El movimiento del mundo y el problema del aparecer

This text initially presents the specific movement of Patočka’s a-subjective phenomenology, itself based on his critique of the subjectivist version of the Appearing. Subsequently a phenomenological dynamic comes to light, which understands the manifestation as the very world’s work. In this way, the phenomenological’s fate is inflected by the formulation of the universal a priori of correlation that stipulates the universality of an anonymous manifestation. Finally, phenomenology is perceived as a certain cosmology which will commit us to rethink of a new meaning for the subject’s being and of the world’s being from an asubjective’s conception of the AppearingEste texto presenta en un primer momento el movimiento propio de la fenomenología a-subjetiva de Patočka a partir de su crítica de la versión subjetivista del aparecer, para así posteriormente mostrar una dinámica fenomenológica que comprende la manifestación como la obra misma del mundo. En este sentido, el destino de la fenomenología se trasciende en la elaboración del a priori universal de la correlación que estipula la universalidad de una manifestación anónima. Es así que finalmente la fenomenología se modifica en una cierta cosmología que nos obligará a repensar una nueva acepción del ser del sujeto y que postula un nuevo sentido de ser del mundo a partir de una concepción asubjetiva del aparecer.This text initially presents the specific movement of Patočka’s a-subjective phenomenology, itself based on his critique of the subjectivist version of the Appearing. Subsequently a phenomenological dynamic comes to light, which understands the manifestation as the very world’s work. In this way, the phenomenological’s fate is inflected by the formulation of the universal a priori of correlation that stipulates the universality of an anonymous manifestation. Finally, phenomenology is perceived as a certain cosmology which will commit us to rethink of a new meaning for the subject’s being and of the world’s being from an asubjective’s conception of the Appearin

La existencia del mundo

The article does not ask the question whether the world exists, but rather questions the meaning of being of the world from Husserl. It explores, from the thought of Patočka and, by difference with Husserl, the possibility of a non-ideal donation of the world which makes it possible to put into question the neorealist approach to the world's existence. It shows the conflict at work in the Husserl of the Ideen 1 between the phenomenology of perception and the phenomenology of reason and asserts the possibility of a chaotic dimension of the world, which is irreducible to a pure cosmos. This conflict proceeds from the intuitionist conception of evidence in Husserl, which opens the way to an alternative: a non-intuitive donation of the world. This thesis, which is inspired by the Merleau-Pontyan conception of the infinite, allows criticizing the realist perspective and asserting the new proposal of an arch-realism of the world.El artículo no se hace la pregunta de si el mundo existe, sino que cuestiona el sentido del ser del mundo desde Husserl y explora, desde el pensamiento de Patočka, y a diferencia de Husserl, la posibilidad de una donación no ideal del mundo que permita poner en cuestión el enfoque neorrealista de la existencia de éste. Se trata de denunciar el conflicto que opera en el Husserl de las Ideen 1, entre la fenomenología de la percepción y la fenomenología de la razón, y de hacer valer la posibilidad de una dimensión caótica del mundo, irreductible a un puro cosmos. En realidad, la crítica de este conflicto, que procede de la concepción intuicionista de la evidencia, abre el camino a la alternativa de una donación no intuitiva del mundo. Esta tesis inspirada en la concepción merleau-pontyana de lo infinito permite criticar la perspectiva realista y hacer valer la novedosa propuesta de un archi-realismo del mundo

A presença do filósofo

O artigo homenageia a obra de Bento Prado Jr, enfatizando a originalidade e o aspecto crítico de sua postura filosófica. Neste sentido, ele analisa a força do conceito de “Presença” – eixo central da tese de doutoramento do autor, publicada sob o título Presença e campo transcendental –, capaz de desenhar de maneira inédita um ponto de convergência entre as filosofias de Bergson, Sartre e Merleau-Ponty.This paper pays tribute to the Bento Prado’s work, stressing the originality and the critical aspect of his philosophical posture. In this sense, it analyses the strength of the concept of “Presence” – central axis of the author’s doctoral thesis, published with the title Presence and transcendental field – which is able to design in an unheard-of manner a point of convergence between the philosophies of Bergson, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty

L'ambiguïté du monde

Mon interrogation portera sur le statut et la place de la perspective cosmologique chez Patočka, plus précisément sur son aptitude à rendre compte de la phénoménalité dans la plénitude de son sens, à savoir à la fois comme phénoménalité anonyme du monde et ce que je nommerai phénoménalité secondaire, qui renvoie à l’apparaître à un sujet, ou encore à l’apparaître comme tel. Ce qui est en question n’est donc autre que la possibilité de penser la subjectivation dans un cadre strictement cosmolo..

