2,271 research outputs found

    The Combinatorial World (of Auctions) According to GARP

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    Revealed preference techniques are used to test whether a data set is compatible with rational behaviour. They are also incorporated as constraints in mechanism design to encourage truthful behaviour in applications such as combinatorial auctions. In the auction setting, we present an efficient combinatorial algorithm to find a virtual valuation function with the optimal (additive) rationality guarantee. Moreover, we show that there exists such a valuation function that both is individually rational and is minimum (that is, it is component-wise dominated by any other individually rational, virtual valuation function that approximately fits the data). Similarly, given upper bound constraints on the valuation function, we show how to fit the maximum virtual valuation function with the optimal additive rationality guarantee. In practice, revealed preference bidding constraints are very demanding. We explain how approximate rationality can be used to create relaxed revealed preference constraints in an auction. We then show how combinatorial methods can be used to implement these relaxed constraints. Worst/best-case welfare guarantees that result from the use of such mechanisms can be quantified via the minimum/maximum virtual valuation function

    Budget feasible mechanisms on matroids

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    Motivated by many practical applications, in this paper we study budget feasible mechanisms where the goal is to procure independent sets from matroids. More specifically, we are given a matroid =(,) where each ground (indivisible) element is a selfish agent. The cost of each element (i.e., for selling the item or performing a service) is only known to the element itself. There is a buyer with a budget having additive valuations over the set of elements E. The goal is to design an incentive compatible (truthful) budget feasible mechanism which procures an independent set of the matroid under the given budget that yields the largest value possible to the buyer. Our result is a deterministic, polynomial-time, individually rational, truthful and budget feasible mechanism with 4-approximation to the optimal independent set. Then, we extend our mechanism to the setting of matroid intersections in which the goal is to procure common independent sets from multiple matroids. We show that, given a polynomial time deterministic blackbox that returns -approximation solutions to the matroid intersection problem, there exists a deterministic, polynomial time, individually rational, truthful and budget feasible mechanism with (3+1) -approximation to the optimal common independent set

    Webteaching: sequencing of subject matter in relation to prior knowledge of pupils

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    Two experiments are discussed in which the sequencing procedure of webteaching is compared with a linear sequence for the presentation of text material.\ud \ud In the first experiment variations in the level of prior knowledge of pupils were studied for their influence on the sequencing mode of text presentation. Prior knowledge greatly reduced the effect of the size of sequencing procedures.\ud \ud In the second experiment pupils with a low level of prior knowledge studied a text, following either a websequence or a linear sequence. Webteaching was superior to linear teaching on a number of dependent variables. It is concluded that webteaching is an effective sequencing procedure in those cases where substantial new learning is required

    Parameterized Supply Function Bidding: Equilibrium and Efficiency

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    We consider a model where a finite number of producers compete to meet an infinitely divisible but inelastic demand for a product. Each firm is characterized by a production cost that is convex in the output produced, and firms act as profit maximizers. We consider a uniform price market design that uses supply function bidding: firms declare the amount they would supply at any positive price, and a single price is chosen to clear the market. We are interested in evaluating the impact of price-anticipating behavior both on the allocative efficiency of the market and on the prices seen at equilibrium. We show that by restricting the strategy space of the firms to parameterized supply functions, we can provide upper bounds on both the inflation of aggregate cost at the Nash equilibrium relative to the socially optimal level, as well as the markup of the Nash equilibrium price above the competitive level: as long as N > 2 firms are competing, these quantities are both upper bounded by 1 + 1/(N − 2). This result holds even in the presence of asymmetric cost structure across firms. We also discuss several extensions, generalizations, and related issues.National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Graduate Research Fellowship)National Science Foundation (U.S.) (grant ECS-0312921

    Gerir a diversidade: contributos da aprendizagem cooperativa para a construção de salas de aula inclusivas

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    The action-research we have held at the primary education, in a school placed near the town of Tomar, in 2009-2010, under the master's degree in Special Education, was the starting point for writing this article. The research had as main objective to promote the successful learning of a heterogeneous group of students, where a child considered with longstanding special educational needs is included – diagnosis of galactosaemia and cognitive impairment. Starting from the educational context of a particular classroom of 2nd and 3rd grades, where we were working as special education teacher, we had created an inclusive learning environment for each student in the class. Through effective collaboration between fellow teachers, we generated changes in methodologies, breaking with some traditional practices in the classroom, when regular teachers and special education are in the same learning space. By a systematic implementation of cooperative learning strategies among students, and applying qualitative data gathering techniques of research, before and after the intervention – interview, naturalistic observation, sociometry and documental research –, we have increased the quality and quantity of learning and promoted another way of ‘looking to’ the difference

    The role of TcdB and TccC subunits in secretion of the photorhabdus Tcd toxin complex

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    The Toxin Complex (TC) is a large multi-subunit toxin encoded by a range of bacterial pathogens. The best-characterized examples are from the insect pathogens Photorhabdus, Xenorhabdus and Yersinia. They consist of three large protein subunits, designated A, B and C that assemble in a 5:1:1 stoichiometry. Oral toxicity to a range of insects means that some have the potential to be developed as pest control technology. The three subunit proteins do not encode any recognisable export sequences and as such little progress has been made in understanding their secretion. We have developed heterologous TC production and secretion models in E. coli and used them to ascribe functions to different domains of the crucial B+C sub-complex. We have determined that the B and C subunits use a secretion mechanism that is either encoded by the proteins themselves or employ an as yet undefined system common to laboratory strains of E. coli. We demonstrate that both the N-terminal domains of the B and C subunits are required for secretion of the whole complex. We propose a model whereby the N-terminus of the C-subunit toxin exports the B+C sub-complex across the inner membrane while that of the B-subunit allows passage across the outer membrane. We also demonstrate that even in the absence of the B-subunit, that the C-subunit can also facilitate secretion of the larger A-subunit. The recognition of this novel export system is likely to be of importance to future protein secretion studies. Finally, the identification of homologues of B and C subunits in diverse bacterial pathogens, including Burkholderia and Pseudomonas, suggests that these toxins are likely to be important in a range of different hosts, including man

    The merger of vertically offset quasi-geostrophic vortices

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    We examine the critical merging distance between two equal-volume, equal-potential-vorticity quasi-geostrophic vortices. We focus on how this distance depends on the vertical offset between the two vortices, each having a unit mean height-to-width aspect ratio. The vertical direction is special in the quasi-geostrophic model (used to capture the leading-order dynamical features of stably stratified and rapidly rotating geophysical flows) since vertical advection is absent. Nevertheless vortex merger may still occur by horizontal advection. In this paper, we first investigate the equilibrium states for the two vortices as a function of their vertical and horizontal separation. We examine their basic properties together with their linear stability. These findings are next compared to numerical simulations of the nonlinear evolution of two spheres of potential vorticity. Three different regimes of interaction are identified, depending on the vertical offset. For a small offset, the interaction differs little from the case when the two vortices are horizontally aligned. On the other hand, when the vertical offset is comparable to the mean vortex radius, strong interaction occurs for greater horizontal gaps than in the horizontally aligned case, and therefore at significantly greater full separation distances. This perhaps surprising result is consistent with the linear stability analysis and appears to be a consequence of the anisotropy of the quasi-geostrophic equations. Finally, for large vertical offsets, vortex merger results in the formation of a metastable tilted dumbbell vortex.Publisher PDFPeer reviewe
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