An Unrealistic Account of Moral Reasons

UID/FIL/00183/2019In this paper I will analyze John McDowell’s broad account of practical rationality and moral reasons, which he mainly puts forward in his articles “Are moral requirements hypothetical imperatives?” (1978) and “Might there be external reasons?” (1995). My main aim is to argue that from a philosophical perspective, no less than from an empirical one, McDowell’s account of practical rationality is not a realistic one. From a philosophical point of view, I will argue that his intellectualist account is not convincing; and if we consider his virtue-ethical ideal of practical rationality in light of the model of human cognition, we also realize that moral behavior is not immune to cognitive biases and does not always flow from robust traits of character like virtues. At the same time, this puts at stake his strong thesis of moral autonomy – the idea that with the ‘onset of reason’ moral beings are no longer determined by ‘first nature’ features.publishersversionpublishe

Anscombe reading Aristotle

Under one particular reading of it, Anscombe's 'Modern Moral Philosophy' is considered a seminal text in the revival of virtue ethics. Seen thus, Anscombe is implying that it is possible to do ethics without using concepts such as 'moral ought' or 'moral obligation', the perfect example being Aristotelian ethics. On the other hand, Anscombe claims that it is not useful at present to engage in moral philosophy since she finds that 'philosophically there is a huge gap… which needs to be filled by an account of human nature, human action, …and above all of human "flourishing"' (Anscombe, 1958: 18). The gap Anscombe refers to appears where there should be a 'proof that an unjust man is a bad man'. My aim in this paper is to discuss the various ways in which Anscombe's theses can be interpreted, recalling two other philosophers for whom Aristotelian virtue ethics was also essential: P. Foot and J. McDowell. I will argue that Anscombe did not expect Aristotelian ethics to answer the problems modern ethics poses.Fent-ne una lectura particular, "Modern Moral Philosophy" (La filosofia moral moderna) d'Anscombe es considera un text fundador en el renaixement de l'ètica de la virtut. Vist així, Anscombe insinua que és possible fer ètica sense emprar conceptes com "deure moral" o "obligació moral"; l'exemple perfecte n'és l'ètica aristotèlica. D'altra banda, Anscombe afirma que actualment no és útil fer filosofia moral, ja que troba que "filosòficament hi ha una gran bretxa […] que s'ha d'omplir amb una explicació de la naturalesa humana, l'acció humana […] i, sobretot, del "floriment" humà" (Anscombe, 1958: 18). La bretxa a la qual es refereix apareix on hi hauria d'haver una "prova que un home injust és un home dolent". El meu objectiu en aquest article és discutir les diverses formes en què es poden interpretar les tesis d'Anscombe, recordant dos altres filòsofs per a qui l'ètica de la virtut aristotèlica també era essencial: P. Foot i J. McDowell. Argumentaré que Anscombe no esperava que l'ètica aristotèlica respongués als problemes que l'ètica moderna ens planteja.Bajo una lectura particular del mismo, "Modern Moral Philosophy" de Anscombe se considera un texto fundador en el renacimiento de la ética de la virtud. Visto así, Anscombe insinúa que es posible hacer ética sin usar conceptos como "deber moral" u "obligación moral"; el ejemplo perfecto de esto es la ética aristotélica. Por otro lado, Anscombe afirma que no es útil en la actualidad hacer filosofía moral, ya que encuentra que "filosóficamente hay una gran brecha [...] que debe llenarse con una explicación de la naturaleza humana, la acción humana [...] y, sobre todo, de la "prosperidad" humana" (Anscombe, 1958: 18). La brecha a la que se refiere aparece donde debería haber una "prueba de que un hombre injusto es un hombre malo". Mi objetivo en este artículo es discutir las diversas formas en que se pueden interpretar las tesis de Anscombe, recordando a otros dos filósofos para quienes la ética de la virtud aristotélica también era esencial: P. Foot y J. McDowell. Argumentaré que Anscombe no esperaba que la ética aristotélica respondiera a los problemas que la ética moderna nos plantea

Entanglement and non-ontology: how Putnam clarifies the Link between aesthetic and ethical value

In this article we consider Putnam's project of an "ethics without ontology," focusing on some of its crucial aspects, namely, the entanglement of fact and value and the idea of forming and "imaginatively identifying" with a "particular evaluative outlook." We use that approach to shed light on the issue of value objectivity. Putnam's "pragmatist enlightenment" suggests a way of abandoning the traditional project of grounding ethics and aesthetics on metaphysics, preserving the idea of realism and objectivity about values. Ethical and aesthetic discriminations may be contextually specific and depend on the responses and the socially embedded experience of observers, but they are brought about by certain features of reality, far more complex than a domain of "objects" that would "correspond" to values. With our eyes set on these aspects, we draw important lessons for the project of a joint approach to aesthetic and ethical value, taking seriously the pervading entanglement of both, as suggested by the way we are able to apply the so-called thick concepts. This provides us with the outline of a contextualist approach to aesthetics that draws on Putnam's project for ethics. We conclude by suggesting that a fruitful way of pursuing this connection could be found in co-opting resources from virtue ethics

Realismo / Anti-realismo moral

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Imagining Futures for Intergenerational Ethics