Dinâmica da manifestação

L’a priori universel de la corrélation entre l’étant transcendant et ses modes de donnée subjectifs dessine le cadre minimal de toute démarche qui se revendique de la phénoménologie. L’objet propre de celle-ci est alors de caractériser à la fois la nature exacte de la corrélation et le sens d’être des termes en relation, à savoir du sujet et du monde. Il s’agit de montrer qu’une analyse rigoureuse de la corrélation se déploie nécessairement à trois niveaux et que la phénoménologie est ainsi vouée à se dépasser elle-même vers une cosmologie et une métaphysique. La corrélation phénoménologique, dont on établit qu’elle est en son fond relation d’un sujet qui est désir et d’un monde qui est profondeur, suppose leur appartenance commune à une physis, dont la description relève d’une cosmologie. Mais la différence du sujet, sans laquelle il n’y a pas de corrélation, renvoie elle-même à une scission, plus originaire encore, qui affecte le procès même de la manifestation et ouvre l’espace d’une métaphysique. Nous montrons donc que la phénoménologie s’accomplit sous la forme d’une dynamique générale de la manifestation, pour autant qu’elle est nécessairement conduite à penser le mouvement sous la triple figure du désir qui traverse notre existence, de l’archi-mouvement de la manifestation et de l’archi-événement de la scission qui l’affecteO a priori universal da correlação entre o ente transcendente e seus modos subjetivos de doação desenha o quadro mínimo de qualquer abordagem que se reivindique fenomenológica. Seu objetivo próprio é, então, caracterizar ao mesmo tempo a natureza exata da relação e o sentido de ser dos termos em relação, a saber, do sujeito e do mundo. Trata-se de mostrar que uma análise rigorosa da correlação necessariamente se desdobra em três níveis e que a fenomenologia está, assim, destinada a ultrapassar-se a si mesma em direção a uma cosmologia e a uma metafísica. A correlação fenomenológica, a qual se estabelece como sendo, no fundo, a relação entre um sujeito que é desejo e um mundo que é profundidade, supõe sua filiação comum a uma physis, cuja descrição depende de uma cosmologia. Mas a diferença do sujeito, sem a qual não há correlação, remete ela própria a uma cisão, ainda mais originária, a qual afeta o processo mesmo da manifestação e abre espaço a uma metafísica. Nós mostramos, portanto, que a fenomenologia se realiza sob a forma de uma dinâmica geral da manifestação, na medida em que ela é necessariamente conduzida a pensar o movimento sob a tripla figura do desejo que atravessa nossa existência, do arquimovimento da manifestação e do arquievento da cisão que o afeta

L’Erôs et la désublimation du désir

L’Erôs est traditionnellement considéré comme relevant du registre de l’affectivité, lui-même opposé à celui de la connaissance en son sens le plus large. Cela signifie que si l’Erôs enveloppe bien un rapport à un autre, néanmoins, il ne dévoile rien, ne fait rien connaître par lui-même. Il suppose au contraire que son objet soit déjà donné afin de pouvoir se rapporter à lui ; il appelle un voir préalable comme la condition de son désir. C’est ce que Husserl lui-même résumait à travers l’affi..

Merleau-Ponty y la psicología de la forma

On the basis of the relationship Merleau- Ponty establishes with Gestalt psychology, I seek to provide an interpretation his phenomenology as an ontological reading of the notion of form. Therefore, I claim that Merleau-Ponty is able, not only to develop an alternative to Husserl’s phenomenology, but also to elaborate his own idea of Being; in addition, he can offer a new understanding of the Heidegger's ontological difference. From a phenomenological description of perceptive experience, and starting with the notions of behavior, form and structure, I will then show the sense of being mobilized by a philosophy of form. This sense of being implies a projection of a thinking of phenomenality's radical belonging to the existence and, also, renewal of a genetic phenomenology that considers the whole of transcendental consciousness within the framework of an originary facticityA partir del análisis de la relación de Merleau-Ponty con la psicología de la forma, se intenta dar una lectura de su fenomenología como una lectura ontológica de la forma. De este modo, Merleau-Ponty no solo puede pensar una alternativa a la fenomenología de Husserl, sino que le permite elaborar su propia idea de Ser y dar una nueva interpretación de la diferencia ontológica de Heidegger. Desde una descripción fenomenológica de la experiencia perceptiva, a partir de las nociones de comportamiento, forma y estructura, se mostrará enseguida el sentido de ser que moviliza una filosofía de la forma que implicará proyectar un pensamiento de una pertenencia radical de la fenomenalidad a la existencia, y además renovar el sentido de una fenomenología genética que considera toda conciencia trascendental en el marco de una facticidad originaria.On the basis of the relationship Merleau- Ponty establishes with Gestalt psychology, I seek to provide an interpretation his phenomenology as an ontological reading of the notion of form. Therefore, I claim that Merleau-Ponty is able, not only to develop an alternative to Husserl’s phenomenology, but also to elaborate his own idea of Being; in addition, he can offer a new understanding of the Heidegger's ontological difference. From a phenomenological description of perceptive experience, and starting with the notions of behavior, form and structure, I will then show the sense of being mobilized by a philosophy of form. This sense of being implies a projection of a thinking of phenomenality's radical belonging to the existence and, also, renewal of a genetic phenomenology that considers the whole of transcendental consciousness within the framework of an originary facticit

La phénoménologie et le concept de vie: Un entretien avec Renaud Barbaras

Interview with Renaud Barbaras, conducted on May 18, 2011

On the motivations for Merleau-Ponty’s ontological research

This paper attempts to clarify Merleau-Ponty’s later work by tracing a hitherto overlooked set of concerns that were of key consequence for the formulation of his ontological research. I argue that his ontology can be understood as a response to a set of problems originating in reflections on the intersubjective use of language in dialogue, undertaken in the early 1950s. His study of dialogue disclosed a structure of meaning-formation and pointed towards a theory of truth (both recurring ontological topics) that post-Phenomenology premises could not account for. A study of dialogue shows that speakers’ positions are interchangeable, that speaking subjects are active and passive in varying degrees, and that the intentional roles of subjects and objects are liable to shift or ‘transgress’ themselves. These observations anticipate the concepts of ‘reversibility’ and ‘narcissism’, his later view of activity and passivity, and his later view of intentionality, and sharpened the need to adopt an intersubjective focus in ontological research