning alongside other variables that may influence the content of ethical commitments themselves. The chapter analyzes additional data from the survey featured in Chapter One to empirically investigate an influential line of normative theory in environmental ethics, called “extensionism,” which is predicated on the philosophical imperative of rational consistency. Results challenge extensionist theory as a descriptive explanation for survey respondents’ beliefs about value in nonhuman nature, suggesting such beliefs arise less by the pure exercise of rational deliberation prescribed by philosophers, than by a confluence of psychological processes. Altogether, this dissertation presents morality as a highly constrained, social and psychological phenomenon of human life. But this work also maintains that environmental ethics is an important aspirational endeavor, the value of which supersedes any significance it has (or lacks) as a descriptive account of human conduct

The Ethics of Eliminating Harmful Species: The Case of the Tsetse Fly

Wildlife species harmful to humans are often targets of control and elimination programs. A contemporary example is the tsetse fly, a vector of sleeping sickness and African animal trypanosomosis. Tsetse flies have recently been targeted by a pan-African eradication campaign. If it is successful, the campaign could push the entire tsetse family to extinction. With the emergence of effective and efficient elimination technologies, ethical assessment of proposed elimination campaigns is urgently needed. We examine the ethics of tsetse fly elimination by considering arguments predicated on both the instrumental and the intrinsic values of the species at local and global scales. We conclude that, although global eradication of tsetse flies is not ethically justified, localized elimination campaigns targeting isolated populations are ethically defensible. We urge assessments of this kind be conducted regularly and in context, so that all relevant factors underlying decisions on species elimination are routinely laid bare for evaluation

The Elephant (Head) in the Room: A Critical Look at Trophy Hunting

Trophy hunting has occupied a prominent position in recent scholarly literature and popular media. In the scientific conservation literature, researchers are generally supportive of or sympathetic to its usage as a source of monetary support for conservation. Although authors at times acknowledge that trophy hunting faces strong opposition from many members of the public, often for unspecified reasons associated with ethics, neither the nature nor the implications of these ethical concerns have been substantively addressed. We identify the central act of wildlife “trophy” taking as a potential source of ethical discomfort and public opposition. We highlight that trophy hunting entails a hunter paying a fee to kill an animal and claim its body or body parts as a trophy of conquest. Situating this practice in a Western cultural narrative of chauvinism, colonialism, and anthropocentrism, we argue trophy hunting is morally inappropriate. We suggest alternative strategies for conservation and community development should be explored and decisively ruled out as viable sources of support before the conservation community endorses trophy hunting. If wildlife conservation is broadly and inescapably dependent on the institution of trophy hunting, conservationists should accept the practice only with a due appreciation of tragedy, and proper remorse

Nature for whom? How type of beneficiary influences the effectiveness of conservation outreach messages

In recent years the conservation community has engaged in debate over value in nonhuman nature, especially as it relates to motivations for conservation. Many have expressed the assumption that more people are willing to support conservation when emphasis is placed on the human benefits of nonhuman nature, rather than the value of nonhuman nature for its own sake. To test this assumption, we designed an online survey investigating how the type of beneficiary (human, nonhuman, or both) depicted in outreach messages affects two metrics of support: attitudes toward the message and donations for a conservation organization. Each respondent viewed one message highlighting humans, nonhumans, or both as conservation beneficiaries. Predicting that the effect of beneficiary type would depend partially on individual differences, we also measured respondents' moral inclusivity, i.e., the values and beliefs they hold with regard to human and various nonhuman entities. Although beneficiary type did not affect attitudes, we report several key findings for donation. Compared to messages depicting only nonhuman beneficiaries, messages depicting only human beneficiaries were associated with lower likelihood of donation overall and, among less morally inclusive respondents, lower donation amounts. At the same time, messages depicting both human and nonhuman beneficiaries were not associated with more positive donation outcomes than messages depicting only nonhuman beneficiaries. Our results suggest that highlighting humans as conservation beneficiaries may not most effectively generate social support for conservation. Messages advocating the protection of nonhuman nature for its own sake may produce the most consistently positive donation outcomes.Keywords: intrinsic value, ecosystem services, elaboration likelihood, charitable giving, conservation marketing, environmental ethic

Recognizing animal personhood in compassionate conservation

Compassionate conservation is based on the ethical position that actions taken to protect biodiversity should be guided by compassion for all sentient beings. Critics argue that there are 3 core reasons harming animals is acceptable in conservation programs: the primary purpose of conservation is biodiversity protection; conservation is already compassionate to animals; and conservation should prioritize compassion to humans. We used argument analysis to clarify the values and logics underlying the debate around compassionate conservation. We found that objections to compassionate conservation are expressions of human exceptionalism, the view that humans are of a categorically separate and higher moral status than all other species. In contrast, compassionate conservationists believe that conservation should expand its moral community by recognizing all sentient beings as persons. Personhood, in an ethical sense, implies the individual is owed respect and should not be treated merely as a means to other ends. On scientific and ethical grounds, there are good reasons to extend personhood to sentient animals, particularly in conservation. The moral exclusion or subordination of members of other species legitimates the ongoing manipulation and exploitation of the living worlds, the very reason conservation was needed in the first place. Embracing compassion can help dismantle human exceptionalism, recognize nonhuman personhood, and navigate a more expansive moral space

Nature for whom? How type of beneficiary influences the effectiveness of conservation outreach messages

© 2018 Elsevier Ltd In recent years the conservation community has engaged in debate over value in nonhuman nature, especially as it relates to motivations for conservation. Many have expressed the assumption that more people are willing to support conservation when emphasis is placed on the human benefits of nonhuman nature, rather than the value of nonhuman nature for its own sake. To test this assumption, we designed an online survey investigating how the type of beneficiary (human, nonhuman, or both) depicted in outreach messages affects two metrics of support: attitudes toward the message and donations for a conservation organization. Each respondent viewed one message highlighting humans, nonhumans, or both as conservation beneficiaries. Predicting that the effect of beneficiary type would depend partially on individual differences, we also measured respondents’ moral inclusivity, i.e., the values and beliefs they hold with regard to human and various nonhuman entities. Although beneficiary type did not affect attitudes, we report several key findings for donation. Compared to messages depicting only nonhuman beneficiaries, messages depicting only human beneficiaries were associated with lower likelihood of donation overall and, among less morally inclusive respondents, lower donation amounts. At the same time, messages depicting both human and nonhuman beneficiaries were not associated with more positive donation outcomes than messages depicting only nonhuman beneficiaries. Our results suggest that highlighting humans as conservation beneficiaries may not most effectively generate social support for conservation. Messages advocating the protection of nonhuman nature for its own sake may produce the most consistently positive donation outcomes