293 research outputs found
Beyond shareholder primacy? Reflections on the trajectory of UK corporate governance.
Core institutions of UK corporate governance, in particular the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, the Combined Code on Corporate Governance and the law on directors’ duties, are strongly orientated towards the norm of shareholder primacy. Beyond the core, however, stakeholder interests are better represented, in particular at the intersection of insolvency and employment law. This reflects the influence of European Community laws on information and consultation of employees. In addition, there are signs that some institutional shareholders are redirecting their investment strategies, under government encouragement, away from a focus on short-term returns, in such a way as to favour stakeholder-inclusive practices by firms. On this basis we suggest that the UK system is currently in a state of flux and that the debate over shareholder primacy has not been concluded
Governance tools for board members : adapting strategy maps and balanced scorecards for directorial action
The accountability of members of the board of directors of publicly traded companies has increased over years. Corresponding to these developments, there has been an inadequate advancement of tools and frameworks to help directorial functioning. This paper provides an argument for design of the Balanced Scorecard and Strategy Maps made available to the directors as a means of influencing, monitoring, controlling and assisting managerial action. This paper examines how the Balanced Scorecard and Strategy Maps could be modified and used for this purpose. The paper suggests incorporating Balanced Scorecards in the Internal Process perspective, ‘internal’ implying here not just ‘internal to the firm’, but also ‘internal to the inter-organizational system’. We recommend that other such factors be introduced separately under a new ‘perspective’ depending upon what the board wants to emphasize without creating any unwieldy proliferation of measures. Tracking the Strategy Map over time by the board of directors is a way for the board to take responsibility for the firm’s performance. The paper makes a distinction between action variables and monitoring variables. Monitoring variables are further divided on the basis of two considerations: a) whether results have been met or not and b) whether causative factors have met the expected levels of performance or not. Based on directorial responsibilities and accountability, we take another look at how the variables could be specified more completely and accurately with directorial recommendations for executives
Communitarian perspectives on social enterprise
Concepts of social enterprise have been debated repeatedly, and continue to cause confusion. In this paper, a meta-theoretical framework is developed through discussion of individualist and communitarian philosophy. Philosophers from both traditions build social theories that emphasise either consensus (a unitarist outlook) or diversity (a pluralist outlook). The various discourses in corporate governance reflect these assumptions and create four distinct approaches that impact on the relationship between capital and labour. In rejecting the traditional discourse of private enterprise, social enterprises have adopted other approaches to tackle social exclusion, each derived from different underlying beliefs about the purpose of enterprise and the nature of governance. The theoretical framework offers a way to understand the diversity found within the sector, including the newly constituted Community Interest Company (CIC).</p
Governors and directors: Competing models of corporate governance
Why do we use the term ‘corporate governance’ rather than ‘corporate direction’? Early British joint stock companies were normally managed by a single ‘governor’. The ‘court of governors’ or ‘board of directors’ emerged slowly as the ruling body for companies. By the nineteenth century, however, companies were typically run by directors while not-for-profit entities such as hospitals, schools and charitable bodies had governors. The nineteenth century saw steady refinement of the roles of company directors, often in response to corporate scandals, with a gradual change from the notion of the director as a ‘representative shareholder’ to the directors being seen collectively as ‘representatives of the shareholders’. Governors in not-for-profit entities, however, were regarded as having broader responsibilities. The term ‘governance’ itself suggests that corporate boards should be studied as ‘political’ entities rather than merely through economic lenses such as agency theory
Governance, regulation and financial market instability: the implications for policy
Just as the 1929 Stock Market Crash discredited Classical economic theory and policy and opened the way for Keynesianism, a consequence of the collapse of confidence in financial markets and the banking system—and the effect that this has had on the global macro economy—is currently discrediting the ‘conventional wisdom’ of neo-liberalism. This paper argues that at the heart of the crisis is a breakdown in governance that has its roots in the co-evolution of political and economic developments and of economic theory and policy since the 1929 Stock Market Crash and the Great Depression that followed. However, while many are looking back to the Great Depression and to the theories and policies that seemed to contribute to recovery during the first part of the twentieth century, we argue that the current context is different from the earlier one; and there are more recent events that may provide better insight into the causes and contributing factors giving rise to the present crisis and to the implications for theory and policy that follow
Combating Environmental Irresponsibility of TNCs in Africa: An Empirical Analysis
Environmental irresponsibility is one of the most prominent issues confronting host communities of transnational corporations (TNCs) engaged in the production of economic goods and, sometimes, services. Drawing mainly on stakeholder theory, combined with legitimacy theory, this article addresses how host communities in Africa combat the challenge of environmental irresponsibility of TNCs. To illustrate the dimensions and dynamics of the challenge, this paper examines the experience of despoliation of Ogoniland by the oil giant Shell in Nigeria. The analysis draws attention to the significance of the role of individuals and civil society groups in securing accountability of one of the most formidable fronts of economic globalisation. The analysis is particularly relevant to the experience of environmental irresponsibility in the context of weak governance structures
Science and scientists in Victorian and Edwardian literary novels: insights into the emergence of a new profession
Examining the Link Between Religion and Corporate Governance: Insights From Nigeria
This article examines whether the degree of religiosity in an institutional environment can stimulate the emergence of a robust corporate governance system. This study utilizes the Nigerian business environment as its context and embraces a qualitative interpretivist research approach. This approach permitted the engagement of a qualitative content analysis (QCA) methodology to generate insights from interviewees. Findings from the study indicate that despite the high religiosity among Nigerians, religion has not stimulated the desired corporate governance system in Nigeria. The primary explanation for this outcome is the presence of rational ordering over religious preferences thus highlighting the fact that religion, as presently understood and practiced by stakeholders, is inconsistent with the principles underpinning good corporate governance
Self or other: Directors’ attitudes towards policy initiatives for external board evaluation
Recurrent crises in corporate governance have board practice and created policy pressure to assess the effectiveness of boards. Since the 1990s boards have faced calls to undertake regular, formal evaluation. Since 2010, the UK Corporate Governance Code has urged large corporations to engage outside parties to conduct them at least every three years, a move that other jurisdictions have copied. Despite this policy importance, little research has been conducted into processes or outcomes of board evaluation. This study explores the attitudes of directors on evaluation, whether self-administered or facilitated by others. We find acceptance of the principle but reservations about the value and even honesty in questionnaire-based approaches. We find scepticism about, but also acknowledgement of, the benefits of using outside facilitators, especially for their objectivity and because their interviewing elicits insights into board dynamics. As this practice expands beyond listed companies to non-listed ones, charities, and even governance branches of government, our findings point to a need to professionalise outside facilitation
The effect of culture on Corporate Governance Practices in Nigeria
This study focuses on the effect of culture on the application of corporate governance practices in Nigeria. Corporate governance has been receiving serious attention in emerging markets over the past two decades. But relatively little attention has been given to the study on corporate governance in a country study. The current situations in Nigerian public and private sectors such as the corporate scandal resulting from Lever Brothers Nigeria plc, Siemens, Shell, Halliburton, and Cadbury Nigeria plc, have shown that the issue of fraud, corruption, and corporate scandals cannot be overlooked. Most top management, as this study argues, bring in beliefs acquired from their early childhood into their senior management roles and responsibilities. This study adopts a grounded theory and reports on the effect of culture on the implementation of corporate governance in Nigeria. Based on the interview with 32 staffs, this study identifies the effect of culture that shapes corporate governance and they include abuse of power by top management, weak legal framework, poor recruitment and ineffective control. Although having efficient corporate governance is worth pursuing, this depends on the power of top management, the strength of internal control procedures and the legal framework put in place by management
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