Visual Analytics of Surveillance Data on Foodborne Vibriosis, United States, 1973–2010

Foodborne illnesses caused by microbial and chemical contaminants in food are a substantial health burden worldwide. In 2007, human vibriosis (non-cholera Vibrio infections) became a notifiable disease in the United States. In addition, Vibrio species are among the 31 major known pathogens transmitted through food in the United States. Diverse surveillance systems for foodborne pathogens also track outbreaks, illnesses, hospitalization and deaths due to non-cholera vibrios. Considering the recognition of vibriosis as a notifiable disease in the United States and the availability of diverse surveillance systems, there is a need for the development of easily deployed visualization and analysis approaches that can combine diverse data sources in an interactive manner. Current efforts to address this need are still limited. Visual analytics is an iterative process conducted via visual interfaces that involves collecting information, data preprocessing, knowledge representation, interaction, and decision making. We have utilized public domain outbreak and surveillance data sources covering 1973 to 2010, as well as visual analytics software to demonstrate integrated and interactive visualizations of data on foodborne outbreaks and surveillance of Vibrio species. Through the data visualization, we were able to identify unique patterns and/or novel relationships within and across datasets regarding (i) causative agent; (ii) foodborne outbreaks and illness per state; (iii) location of infection; (iv) vehicle (food) of infection; (v) anatomical site of isolation of Vibrio species; (vi) patients and complications of vibriosis; (vii) incidence of laboratory-confirmed vibriosis and V. parahaemolyticus outbreaks. The additional use of emerging visual analytics approaches for interaction with data on vibriosis, including non-foodborne related disease, can guide disease control and prevention as well as ongoing outbreak investigations

Yellow fever in the diagnostics laboratory

Yellow fever (YF) remains a public health issue in endemic areas despite the availability of a safe and effective vaccine. In 2015-2016, urban outbreaks of YF were declared in Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and a sylvatic outbreak has been ongoing in Brazil since December 2016. Of great concern is the risk of urban transmission cycles taking hold in Brazil and the possible spread to countries with susceptible populations and competent vectors. Vaccination remains the cornerstone of an outbreak response, but a low vaccine stockpile has forced a sparing-dose strategy, which has thus far been implemented in affected African countries and now in Brazil. Accurate laboratory confirmation of cases is critical for efficient outbreak control. A dearth of validated commercial assays for YF, however, and the shortcomings of serological methods make it challenging to implement YF diagnostics outside of reference laboratories. We examine the advantages and drawbacks of existing assays to identify the barriers to timely and efficient laboratory diagnosis. We stress the need to develop new diagnostic tools to meet current challenges in the fight against YF

Interim CDC findings

"This interim report of a CDC study provides information about formaldehyde levels in a random sample of FEMA-supplied occupied travel trailers, park models, and mobile homes still being used as of December 2007 and January 2008 as temporary shelter for residents of the U.S. Gulf Coast region displaced by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Additional analyses on this study; and additional peer review of the study, its results, and conclusions; are ongoing. A final report on this study will be published in the spring 2008. In addition, other studies related to the health of persons displaced by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and to formaldehyde levels in travel trailers, park models, and mobile homes are ongoing. However, this interim report suggests that formaldehyde levels in many of the travel trailers, park models, and mobile homes (geometric mean 77 parts per billion [ppb] across all types with many levels higher than this average) are higher than typical U.S. background levels (e.g., approximately 10-30 ppb in indoor air). Therefore, actions should be taken now to limit further exposures to residents. (For specific information, see the report sections below on recommendations to residents and recommendations to public officials).""February 29, 2008"Running title: Interim CDC findings--formaldehyde levels in FEMA-supplied travel trailers, park models, and mobile homesAvailable on the internet as an Acrobat .pdf file (180 KB, 21 p.)

Fact book 2000/2001

Describes key indicators used in measuring the nation's health status, current health concerns of the public, and the organization and activites of CDC in the years 2000/01.Vision statement -- MIssion -- Profile of the nation's health -- Health concerns of recent interest to the public -- CDC's partners in prevention -- CDC organization for prevention -- CDC FY 2001 budget -- Brief history of CDC."September 2000.

