An evaluation of best compromise search in graphs

This work evaluates two different approaches for multicriteria graph search problems using compromise preferences. This approach focuses search on a single solution that represents a balanced tradeoff between objectives, rather than on the whole set of Pareto optimal solutions. We review the main concepts underlying compromise preferences, and two main approaches proposed for their solution in heuristic graph problems: naive Pareto search (NAMOA ), and a k-shortest-path approach (kA ). The performance of both approaches is evaluated on sets of standard bicriterion road map problems. The experiments reveal that the k-shortest-path approach looses effectiveness in favor of naive Pareto search as graph size increases. The reasons for this behavior are analyzed and discussedPartially funded by P07-TIC-03018, Cons. Innovación, Ciencia y Empresa (Junta Andalucía), and Univ. Málaga, Campus Excel. Int. Andalucía Tec

Dynamics of Intrahousehold Bargaining

This paper studies the dynamics of bargaining in an intrahousehold context. To explore long-term partner relationships, we analyse bilateral bargaining by considering that spouses take decisions sequentially. We conclude that a greater valuation of the present, rather than the future, for the spouse who takes the second decision, increases the set of possible sustainable agreements, as well as the proportion of time that this agent devotes to a family good.Stackelberg game, family bargaining, family good

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The stability of intergenerational cooperation in altruistic families

This paper analyses the stability of bargaining solutions in a family consisting of two parents and one adult child, by developing a non-cooperative family game. Assuming different bargaining powers between parents and the child, we find that the greater bargaining power of the parents allows them to take greater gains from the cooperation, and reduce the incentives to deviate from the cooperative agreement. The presence of altruism between the players will significantly reduce the probability that there will be incentives to break the cooperative agreement. A higher level of altruism increases the stability of cooperation, and will overcome the contrary effect of other factors.

La estructura del sistema jurídico: las relaciones entre las fuentes del derecho en la Constitución vigente

La recientemente en vigor Constitución boliviana de 2009 trae consigo cambios en la estructura del sistema jurídico. Este artículo analiza dichos cambios a través de las relaciones formales entre las distintas fuentes del derecho y expone la estructura unitaria y a la vez territorialmente descentralizada inaugurada por la Constitución. Además de un marco teórico previo, el artículo está dividido en dos partes principales: la primera se ocupa de la Constitución como fuente del derecho, e incluye las consecuencias jurídicas de su supremacía, los límites de la cláusula de interpretación de la Constitución y el carácter vinculante de los precedentes del Tribunal Constitucional; la segunda parte presenta las fuentes de derecho ordinario, sus respectivas posiciones en la estructura del sistema y las relaciones formales entre ellas.The recently in force Bolivian Constitution of 2009 brings a change in the structure of the legal system. This paper analyzes such change through the formal relations among the legal sources and exposes the structure of the Unitarian and territorially decentralized State shaped by the Constitution. Besides a previous theoretical frame, the paper is divided into two main parts: the first one regards the Constitution as a legal source, and includes the legal consequences of its supremacy, the limits of the interpretation clause of the Constitution and the application of the stare decisis doctrine to the Constitutional Court precedents; the second part exposes the ordinary legal sources, its respective position in the structure of the legal system and the formal relations among them

Argumentación, arbitraje y arbitrariedad: las contradicciones del Tribunal Constitucional en el Recurso Directo de Nulidad contra laudos

Este artículo analiza una sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional de Bolivia desde el punto de vista de la argumentación de las decisiones judiciales. En ella, el Tribunal sostuvo que las pretensiones de nulidad contractual no eran materia arbitrable. A este artículo no le concierne el fondo de esta afirmación, sino las implicancias de la misma respecto a los anteriores precedentes del propio Tribunal Constitucional. En este sentido, el artículo concluye que, para dictar la sentencia en análisis, el Tribunal ha violado sus propios precedentes respecto al recurso directo de nulidad (que es el recurso específico que produjo la sentencia en comento), respecto a la licitud de someter pretensiones de nulidad contractual a arbitramento y respecto a la producción judicial del derecho. Al tratarse de una sentencia contraria a sus propios precedentes, la misma es una sentencia arbitraria, lo que da título al presente artículo.This article analyzes a ruling of the Bolivian Constitutional Tribunal from the point of view of the argumentation of the court rulings. In the ruling, the Tribunal stated that the request for contractual nullity was not a matter of arbitration. This article is not focused on the grounds of this assertion, but on its implications with respect to the precedents of same Constitutional Tribunal. In this regard, the article concludes that, to hand down the ruling in question, the Tribunal violated its own precedents for the direct recourse of nullity (which is the specific recourse that resulted in said ruling) about the legality of submitting requests for contractual nullity to arbitration and regarding the judicial production of the law. Since this ruling is contrary to its own precedents, it is an arbitrary ruling, giving rise to this article