The hidden advantage of delegation: pareto-improvements in a gift-exchange game

This paper analyzes the effect on performance and earnings of delegating the wage choice to employees. Our results how that such delegation significantly increases effort levels. Moreover, we observe a Pareto-improvement, as the earnings of both employers and employees increase when employers delegate than when they do not. Interestingly, we also find that the employees’ performance under delegation is higher than under non-delegation, even for similar wages. While there is strong evidence that behavior reflects strategic considerations, this result also holds for one-shot interactions. A possible non-strategic motivation explaining the positive reaction to delegation is a sense of enhanced responsibility

The impact of relative position and returns on sacrifice and reciprocity: an experimental study using individual decisions

We present a comprehensive experimental design that makes it possible to characterize other-regarding preferences and their relationship to the decision maker’s relative position. Participants are faced with a large number of decisions involving variations in the trade-offs between own and other’s payoffs, as well as in other potentially important factors like the decision maker’s relative position. We find that: (1) choices are responsive to the cost of helping and hurting others; (2) The weight a decision maker places on others’ monetary payoffs depends on whether the decision maker is in an advantageous or disadvantageous relative position; and (3) We find no evidence of reciprocity of the type linked to menu-dependence. The results of a mixture-model estimation show considerable heterogeneity in subjects’ motivations and confirm the absence of reciprocal motives. Pure selfish behavior is the most frequently observed behavior. Among the subjects exhibiting social preferences, social-welfare maximization is the most frequent, followed by inequality-aversion and by competitiveness

Interstellar Carbodiimide (HNCNH) - A New Astronomical Detection from the GBT PRIMOS Survey via Maser Emission Features

In this work, we identify carbodiimide (HNCNH), which is an isomer of the well-known interstellar species cyanamide (NH2CN), in weak maser emission, using data from the GBT PRIMOS survey toward Sgr B2(N). All spectral lines observed are in emission and have energy levels in excess of 170 K, indicating that the molecule likely resides in relatively hot gas that characterizes the denser regions of this star forming region. The anticipated abundance of this molecule from ice mantle experiments is ~10% of the abundance of NH2CN, which in Sgr B2(N) corresponds to ~2 x 10^13 cm-2. Such an abundance results in transition intensities well below the detection limit of any current astronomical facility and, as such, HNCNH could only be detected by those transitions which are amplified by masing.Comment: Accepted in The Astrophysical Journal Letters, 13 pages, 2 figures, generated using AAS LaTeX Macros v 5.

Which social categories matter to people: An experiment

Social categories matter to people, but it is not obvious ex ante which ones matter more. To explore this, we conduct a novel experimental market of anonymous partners based on social categories. Participants have the option of choosing or discarding a peer according to their gender, ethnicity, and religion. Our research design allows us to explore whether individuals prioritize social categories when selecting a peer and whether the order in which social categories are prioritized is context dependent. Considering both free and costly decisions, two economic contexts are evaluated: donations (dictator game) and investments (risk game). We find that when selecting a partner, gender appears to be the dominant social category across different conditions, with subjects exhibiting sharp preferences for being matched with a female partner. However, the partner\u27s religion gains prominence as a requested social category when issues concerning social-group decision-making become relevant to one\u27s own payoffs. Finally, we find that choosing social categories seems to have economic consequences both by increasing economic donations and increasing investments. (c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved

A pattern-recognition theory of search in expert problem solving

Understanding how look-ahead search and pattern recognition interact is one of the important research questions in the study of expert problem-solving. This paper examines the implications of the template theory (Gobet & Simon, 1996a), a recent theory of expert memory, on the theory of problem solving in chess. Templates are "chunks" (Chase & Simon, 1973) that have evolved into more complex data structures and that possess slots allowing values to be encoded rapidly. Templates may facilitate search in three ways: (a) by allowing information to be stored into LTM rapidly; (b) by allowing a search in the template space in addition to a search in the move space; and (c) by compensating loss in the "mind's eye" due to interference and decay. A computer model implementing the main ideas of the theory is presented, and simulations of its search behaviour are discussed. The template theory accounts for the slight skill difference in average depth of search found in chess players, as well as for other empirical data

Expert chess memory: Revisiting the chunking hypothesis

After reviewing the relevant theory on chess expertise, this paper re-examines experimentally the finding of Chase and Simon (1973a) that the differences in ability of chess players at different skill levels to copy and to recall positions are attributable to the experts' storage of thousands of chunks (patterned clusters of pieces) in long-term memory. Despite important differences in the experimental apparatus, the data of the present experiments regarding latencies and chess relations between successively placed pieces are highly correlated with those of Chase and Simon. We conclude that the 2-second inter-chunk interval used to define chunk boundaries is robust, and that chunks have psychological reality. We discuss the possible reasons why Masters in our new study used substantially larger chunks than the Master of the 1973 study, and extend the chunking theory to take account of the evidence for large retrieval structures (templates) in long-term memory

Incomplete Punishment Networks in Public Goods Games: Experimental Evidence

Abundant evidence suggests that high levels of contributions to public goods can be sustained through self-governed monitoring and sanctioning. This experimental study investigates the effectiveness of decentralized sanctioning institutions in alternative punishment networks. Our results show that the structure of punishment network significantly affects allocations to the public good. In addition, we observe that network configurations are more important than punishment capacities for the levels of public good provision, imposed sanctions and economic efficiency. Lastly, we show that targeted revenge is a major driver of anti-social punishment

Behavioral aspects of communication in organizations

International audienc

The UN in the lab

We consider two alternatives to inaction for governments combating terrorism, which we term Defense and Prevention. Defense consists of investing in resources that reduce the impact of an attack, and generates a negative externality to other governments, making their countries a more attractive objective for terrorists. In contrast, Prevention, which consists of investing in resources that reduce the ability of the terrorist organization to mount an attack, creates a positive externality by reducing the overall threat of terrorism for all. This interaction is captured using a simple 3×3 “Nested Prisoner’s Dilemma” game, with a single Nash equilibrium where both countries choose Defense. Due to the structure of this interaction, countries can benefit from coordination of policy choices, and international institutions (such as the UN) can be utilized to facilitate coordination by implementing agreements to share the burden of Prevention. We introduce an institution that implements a burden-sharing policy for Prevention, and investigate experimentally whether subjects coordinate on a cooperative strategy more frequently under different levels of cost sharing. In all treatments, burden sharing leaves the Prisoner’s Dilemma structure and Nash equilibrium of the game unchanged. We compare three levels of burden sharing to a baseline in a between-subjects design, and find that burden sharing generates a non-linear effect on the choice of the efficient Prevention strategy and overall performance. Only an institution supporting a high level of mandatory burden sharing generates a significant improvement in the use of the Prevention strategy