Enriching Deontic Logic

It is well known that systems of action deontic logic emerging from a standard analysis of permission in terms of possibility of doing an action without incurring in a violation of the law are subject to paradoxes. In general, paradoxes are acknowledged as such if we have intuitions telling us that things should be different. The aim of this paper is to introduce a paradox-free deontic action system by (i) identifying the basic intuitions leading to the emergence of the paradoxes and (ii) exploiting these intuitions in order to develop a consistent deontic framework, where it can be shown why some phenomena seem to be paradoxical and why they are not so if interpreted in a correct way

Perspectival Logic of Acceptance and Rejection

This paper aims at developing a logical theory of perspectival epistemic attitudes. After presenting a standard framework for modeling acceptance, where the epistemic space of an agent coincides with a unique epistemic cell, more complex systems are introduced, which are characterized by the existence of many connected epistemic cells, and different possible attitudes towards a proposition, both positive and negative, are discussed. In doing that, we also propose some interesting ways in which the systems can be interpreted on well known epistemological standpoints

The Truthmaker Solution to the Gettier Problems

A truthmaker solution to the Gettier problems is based on the idea that knowledge can be defined as justified true belief provided that the source of one’s justification is suitably connected with what makes the believed proposition true. Different developments of this basic intuition have been recently criticized on the basis of a series of arguments aiming at showing that no truthmaker theory can allow us to solve Gettier problems, since the very idea underlying such solution is ineffective. In this paper, I discuss the criticism to the truthmaker solution I consider most promising and show how it can be successfully addressed

Relating Semantics for Epistemic Logic

The aim of this paper is to explore the advantages deriving from the application of relating semantics in epistemic logic. As a first step, I will discuss two versions of relating semantics and how they can be differently exploited for studying modal and epistemic operators. Next, I consider several standard frameworks which are suitable for modelling knowledge and related notions, in both their implicit and their explicit form and present a simple strategy by virtue of which they can be associated with intuitive systems of relating logic. As a final step, I will focus on the logic of knowledge based on justification logic and show how relating semantics helps us to provide an elegant solution to some problems related to the standard interpretation of the explicit epistemic operators

Basic Action Deontic Logic

The aim of this paper is to introduce a system of dynamic deontic logic in which the main problems related to the definition of deontic concepts, especially those emerging from a standard analysis of permission in terms of possibility of doing an action without incurring in a violation of the law, are solved. The basic idea is to introduce two crucial distinctions allowing us to differentiate (i) what is ideal with respect to a given code, which fixes the types of action that are abstractly prescribed, and what is ideal with respect to the specific situation in which the agent acts, and (ii) the transitions associated with actions and the results of actions, which can obtain even without the action being performed

Csound Synthesis Approach for the iVCS3 iOS App

This article is about the process of creating an iOS based app for the digital emulation of the famous electronic synthesizer VCS3 by EMS using a Csound orchestra as its sound engine. Despite the out of standard features of the original instrument, we have attempted to clone a large amount of details regarding the sound generation, the connectivity, the look and its specific original ergonomy. We will try to illustrate the general synthesis strategies adopted in creating this musical synth application and in particular, we will focus on Csound code from the main sound modules and their relative individual modeling approach

Prismatic to asbestiform offretite from Northern Italy. Occurrence, morphology and crystal-chemistry of a new potentially hazardous zeolite

A multi-methodological approach, based upon field investigation, morphological characterization, chemical analysis and structure refinement was applied to different samples of fibrous offretite, a new potentially hazardous zeolite recently discovered in northern Italy. Their morphology ranges from stocky-prismatic to asbestiform. All the investigated fibers may be considered as "inhalable", and they are well within the range of the "more carcinogenic fibers" regarding diameter. As regards the length, the main mode observed in the asbestiform samples is 20-25 mu m, and similar to 93% of the measured fibers are >5 mu m and may be significantly associated with carcinogenesis also in terms of lengths. The chemical-structural features of the investigated fibers are comparable: the extra-framework cations K+, Mg2+ and Ca2+ are present in all samples in similar proportions, and refined cell parameters are similar among the samples. Offretite occurs in 60% of the investigated sites, with an estimated amount up to 75 vol % of the associated minerals. The presence of this mineral could be of concern for risk to human health, especially if one considers the vast number of quarries and mining-related activities that are operating in the zeolite host rocks

On a New Tentative Solution to Fitch’s Paradox

In a recent paper, Alexander argues that relaxing the requirement that sound knowers know their own soundness might provide a solution to Fitch’s paradox and introduces a suitable axiomatic system where the paradox is avoided. In this paper an analysis of this solution is proposed according to which the effective move for solving the paradox depends on the axiomatic treatment of the ontic modality rather than the limitations imposed on the epistemic one. It is then shown that, once the ontic modality is standardly introduced, the paradox still follows and, in addition, some puzzling consequences arise

A suitable semantics for implicit and explicit belief

In the present paper a new semantic framework for modelling the distinction between implicit and explicit belief is proposed and contrasted with the currently standard framework based on the idea that explicit belief can be construed as implicit belief accompanied by awareness. It is argued that within this new framework it is possible to get both a more intuitive interpretation of the aforementioned distinction and a straightforward solution to two critical problems to which the standard view is subjected. A system of logic for belief is introduced and proved to be complete with respect to the class of all frames for implicit and explicit belief constructed in accord to the new view

On the factivity of implicit intersubjective knowledge

The concept of knowledge can be modelled in epistemic modal logic and, if modelled by using a standard modal operator, it is subject to the problem of logical omniscience. The classical solution to this problem is to distinguish between implicit and explicit knowledge and to construe the knowledge operator as capturing the concept of implicit knowledge. In addition, since a proposition is said to be implicitly known just in case it is derivable from the set of propositions that are explicitly known by using a certain set of logical rules, the concept of implicit knowledge is definable on the basis of the concept of explicit knowledge. In any case, both implicit and explicit knowledge are typically characterized as factive, i.e. such that it is always the case that what is known is also true. The aim of the present paper is twofold: first, we will develop a dynamic system of explicit intersubjective knowledge that allows us to introduce the operator of implicit knowledge by definition; secondly, we will show that it is not possible to hold together the following two theses: (1) the concept of implicit knowledge is definable along the lines indicated above and (2) the concept of implicit knowledge is factiv