Developmental differences in the control of action selection by social information

Our everyday actions are often performed in the context of a social interaction. We previously showed that, in adults, selecting an action on the basis of either social or symbolic cues was associated with activations in the fronto-parietal cognitive control network, whereas the presence and use of social versus symbolic cues was in addition associated with activations in the temporal and medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) social brain network. Here we investigated developmental changes in these two networks. Fourteen adults (21–30 years of age) and 14 adolescents (11–16 years) followed instructions to move objects in a set of shelves. Interpretation of the instructions was conditional on the point of view of a visible “director” or the meaning of a symbolic cue (Director Present vs. Director Absent) and the number of potential referent objects in the shelves (3-object vs. 1-object). 3-object trials elicited increased fronto-parietal and temporal activations, with greater left lateral prefrontal cortex and parietal activations in adults than adolescents. Social versus symbolic information led to activations in superior dorsal MPFC, precuneus, and along the superior/middle temporal sulci. Both dorsal MPFC and left temporal clusters exhibited a Director × Object interaction, with greater activation when participants needed to consider the directors' viewpoints. This effect differed with age in dorsal MPFC. Adolescents showed greater activation whenever social information was present, whereas adults showed greater activation only when the directors' viewpoints were relevant to task performance. This study thus shows developmental differences in domain-general and domain-specific PFC activations associated with action selection in a social interaction context

Human-centred explanations for artificial intelligence systems

As Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems increase in capability, so there are growing concerns over the ways in which the recommendations they provide can affect people's everyday life and decisions. The field of Explainable AI (XAI) aims to address such concerns but there is often a neglect of the human in this process. We present a formal definition of human-centred XAI and illustrate the application of this formalism to the design of a user interface. The user interface supports users in indicating their preferences relevant to a situation and to compare their preferences with those of a computer recommendation system. A user trial is conducted to evaluate the resulting user interface. From the user trial, we believe that users are able to appreciate how their preferences can influence computer recommendations, and how these might contrast with the preferences used by the computer. We provide guidelines of implementing human-centred XAI.</p

Task constraints distinguish perspective inferences from perspective use during discourse interpretation in a false belief task

Interpreting other peoples’ actions relies on an understanding of their current mental states (e.g. beliefs, desires and intentions). In this paper, we distinguish between listeners’ ability to infer others’ perspectives and their explicit use of this knowledge to predict subsequent actions. In a visual-world study, two groups of participants (passive observers vs. active participants) watched short videos, depicting transfer events, where one character (‘Jane’) either held a true or false belief about an object’s location. We tracked participants’ eye-movements around the final visual scene, time-locked to related auditory descriptions (e.g. “Jane will look for the chocolates in the container on the left”.). Results showed that active participants had already inferred the character’s belief in the 1 s preview period prior to auditory onset, before it was possible to use this information to predict an outcome. Moreover, they used this inference to correctly anticipate reference to the object’s initial location on false belief trials at the earliest possible point (i.e. from “Jane” onwards). In contrast, passive observers only showed evidence of a belief inference from the onset of “Jane”, and did not show reliable use of this inference to predict Jane’s behaviour on false belief trials until much later, when the location (“left/right”) was auditorily available. These results show that active engagement in a task activates earlier inferences about others’ perspectives, and drives immediate use of this information to anticipate others’ actions, compared to passive observers, who are susceptible to influences from egocentric or reality biases. Finally, we review evidence that using other peoples’ perspectives to predict their behaviour is more cognitively effortful than simply using one’s own

Interacting mindreaders

Could interacting mindreaders be in a position to know things which they would be unable to know if they were manifestly passive observers? This paper argues that they could. Mindreading is sometimes reciprocal: the mindreader's target reciprocates by taking the mindreader as a target for mindreading. The paper explains how such reciprocity can significantly narrow the range of possible interpretations of behaviour where mindreaders are, or appear to be, in a position to interact. A consequence is that revisions and extensions are needed to standard theories of the evidential basis of mindreading. The view also has consequences for understanding how abilities to interact combined with comparatively simple forms of mindreading may explain the emergence, in evolution or development, of sophisticated forms of social cognition

What’s Worth Talking About? Information Theory Reveals How Children Balance Informativeness and Ease of Production

Of all the things we could say, what determines what is worth saying? Greenfield’s principle of informativeness states that, right from the onset of language, humans selectively comment on whatever they find unexpected. We quantify this tendency using information theoretic measures, and test the counterintuitive prediction that children will produce words that are low frequency given the context because these will be most informative. Using corpora of child directed speech, we identified adjectives that varied in how informative (i.e., unexpected) they were given the noun they modified. Three-year-olds (N=31, replication N=13) heard an experimenter use these adjectives to describe pictures. The children’s task was then to describe the pictures to another person. As the information content of the experimenter’s adjective increased, so did children’s tendency to comment on the feature that adjective had encoded. Furthermore, our analyses suggest that children balance this informativeness with a competing drive to ease production

Is It Rational to Assume that Infants Imitate Rationally? A Theoretical Analysis and Critique

It has been suggested that preverbal infants evaluate the efficiency of others' actions (by applying a principle of rational action) and that they imitate others' actions rationally. The present contribution presents a conceptual analysis of the claim that preverbal infants imitate rationally. It shows that this ability rests on at least three assumptions: that infants are able to perceive others' action capabilities, that infants reason about and conceptually represent their own bodies, and that infants are able to think counterfactually. It is argued that none of these three abilities is in place during infancy. Furthermore, it is shown that the idea of a principle of rational action suffers from two fallacies. As a consequence, is it suggested that it is not rational to assume that infants imitate rationally. Copyright (C) 2012 S. Karger AG, Base

Tracking the impact of depression in a perspective-taking task

Research has identified impairments in Theory of Mind (ToM) abilities in depressed patients, particularly in relation to tasks involving empathetic responses and belief reasoning. We aimed to build on this research by exploring the relationship between depressed mood and cognitive ToM, specifically visual perspective-taking ability. High and low depressed participants were eye-tracked as they completed a perspective-taking task, in which they followed the instructions of a ‘director’ to move target objects (e.g. a “teapot with spots on”) around a grid, in the presence of a temporarily-ambiguous competitor object (e.g. a “teapot with stars on”). Importantly, some of the objects in the grid were occluded from the director’s (but not the participant’s) view. Results revealed no group-based difference in participants’ ability to use perspective cues to identify the target object. All participants were faster to select the target object when the competitor was only available to the participant, compared to when the competitor was mutually available to the participant and director. Eye-tracking measures supported this pattern, revealing that perspective directed participants’ visual search immediately upon hearing the ambiguous object’s name (e.g. “teapot”). We discuss how these results fit with previous studies that have shown a negative relationship between depression and ToM