UIDB/00183/2020 UIDP/00183/2020This paper explores the relevance of intergenerational ethics in the context of climate change and argues that virtue ethics provides a suitable framework for addressing these ethical concerns. We suggest the inclusion of a new virtue, called prospection, which involves cultivating the ability to think and care deeply about the future, navigate its inherent uncertainties constructively, and ensure the availability of sustainable options for future generations. We suggest that thinking and imagining sustainable futures trigger good dispositions towards future humans, non-humans and nature and that ought to be part of the definition of a good life. We posit that fostering this disposition can inspire and motivate present actions that effectively mitigate climate change. Virtue ethics implies an element of timelessness in morality because the future tends to be there by default; with prospection, the future will be there by design, reinforcing its importance in intergenerational ethics.preprintepub_ahead_of_prin

what makes an emotion moral?

UID/FIL/00183/2019 DL 57/2016/CP1453/CT0050 DL 57/2016/CP1453/CT0096The paper proposes a way to understand moral emotions in ethics building upon Bernard Williams' claim that feelings, emotions and sentiments are an integral part of rationality. Based upon Bernard Williams' analysis of shame we argue that the richness and thickness that it is attached to some emotions is the key to understand why some emotions have a distinct ethical resonance. The first part takes up Bernard Williams' philosophical assessment of the concept of shame (Williams 1993) establishing a general framework to show how recent developments in philosophy of emotions are in line with the far-reaching consequences of Bernard Williams' insights. Then we highlight the way in which there is both an historical relativity to emotions and an intemporal understanding of their ethical role, and use the concept of meta-emotion to reinforce the idea that what makes some emotions moral requires employing Williams' distinction between thick and thin concepts.publishersversionpublishe

Anscombe e Ricœur, leitores de Aristóteles

UIDB/00183/2020 UIDP/00183/2020 SFRH/BPD/102949/2014This paper discusses the influence and role of Aristotelian ethics in two contemporary ethical theories stemming from different traditions, those put forward by Elizabeth Anscombe and Paul Ricœur. In different ways, these accounts of ethics can be considered “virtue theories”. First, we focus on Anscombe’s recovery of Aristotelian “virtue ethics” in the context of her criticism of the standpoint of moral philosophy. We discuss the reception that her 1958 “Modern Moral Philosophy” has had, leading to contradicting interpretations of the role she ascribes to Aristotelian ethics and the problems raised by modern moral philosophy. Second, we discuss the status of the Aristotelian standpoint in Paul Ricœur’s “little ethics”, focusing on the primacy given to the ethical aim over moral obligation, and the role of Aristotelian practical wisdom (phronesis) in the overcoming of the difficulties of a modern deontological standpoint. Drawing on these two readings of Aristotelian ethics, we discuss issues such as the prospects of “human flourishing”, the conception of the subject underlying these accounts and the extent to which the context-dependent traits of human experience – as against an essentialist standpoint – should be taken into account in these theoriespublishersversionpublishe

Ética, moral e virtudes: Anscombe e Ricoeur, leitores de Aristóteles

This paper discusses the influence and role of Aristotelian ethics in two contemporary ethical theories stemming from different traditions, those put forward by Elizabeth Anscombe and Paul Ricoeur. In different ways, these accounts of ethics can be considered "virtue theories". First, we focus on Anscombe's recovery of Aristotelian "virtue ethics" in the context of her criticism of the standpoint of moral philosophy. We discuss the reception that her 1958 "Modern Moral Philosophy" has had, leading to contradicting interpretations of the role she ascribes to Aristotelian ethics and the problems raised by modern moral philosophy. Second, we discuss the status of the Aristotelian standpoint in Paul Ricoeur's "little ethics", focusing on the primacy given to the ethical aim over moral obligation, and the role of Aristotelian practical wisdom (phronesis) in the overcoming of the difficulties of a modern deontological standpoint. Drawing on these two readings of Aristotelian ethics, we discuss issues such as the prospects of "human flourishing", the conception of the subject underlying these accounts and the extent to which the context-dependent traits of human experience - as against an essentialist standpoint - should be taken into account in these theories.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Wittgenstein sobre Ética

UID/FIL/00183/2019 DL 57/2016/CP1453/CT0096Ao longo deste volume, analisam-se vários textos, fragmentos, observações e notas em que a temática da ética está presente — desde a Conferência sobre Ética, reconhecidamente o único texto em que a Ética é objeto directo da análise de Witgenstein, passando pelas suas Observações sobre “O Ramo Dourado” de Frazer, até algumas passagens célebres tanto das Investigações Filosóficas como do Tractatus. Procura-se compreender e lançar luz sobre alguns dos conceitos fundamentais do trabalho filosófico de Wittgenstein, também na sua relação com a dimensão ética — o conceito de seguir-regras, a ideia do sem-sentido ou da inexprimibilidade — e são testadas algumas intuições, tais como a proximidade entre a Lógica e a Ética ou a possibilidade de uma abordagem não-metafísica da Ética. Os textos que aqui se apresentam são diferentes exercícios que tendem a demonstrar a importância que a Ética teve, para o próprio Wittgenstein, mas também de que modo essa forma de interpelar o mundo e viver esses problemas é absolutamente atual.publishersversionpublishe