CDC HIV prevention strategic plan: extended through 2010

"This plan extends the HIV Prevention Strategic Plan Through 2005 (2001 Plan) published by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in January 2001. The short-term goal, milestones, and accompanying objectives are based on general and specific recommendations from the CDC and HRSA Advisory Committee on HIV and STD Prevention and Treatment (CHAC), formerly known as the Advisory Committee for HIV and STD Prevention. The HIV Prevention Strategic Plan: Extended Through 2010 ( Extended Plan), which will serve as CDC's strategic guide for HIV prevention through 2010, includes a short-term goal of reducing new HIV infections by 5 percent per year or at least 10 percent by the end of 2010. To achieve this goal, the Extended Plan includes an expanded set of objectives and performance indicators that make priorities more explicit and ensure that key issues are effectively addressed. Twelve new objectives have been added, 20 existing objectives have been modified, and one objective was deleted (42 objectives total, compared to 27 in the 2001 Plan). The Extended Plan also incorporates 17 additional performance indicators (25 total, compared to 11 previously)." p. 2-3Introduction -- Background of the CDC HIV Prevention Strategic Plan, 2001-2005 -- CDC Activities to Implement the 2001-2005 HIV Prevention Strategic Plan -- CHAC Strategic Plan Workgroup -- CDC Response to CHAC Recommendations and Major Considerations of the Plan -- Looking Ahead: The Future of HIV Prevention Strategic Planning at CDC -- Goals and Objectives of the CDC HIV Prevention Strategic Plan: Extended Through 2010 -- HIV Prevention Strategic Plan Performance Indicators -- Appendix 1 : November 2006 CHAC Meeting Minutes -- Appendix 2 : List of CHAC Strategic Plan Workgroup Members -- Appendix 3 - CDC Summary Report of Activities Addressing Plan (submitted to CHAC) -- Appendix 4 : Draft Report from CHAC Strategic Plan WorkgroupTitle from cover."October 2007"Also available via the World Wide Web

Procedures for protection of human research participants

This manual of procedures applies to all research involving human participants conducted by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)2 or funded in whole or in part by CDC. (1) This includes research conducted by CDC employees, either directly through grants, cooperative agreements or contracts, or in collaboration with outside parties. (2) It also includes research conducted or funded by CDC outside the United States. The Office for Protection from Research Risks (OPRR), National Institutes of Health, is responsible for overseeing the implementation of the Federal Policy (Common Rule for protecting human subjects) throughout the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). CDC has provided written assurance to OPRR that it will comply with this policy codified at Title 45, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 46. CDC's Multiple Project Assurance (MPA) contains a detailed description of applicability, principles, CDC policy, responsibilities of CDC staff, and Institutional Review Board (IRB) structure, membership requirements, authorities and responsibilities, and procedures.Assurance -- Institutional responsibilities -- Special populations -- Research involving Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulated products -- Establishment and composition of CDC's IRBs -- Conflict of interest -- IRB meetings -- IRB actions on research protocols -- Appeal of IRB actions -- Reporting of adverse events -- IRB records management -- Protocol handling -- Expedited review -- Suspensions or terminations -- Exempt research -- Cooperative research -- Noncompliance by an investigator -- Noncompliance by an IRB -- ReferencesOctober 1997.Also available via the World Wide Web as an Acrobat .pdf file (118.95 KB, 44 p.).Includes bibliographical references (p. 42)

Endemic, Notifiable Bioterrorism-Related Diseases, United States, 1992–1999

Little information is available in the United States regarding the incidence and distribution of diseases caused by critical microbiologic agents with the potential for use in acts of terrorism. We describe disease-specific, demographic, geographic, and seasonal distribution of selected bioterrorism-related conditions (anthrax, botulism, brucellosis, cholera, plague, tularemia, and viral encephalitides) reported to the National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System in 1992–1999. Tularemia and brucellosis were the most frequently reported diseases. Anthrax, plague, western equine encephalitis, and eastern equine encephalitis were rare. Higher incidence rates for cholera and plague were noted in the western United States and for tularemia in the central United States. Overall, the incidence of conditions caused by these critical agents in the United States is low. Individual case reports should be considered sentinel events. For potential bioterrorism-related conditions that are endemic and have low incidence, the use of nontraditional surveillance methods and complementary data sources may enhance our ability to rapidly detect changes in disease incidence

Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Surveillance for Severe Illness and Response, New York, New York, USA, April–July 2009

Health departments need the capacity to rapidly expand and modify surveillance during a changing outbreak