The Conservatives and the Union: The 'New English Toryism' and the Origins of Anglo-Britishness

The Union has for over a century been one of the cornerstones of Conservative politics, but with the changes to the old union state in the last 20 years, its value has been increasingly questioned. While the Conservative Party remains committed to maintaining the Union, a new English Toryism is emerging, which has a strong continuity with an older English Toryism which was partially buried by the ascendancy of Unionism. English Tories have always considered the Union to be desirable, but it comes second in their thinking to the need to protect the sovereignty of the British state, the core of which is England and its traditional institutions. What is new about the contemporary Conservative Party is that there is within it the revival of an English Toryism which is happy to discard the older clothes of Empire and Union once so important to Conservative identity and which is unabashedly English in its focus. For an increasing number of contemporary Conservatives, there no longer seems to be any passion about defending the Union or even of continuing to think about the United Kingdom in Unionist terms

'This is what democracy looks like' : New Labour's blind spot and peripheral vision

New Labour in government since 1997 has been roundly criticized for not possessing a clear, coherent and consistent democratic vision. The absence of such a grand vision has resulted, from this critical perspective, in an absence of 'joined-up' thinking about democracy in an evolving multi-level state. Tensions have been all too apparent between the government's desire to exert central direction - manifested in its most pathological form as 'control freakery' - and its democratising initiatives derived from 'third-way' obsessions with 'decentralising', 'empowering' and 'enabling'. The purpose of this article is to examine why New Labour displayed such apparently impaired democratic vision and why it appeared incapable of conceiving of democratic reform 'in the round'. This article seeks to explain these apparent paradoxes, however, through utilising the notion of 'macular degeneration'. In this analysis, the perceived democratic blind spot of New Labour at Westminster is connected to a democratic peripheral vision, which has envisaged innovative participatory and decentred initiatives in governance beyond Westminster

Instances and connectors : issues for a second generation process language

This work is supported by UK EPSRC grants GR/L34433 and GR/L32699Over the past decade a variety of process languages have been defined, used and evaluated. It is now possible to consider second generation languages based on this experience. Rather than develop a second generation wish list this position paper explores two issues: instances and connectors. Instances relate to the relationship between a process model as a description and the, possibly multiple, enacting instances which are created from it. Connectors refers to the issue of concurrency control and achieving a higher level of abstraction in how parts of a model interact. We believe that these issues are key to developing systems which can effectively support business processes, and that they have not received sufficient attention within the process modelling community. Through exploring these issues we also illustrate our approach to designing a second generation process language.Postprin

Patterns of democracy: Coalition governance and majoritarian modification in the United Kingdom, 2010–2015

The UK is often regarded as the archetype of Westminster democracy and as the empirical antithesis of the power-sharing coalitions of Western Europe. Yet, in recent years a different account has emerged that focuses on the subtler institutional dynamics which limit the executive. It is to this body of scholarship that this article responds, locating the recent chapter of coalition government within the wider context of the UK’s democratic evolution. To do so, the article draws Lijphart’s two-dimensional typology of democracies, developing a refined framework that enables systematic comparison over time. The article demonstrates that between over the course of the 2010-15 Parliament, the UK underwent another period of majoritarian modification, driven by factors including the long-term influence of the constitutional forces unleashed under Labour and the short-term impact of coalition management. The article makes several important contributions, salient in the UK and beyond. Theoretically, it offers a critical rejoinder to debates regarding the relationship between institutional design and democratic performance. Methodologically, it demonstrates that the tools of large-scale comparison can be effectively scaled-down to facilitate withincase analysis. Empirically, it provides a series of conclusions regarding the tenability of the UK’s extant democratic architecture under the weight of pressures to which it continues to be subject

Constitutional patriotism

Constitutional patriotism is a political theory that seeks to provide an explanation for the sense of ownership that most individuals have towards their national constitutional system. Specifically, constitutional patriotism assumes that free-thinking individuals involved in a discussion over the common good will reach an agreement that is perceived, at least by those involved in the debate, as having normative value. The awareness that such a deliberative process has historically been a part of the constitutional system also induces a sense of ownership of past historical accommodations of constitutional principles. The shared perception of being part of historically grounded institutions within a deliberative democracy is sometimes called the ‘normative surplus effect’ or ‘normative spill-over effect’ of the deliberative process. The theory, in its current form, was proposed by Jürgen Habermas and Jean-Werner Müller. Debates over the common good might take place informally or within the state’s institutions. Pell-mell informal debates, with few exceptions, have a limited effect on amending constitutional norms. Yet, the prerogative to openly discuss laws and policies legitimised by constitutional norms is normally sufficient to develop an inner sense of belonging to a constitutional system. Deliberative debates within public institutions (e.g. parliaments and courts) are more likely to change the functioning of a constitutional system, but they are, by way of comparison to informal political discussions, normally constrained by the system of rules that regulate representative democracy and the administration of justice. Thus, the theory of constitutional patriotism provides an explanatory model for the historical development of a democratic constitutional system. As one of the most persuasive explanatory theories of modern pluralist democracy, constitutional patriotism has attracted a series of well-articulated critiques. It has been suggested, for instance, that constitutional patriotism might not provide a plausible model of social integration for international organisations such as the European Union (EU). In this essay, I will provide an overview of the theory and a selection of its critiques