How do markets manage water resources?. An experiment on resource market (de) centralization with endogenous quality.

We test how a monopoly, a duopoly and a public monopoly manage and allocate water resources. Stock depletion for the public monopoly is fastest. However, it reaches the optimal stock level towards the end of the experimental sessions. The private monopoly and duopoly maintain inefficiently high levels of stock throughout the sessions. The average quality to price ratio offered by the public monopoly is substantially higher than that offered by the private monopoly or duopoly. A clear result from the experiments is that a public monopoly offers the highest (average) quality to price ratio and has the fastest rate of stock depletion compared to a private monopoly or duopoly

Monopolistic product line competition with ex post consumer heterogeneity

We model monopolistic competition in product lines, assuming that consumer heterogeneity is the result rather than the cause of product variety. Our results contradict some well-known policy implications yielded by the standard monopolistic competition framework

Good and bad increases in ecological awareness: environmental differentiation revisited

We analyze a vertically differentiated market, assuming that conventional and green firms’ products have different impacts on the environment. Heterogeneous consumers choose to be supplied by a conventional or a green firm, depending on their extra willingness to pay for a green product and the relative prices of the products in the market. We show that environmental awareness campaigns may have a negative impact on total welfare. This possibility is shown to exist without consumer misperceptions about the quality of green products and ruling out changes in the coverage and the structure of the market. Surprisingly, both conventional and green firms may benefit from heterogeneity-enhancing awareness campaigns, while social welfare is more likely to be enhanced by heterogeneity-reducing ones

ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR BY SINGLE-PRODUCT AND MULTIPRODUCT PRICE SETTING FIRMS IN EXPERIMENTAL MARKETS

Using data obtained from experiments reported in García-Gallego (1998) and García- Gallego and Georgantzís (2001), we estimate a simple model of adaptive behavior which could describe pricing in a market whose demand conditions are unknown to the firms. Divergence between the limit of observed prices over time and theoretical predictions concerning multiproduct firms could be partially explained as a result of learning limitations associated with multiple task-oriented problem solving. However, optimal multiproduct pricing requires that subjects use two different kinds of rules: one concerning responses to prices charged by other players and another concerning pricing of own products. Even in a simple environment like the one studied here, subjects seem to be far more successful in learning a number than learning a rule.Adaptive Learning, Experimental Oligopoly, Multiproduct Firms.

El liderazgo upstream vs. downstream en la determinación de la estructura vertical de mercado

En un modelo en el que dos marcas diferenciadas verticalmente pueden ser distribuidas por hasta dos minoristas potencialmente diferenciados, estudiamos la estructura distributiva del mercado en equilibrio resultante de la decisión de los minoristas o los productores. En términos de bienestar social, las estructuras de distribución de equilibrio decididas por los productores dominan débilmente a las resultantes de decisiones de los minoristas. Contrariamente a la preocupación habitual sobre el poder de mercado en el segmento upstream, nuestros resultados sugieren que la elección de la estructura de distribución por parte de minoristas con poder puede, per se, ser la causa de estructuras verticales socialmente ineficientesIn a model in which two vertically differentiated brands can be distributed by up to two potentially differentiated retailers, we study the equilibrium distribution market structure resulting from the decision of retailers or manufacturers. In terms of social welfare, equilibrium distribution structures decided by producers weakly dominate those resulting from retailers’ decisions. Contrary to usual concerns about upstream market power, our results suggest that the choice of the distribution structure by powerful retailers may be, per se, the cause of socially inefficient vertical structure

The SGG risk elicitation task:Implementation and results

We propose a simple task for the elicitation of risk attitudes, initially used in Sabater-Grande and Georgantzís (2002) [SGG], capturing two dimensions of individual decision making: subjects’ average willingness to choose risky projects and their sensitivity towards variations in the return to risk. We report results from a large dataset obtained from the test and discuss regularities and the desirability of its bi-dimensionality when used to explain behaviour in other contexts.Psychometric Tests, Decision-making; Lotteries; Risk aversion.

Mixture and distribution of different water qualities: an experiment on vertical structure in a complex market

We report results from experimental markets in which two different...water are supplied to two types of consumers; households and farmers. In the...studied, we very strategic complexity (and centralization) by varying the...of agents per market. Centralization of information by a multiproduct more (scenario I) improves market preformance with respect to a duopoly...downstream coordinator (scenario 3)succeds in mitigating upstream market...In a complex setup like ours, some centralization on the supply or the de...may enhance market efficiency.Publicad

Rehabilitation and social behavior: Experiments in prison

Despite the economic and social significance of crime reduction and criminals’ rehabilitation, research evaluating the effects of incarceration on behavior is surprisingly scarce. We conduct an experiment with 105 prison inmates and complement it with administrative data in order to explore several aspects of their social behavior. We first perform a comprehensive analysis of behavior in three economic games, finding evidence of discrimination against a sample from outside prison. In addition, our regression analysis reveals that inmates generally become less pro-social towards this out-group the longer they remain incarcerated. Finally, we introduce and evaluate a priming intervention that asks inmates to reflect on their time spent in prison. This intervention has a very sizeable and significant impact, increasing pro-sociality towards the out-group. Hence, a simple, low-cost intervention of this sort can have desirable effects in promoting rehabilitation and integration into social and economic life after release

CULTURAL AND RISK-RELATED DETERMINANTS OF GENDER DIFFERENCES IN ULTIMATUM BARGAINING

We study culture and risk aversion as causes of gender differences in ultimatum bargaining. It has often been conjectured in the literature that gender differences in bargaining experiments are partly due to differences in risky decision making. Using the data obtained from our experimental sessions with Spanish subjects, we are able to disentangle risk-related and genuinely gender-specific effects in ultimatum games framed as salary negotiation between an employer and an employee. First, we confirm the broadly accepted result that women are more risk averse than men. Gender differences in both employer and employee-subjects' behavior remain significant after risk attitudes are accounted for. In fact, we show that the reported gender differences are not because of but rather despite females' higher risk aversion. Gender effects are found to depend also on cultural differences. Greek and Spanish females reject more and offer lower wages than males. British subjects exhibit gender effects only with respect to employee behavior, but the sign of the effect is opposite to that observed in the case of Greece and Spain.Ultimatum bargaining, salaries, gender, risk attitudes, experiments