Carrots and Sticks in Bank Governance: Time for a Bigger Stick?

Purpose — This paper is pre-occupied with how bank governance can be altered to reduce risk taking and engender greater financial stability. Design/methodology/approach — Its approach is to review existing bank governance arrangements, contemporary challenges, and alternative reforms. Findings — It is argued that recent reforms are incomplete. Greater countervailing incentives for bank managers and shareholders are required. This prompts an inquiry into the merits and demerits of four types of reform: changes to executive compensation arrangements; the introduction of a liability standard for directors; the removal of limited liability for bank shareholders; and a criminal offence for managers. Originality/value — Discussion illumines several problems with the current approach to bank governance and provides insights that can help direct future reform

CCPs and network stability in OTC derivatives markets

Among the reforms to OTC derivative markets since the global financial crisis is a commitment to collateralize counterparty exposures and to clear standardized contracts via central counterparties (CCPs). The reforms aim to reduce interconnectedness and improve counterparty risk management in these important markets. At the same time, however, the reforms necessarily concentrate risk in one or a few nodes in the financial network and also increase institutions’ demand for high-quality assets to meet collateral requirements. This paper looks more closely at the implications of increased CCP clearing for both the topology and stability of the financial network. Building on Heath et al. (2013) and Markose (2012), the analysis supports the view that the concentration of risk in CCPs could generate instability if not appropriately managed. Nevertheless, maintaining CCP prefunded financial resources in accordance with international standards and dispersing any unfunded losses widely through the system can limit the potential for a CCP to transmit stress even in very extreme market conditions. The analysis uses the Bank for International Settlements Macroeconomic Assessment Group on Derivatives (MAGD) data set on the derivatives positions of the 41 largest bank participants in global OTC derivative markets in 2012

Are the major global banks now safer? Structural continuities and change in banking and finance since the 2008 crisis

Are the largest banks now safer since the Global Financial Crisis? Focusing on a ‘before’ (2005) and ‘after’ (2015) balance sheet analysis of twenty-one of the largest American, British and European banks, we assess post-crisis banking stability. Much of the literature focuses on post-crisis regulation, but we argue instead the main driver of change since the crisis has been structural conditions in banking and financial markets, particularly high levels of competition, bleak profit and share price conditions, and the largely unsolved too big to fail problem. Older as well as new forms of systemic risk thus prevail and many of the global banks still face major vulnerabilities

Transparency and the Disclosure of Risk Information in the Banking Sector

The essence of any bank is that it is a risktaking enterprise and therefore, as a part of good corporate governance, it is expected that relevant risk-related information will be released to the marketplace. Currently, however, it is suggested that there is insufficient disclosure of risk information by banks and as a consequence Pillar 3 of Basel II lays out a comprehensive framework for risk disclosures with the intention that this will enable stakeholders to assess the risk pro.le of a bank. In addition, one outcome of the UK company law review is that there will be a requirement for all quoted companies to discuss risks and uncertainties within the annual report. This paper analyses these risk disclosure requirements while also reviewing current bank disclosure practices within the context of this risk disclosure debate. The important issues of disclosure of forward-looking risk information, location of disclosure and proprietary risk information are also discussed together with their implications for the proposed disclosure requirements