Perspectives of the european academic research in the microwave..

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Regular Population Monotonic Allocation Schemes and the Core

A subclass of games with population monotonic allocation schemes is studied, namely games with regular population monotonic allocation schemes (rpmas). We focus on the properties of these games and we prove the coincidence between the core and both the Davis-Maschler bargaining set and the Mas-Colell bargaining set.rpmas, bargaining set, pmas, tu-game

Closed-Form Solution for a Two-Sector Endogenous Growth Model with two Controls

In this paper we show a method for solving in closed form a particular family of four-dimension non-linear modified Hamiltonian dynamic systems, with two states and two co-states and two co-states, which arises from a two-sector endogenous growth model where the physical capital stock is combined with a renewable natural capital stock as essential inputs for productionNon-Linear Dynamic System, Analytical Solution, Endogenous Growth, Transitional Dynamics

The proportional distribution in a cooperative model with external opportunities

[cat] En aquest article es considera un problema de cooperació entre agents on cada agent realitza una contribució (diners, capital, treball, esforç) per tal d'obtenir un benefici comú a repartir. El repartiment proporcional respecte a les contribucions és una distribució que pertany al nucli del joc cooperatiu associat. A partir d'aquest model bàsic s'introdueix un agent extern que pot realitzar una determinada aportació que serveix per avaluar el potencial benefici de cada subcoalició d'agents si aquest nou agent finalment entrés. Aquesta anàlisi pot produir que el poder relatiu dels agents hagi variat. en concret s'avalua si la distribució proporcional és encara robusta des del punt de vista de la seva pertinença al conjunt de negociació. Amb aquest objectiu, analitzem el problema utilitzant el model de joc cooperatius amb estructura de coalició. Donat que, en general, la distribució proporcional, no pertany al conjunt de negociació, s'estudia una condició suficient per a que així sigui. També enunciem una condició necessària, i finalment es proposa una condició suficient que garanteix que el repartiment proporcional és la única distribució existent dins del conjunt de negociació.[eng] We study a cooperative problem where agents contribute a certain amount of money or capital in order to obtain a surplus. The proportional distribution with respect to the contributions of players is a core element of the cooperative game associated. Within this basic model, an external agent is introduced in order to evaluate the potential profit of every subcoalition of agents in the case this new agent enters. This analysis can produce that the relative bargaining power of agents may be modified. In particular, we evaluate whether the proportional distribution is still a robust proposal from the point of view of the bargaining set of a cooperative game with coalition structure (Davis and Maschler, 1963). Since, in general, the proportional distribution fails to be a bargaining set element of this game, a sufficient condition for the proportional allocation to belong to the bargaining is stated. A necessary condition is also analysed. Finally, we state a sufficient condition that guarantees the proportional distribution to be the unique element of the bargaining set of the associated game with coalition structure

Non Catastrophic Endogenous Growth with Pollution and Abatment

When there are pollution externalities the competitive equilibrium is not Pareto-optimal nor environmentally sustainable even if abatment activities are endogenously decided. In this paper we introduce the possibility of an ecological catastrophe like the one predicted by the global climate change, imposing the constraint of an upper-limit to the pollutants stock. We characterize this socially optimal soclution and study conditions for the sustainability of the balanced growth path. We find a trade-off between environmental quality and growth. The rate of growth depends negatively on the weight of environmental care in the utility function and positively on the population growth rate. We show that the emissions reduction recommended in the Kioto protocol is an appropriate policy to avoid the ecological catastrophe and ensure global efficiency and positive long-run growth.Environment; Externalities; Optimal Growth, Ecological Catastrophe; Sustainability

RCS of engine inlets by a spectral iterative technique

A novel algorithm designed to compute efficiently and accurately the HF electromagnetic scattering from open-ended waveguide cavities is presented. The cavity is converted into a stepped-waveguide model so that the field spectrums are propagated, forward and backward, along each waveguide section. As boundary conditions for perfect electric conductors are applied via image theory, they are of local nature and take into account only the first order interactions between each pair of waveguide sections. Accordingly, additional forward-backward iterations must be performed if multiple interactions are to be taken into account. Finally, the RCS due to the interior irradiation is calculated by a Kirchhoff-based aperture integral. Good agreement with Method of Moments and Hybrid Modal solutions is found, as well as with experimental data, for 2-D and 3-D cavities.Peer ReviewedPostprint (published version

Demographic Transition Environmental Concern and the Kuznets Curve

In an endogenous growth model with pollution and abatement we characterize the socially optimal solution. We find that the rate of growth depends negatively on the weight of environmental care in utility and positively on the population growth rate. We also find a trade-off between growth and environmental quality beyond which an environmental Kuznets curve is derived in the long term. This one emerges from the implications of the demographic transition for the rate of population growth, and the accompanying variation in the willingness to pay for environmental quality as the economy develops.Optimal Growth; Environment; Population Growth; Preferences

Sequential decisions in allocation problems

In the context of cooperative TU-games, and given an order of players, we consider the problem of distributing the worth of the grand coalition as a sequential decision problem. In each step of the process, upper and lower bounds for the payoff of the players are required related to successive reduced games. Sequentially compatible payoffs are defined as those allocation vectors that meet these recursive bounds. The core of the game is reinterpreted as a set of sequentially compatible payoffs when the Davis-Maschler reduced game is considered (Th.1). Independently of the reduction, the core turns out to be the intersection of the family of the sets of sequentially compatible payoffs corresponding to the different possible orderings (Th.2), so it is in some sense order-independent. Finally, we analyze advantageous properties for the first player.core, reduced game, sequential allocation, tu-game

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