Recession and the Employment of Demographic Groups

macroeconomics, Recession, Demographic

Learning and Noisy Equilibrium Behavior in an Experimental Study of Imperfect Price Competition

This paper considers a duopoly price-choice game in which the unique Nash equilibrium is the Bertrand outcome. Price competition, however, is imperfect in the sense that the market share of the high-price firm is not zero. Economic intuition suggests that price levels should be positively related to the market share of the high-price firm. Although this relationship is not predicted by standard game theory, it is implied by a generalization of the Nash equilibrium that results when players make noisy (logit) best responses to expected payoff differences. This logit equilibrium model was used to design a laboratory experiment with treatments that correspond to changing the market share of the high-price firm. The model predicts the final-period price averages for both treatments with remarkable accuracy. Moreover computer simulations of a naive learning model were used, ex ante, to predict the observed differences in the time paths of average prices.laboratory experiments, simulation, decision error, learning, logit equilibrium.

A General Solution for Linear Decision Rules: An Optimal Dynamic Strategy Applicable Under Uncertainty

Linear decision rules for controlling complex systems are often obtained by matrix inversion, but transform methods offer an alternative approach that yields insights into the structure of the decision problem of maximizing expected payoffs under constraints

A General Solution for Linear Decision Rules: An Optimal Dynamic Strategy Applicable Under Uncertainty

Linear decision rules for controlling complex systems are often obtained by matrix inversion, but transform methods offer an alternative approach that yields insights into the structure of the decision problem of maximizing expected payoffs under constraints

Pricing Strategies Under Emissions Trading: An Experimental Analysis

An important feature in the design of an emissions trading program is how emissions allowances are initially distributed into the market. In a competitive market the choice between an auction and free allocation should, according to economic theory, not have any influence on firms’ production choices nor on consumer prices. However, many observers expect the method of allocation to affect product prices. This paper reports on the use of experimental methods to investigate behavior with respect to how prices will be determined under a cap-and-trade program. Participants initially display a variety of pricing strategies. However, given a simple economic setting in which earnings depend on this behavior, we find that subjects learn to consider the value of allowances and overall behavior moves toward that predicted by economic theory.carbon dioxide; climate change; emissions trading; distributional effects; electricity; allocation; auctions

Bostonia. Volume 18

Founded in 1900, Bostonia magazine is Boston University's main alumni publication, which covers alumni and student life, as well as university activities, events, and programs

Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games

Lecture on the first SFB/TR 15 meeting, Gummersbach, July, 18 - 20, 2004This paper explores predictability of behavior in coordination games with multiple equilibria. In a laboratory experiment we measure subjects' certainty equivalents for three coordination games and one lottery. Attitudes towards strategic uncertainty in coordination games are related to risk aversion, experience seeking, gender and age. From the distribution of certainty equivalents among participating students we estimate probabilities for successful coordination in a wide range of coordination games. For many games success of coordination is predictable with a reasonable error rate. The best response of a risk neutral player is close to the global-game solution. Comparing choices in coordination games with revealed risk aversion, we estimate subjective probabilities for successful coordination. In games with a low coordination requirement, most subjects underestimate the probability of success. In games with a high coordination requirement, most subjects overestimate this probability. Data indicate that subjects have probabilistic beliefs about success or failure of coordination rather than beliefs about individual behavior of other players

The Douglas-Fir Genome Sequence Reveals Specialization of the Photosynthetic Apparatus in Pinaceae.

A reference genome sequence for Pseudotsuga menziesii var. menziesii (Mirb.) Franco (Coastal Douglas-fir) is reported, thus providing a reference sequence for a third genus of the family Pinaceae. The contiguity and quality of the genome assembly far exceeds that of other conifer reference genome sequences (contig N50 = 44,136 bp and scaffold N50 = 340,704 bp). Incremental improvements in sequencing and assembly technologies are in part responsible for the higher quality reference genome, but it may also be due to a slightly lower exact repeat content in Douglas-fir vs. pine and spruce. Comparative genome annotation with angiosperm species reveals gene-family expansion and contraction in Douglas-fir and other conifers which may account for some of the major morphological and physiological differences between the two major plant groups. Notable differences in the size of the NDH-complex gene family and genes underlying the functional basis of shade tolerance/intolerance were observed. This reference genome sequence not only provides an important resource for Douglas-fir breeders and geneticists but also sheds additional light on the evolutionary processes that have led to the divergence of modern angiosperms from the more ancient gymnosperms

Bostonia: The Boston University Alumni Magazine. Volume 9

Founded in 1900, Bostonia magazine is Boston University's main alumni publication, which covers alumni and student life, as well as university activities, events, and programs