Scatterometer Data Analysis program Final report, 1 Jun. 1968 - 31 May 1969

Evaluation and processing of scatterometer data for use in NASA Earth Resources Progra

Solutions of Schr\"odinger Equation with Generalized Inverted Hyperbolic Potential

We present the bound state solutions of the Schr\"odinger equation with generalized inverted hyperbolic potential using the Nikiforov-Uvarov method. We obtain the energy spectrum and the wave function with this potential for arbitrary - state. We show that the results of this potential reduced to the standard known potentials - Rosen-Morse, Poschl - Teller and Scarf potential as special cases. We also discussed the energy equation and the wave function for these special cases.Comment: 20pages, 5figure

The Private Military company-Unravelling the Theoretical, Legal & regulatory Mosaic

Our economic analysis has disclosed the fact that it is only the interests of competing cliques of business men-investors, contractors, export manufacturers, and certain professional classes-that are antagonistic; that these cliques, usurping the authority and voice of the people, use the public resources to push their private interests, and spend the blood and money of the people in this vast and disastrous military game, feigning national antagonisms which have no basis in reality. \u2

Consumer-Producer Interaction: A Strategic Analysis of the Market for Customized Products

This paper focuses on the process by which consumers and producers interact to create better value for consumers. This happens in many situations but is arguably most prominent in mass-customization, an area that has recently gained a lot of popularity among manufacturers (Business Week, March 20, 2000). In terms of communications, such interaction entails a shift from the one-way communication (usually from seller to buyer) of traditional markets, to a two-way communication. Specifically, potential producers need to elicit preference (and other) information from consumers. They then have to provide a product that correctly incorporates such information. This brings up many strategic issues. In particular, we are interested in answering the following questions: (1) What is the 'economic value' of consumers' information? (2) Are there any strategic implications for producers, if they depend on consumer input and have to pay for consumers' information? (3) In what way does pricing for customized products differ from pricing for similar standardized products? (4) Is the strategic relationship between consumers and producers different in the market for customized goods as compared to more traditional markets? The main contribution of this paper is to bring into focus the issues surrounding mass-customization via an analysis of consumer-producer interaction, which is the facilitating process. This paper is the first attempt in marketing to analytically model this emerging area and should be of interest to academics. Practitioners should be interested in the marketing and strategic perspective on mass-customization that this paper adopts. The trade press has approached mass-customization from a manufacturing/production cost angle, while its marketing implications have largely been left open (Wind and Rangaswamy, 2000). To answer the above questions we build a game-theoretic model, which analyses the interaction between consumers and producers in an agency-theoretic framework. The main features of our model are the following. Consumers vary in their desire for customization, with some consumers having a higher need for and willingness to pay for customized goods. Producers vary in the ability to 'successfully customize' according to consumer specifications. Producers first solicit consumers' suggestions/preferences and attempt to screen consumers who are willing to pay for customized products (stage 1: 'Information market'). They then try to provide a product, which correctly incorporates consumers' input and set prices for such customized products (stage 2: 'Product market'). The main question for consumers at this stage is whether the producer has been able to successfully incorporate their input given in the first stage. We start first with the monopoly case to isolate the strategic issues in consumer-producer interaction. Later we incorporate competition between firms. In the latter case, both the information market (where firms compete for consumers' information) and the product market (where firms compete to sell the final product) come into their own and have interesting interactions. We find that, in equilibrium, firms will pay consumers for their information in the first stage. Intuitively, consumers provide costly input, but any commitment by the firm to provide surplus through a lower price of the product in the second stage, lacks commitment. Moreover, the producer's payment can act as a signal of high quality for the skillful customizer who tries to separate from a 'ghost firm', which cannot customize well. Under monopoly, the price of customized products is the same as that of non-customized products, contrary to common wisdom as reflected in the trade press (Anderson, 1997). Thus, our analyses could explain why some manufacturers find that they cannot charge a premium for customized products (Wind and Rangaswamy, 2000). We find that equilibrium prices of customized products are at the high end of the price range for similar non-customized products, consistent with casual observation.Under duopoly, when firms compete for consumers' information, the prices of customized products are in fact less than the price of non-customized products. This counter-intuitive result occurs because firms try to avoid being heldup by consumers who may withhold purchase, after first getting the firm to produce a very individually tailored product which the firm might not be able to sell to other consumers. Since, first stage competition for information gives consumers a high price for their information, it increases their incentive to holdup the firm. The firm, therefore, has to charge a lower price to induce consumers to purchase the product.Finally, we show that, in the market for customized goods (stage 2), consumers can be better off with less competition between firms. When firms compete in the product market in the second stage, they earn less equilibrium profits. Thus, they compensate consumers less for their information in the first stage, and this may yield consumers less overall utility. This finding could be of interest to manufacturers who increasingly attempt to build deep, long lasting ties with consumers. Often such ties are perceived as conflicting with the consumers' desire to retain the flexibility to compare and opt for the offerings of different producers. Our results suggest that such misalignment of interests need not exist, at least in the market for customized goods

Thermodynamics and Stability of Higher Dimensional Rotating (Kerr) AdS Black Holes

We study the thermodynamic and gravitational stability of Kerr anti-de Sitter black holes in five and higher dimensions. We show, in the case of equal rotation parameters, $a_i=a$, that the Kerr-AdS background metrics become stable, both thermodynamically and gravitationally, when the rotation parameters $a_i$ take values comparable to the AdS curvature radius. In turn, a Kerr-AdS black hole can be in thermal equilibrium with the thermal radiation around it only when the rotation parameters become not significantly smaller than the AdS curvature radius. We also find with equal rotation parameters that a Kerr-AdS black hole is thermodynamically favored against the existence of a thermal AdS space, while the opposite behavior is observed in the case of a single non-zero rotation parameter. The five dimensional case is however different and also special in that there is no high temperature thermal AdS phase regardless of the choice of rotation parameters. We also verify that at fixed entropy, the temperature of a rotating black hole is always bounded above by that of a non-rotating black hole, in four and five dimensions, but not in six and more dimensions (especially, when the entropy approaches zero or the minimum of entropy does not correspond to the minimum of temperature). In this last context, the six dimensional case is marginal.Comment: 15 pages, 23 eps figures, RevTex

Chemotherapy drug regimen optimization using deterministic oscillatory search algorithm

Purpose: To schedule chemotherapy drug delivery using Deterministic Oscillatory Search algorithm, keeping the toxicity level within permissible limits and reducing the number of tumor cells within a predefined time period.Methods: A novel metaheuristic algorithm, deterministic oscillatory search, has been used to optimize the Gompertzian model of the drug regimen problem. The model is tested with fixed (fixed interval variable dose, FIVD) and variable (variable interval variable dose, VIVD) interval schemes and the dosage presented for 52 weeks. In the fixed interval, the treatment plan is fixed in such a way that doses are given on the first two days of every seven weeks such as day 7, day 14, etc.Results: On comparing the two schemes, FIVD provided a higher reduction in the number of tumor cells by 98 % compared to 87 % by VIVD after the treatment period. Also, a significant reduction in the number was obtained half way through the regimen. The dose level and toxicity are also reduced in the FIVD scheme. The value of drug concentration is more in FIVD scheme (50) compared to VIVD (41); however, it is well within the acceptable limits of concentration. The results proved the effectiveness of the proposed technique in terms of reduced drug concentration, toxicity, tumor size and drug level within a predetermined time period.Conclusion: Artificial intelligent techniques can be used as a tool to aid oncologists in the effective treatment of cancer through chemotherapy.Keywords: Deterministic Oscillatory Search, Chemotherapy scheduling, Drug schedule, Artificial intelligenc

A NOTE ON PUBLIC DEBT-PRIVATE INVESTMENT NEXUS IN EMERGING ECONOMIES

We examine the effect of public debt on private investment in selected emerging economies. Using a panel threshold regression model, we estimate a threshold value of about 3 percent, on average, below which public debt stimulates private investment. Our additional analysis involving selected developed economies suggests that the crowding out effect is less evident relative to the emerging economies as higher public debt stocks do not seem to significantly undermine their private investments. These results have implications for debt sustainability and maintaining a reasonable public debt–GDP ratio is crucial for sustainable investment growth