Incentives, Reputation and the Allocation of Authority

We address the question how much authority a principal should delegate to a manager with conflicting interests and uncertain ability in a context in which the manager has both compensationbased and reputational incentives. The optimal level of authority balances the value of the manager’s decision-making expertise against the cost of ensuring that the manager uses his discretion productively. Reputational incentives reduce the necessary monetary incentives to discourage purely opportunistic behavior, but may cause the manager to pursue conservative courses of action to preserve his reputation. This undermines the benefits of delegating control, leading to decreased managerial authority and stronger monetary incentives. When the principal can commit to long-term contracts, she eliminates this conservative bias by rewarding a successful manager with greater future compensation and authority than would be optimal in a static setting. Early in the relationship the principal may delegate additional authority in order to screen for managers of high ability

Incentives, Reputation and the Allocation of Authority

We address the question how much authority a principal should delegate to a manager with conflicting interests and uncertain ability in a context in which the manager has both compensation-based and reputational incentives. The optimal level of authority balances the value of the manager's decision-making expertise against the cost of ensuring that the manager uses his discretion productively. Reputational incentives reduce the necessary monetary incentives to discourage purely opportunistic behavior, but may cause the manager to pursue conservative courses of action to preserve his reputation. This undermines the benefits of delegating control, leading to decreased managerial authority and stronger monetary incentives. When the principal can commit to long-term contracts, she eliminates this conservative bias by rewarding a successful manager with greater future compensation and authority than would be optimal in a static setting. Early in the relationship the principal may delegate additional authority in order to screen for managers of high ability.agency problems, delegation, compensation contracts, job design, career concerns, managerial conservatism

Virus Prevalence in Egg Samples Collected from Naturally Selected and Traditionally Managed Honey Bee Colonies across Europe

Monitoring virus infections can be an important selection tool in honey bee breeding. A recent study pointed towards an association between the virus-free status of eggs and an increased virus resistance to deformed wing virus (DWV) at the colony level. In this study, eggs from both naturally surviving and traditionally managed colonies from across Europe were screened for the prevalence of different viruses. Screenings were performed using the phenotyping protocol of the 'suppressed in ovo virus infection' trait but with qPCR instead of end-point PCR and a primer set that covers all DWV genotypes. Of the 213 screened samples, 109 were infected with DWV, 54 were infected with black queen cell virus (BQCV), 3 were infected with the sacbrood virus, and 2 were infected with the acute bee paralyses virus. It was demonstrated that incidences of the vertical transmission of DWV were more frequent in naturally surviving than in traditionally managed colonies, although the virus loads in the eggs remained the same. When comparing virus infections with queen age, older queens showed significantly lower infection loads of DWV in both traditionally managed and naturally surviving colonies, as well as reduced DWV infection frequencies in traditionally managed colonies. We determined that the detection frequencies of DWV and BQCV in honey bee eggs were lower in samples obtained in the spring than in those collected in the summer, indicating that vertical transmission may be lower in spring. Together, these patterns in vertical transmission show that honey bee queens have the potential to reduce the degree of vertical transmission over time

Authoritative subspecies diagnosis tool for European honey bees based on ancestryinformative SNPs

Background With numerous endemic subspecies representing four of its five evolutionary lineages, Europe holds a large fraction of Apis mellifera genetic diversity. This diversity and the natural distribution range have been altered by anthropogenic factors. The conservation of this natural heritage relies on the availability of accurate tools for subspecies diagnosis. Based on pool-sequence data from 2145 worker bees representing 22 populations sampled across Europe, we employed two highly discriminative approaches (PCA and F-ST) to select the most informative SNPs for ancestry inference. Results Using a supervised machine learning (ML) approach and a set of 3896 genotyped individuals, we could show that the 4094 selected single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) provide an accurate prediction of ancestry inference in European honey bees. The best ML model was Linear Support Vector Classifier (Linear SVC) which correctly assigned most individuals to one of the 14 subspecies or different genetic origins with a mean accuracy of 96.2% +/- 0.8 SD. A total of 3.8% of test individuals were misclassified, most probably due to limited differentiation between the subspecies caused by close geographical proximity, or human interference of genetic integrity of reference subspecies, or a combination thereof. Conclusions The diagnostic tool presented here will contribute to a sustainable conservation and support breeding activities in order to preserve the genetic heritage of European honey bees.The SmartBees project was funded by the European Commission under its FP7 KBBE programme (2013.1.3-02, SmartBees Grant Agreement number 613960) https://ec.europa.eu/research/fp7.MP was supported by a Basque Government grant (IT1233-19). The funders provided the financial support to the research, but had no role in the design of the study, analysis, interpretations of data and in writing the manuscript

Incentives, reputation and the allocation of authority

We address the question how much authority a principal should delegate to a manager with conflicting interests and uncertain ability in a context in which the manager has both compensation-based and reputational incentives. The optimal level of authority balances the value of the manager’s decision-making expertise against the cost of ensuring that the manager uses his discretion productively. Reputational incentives reduce the necessary monetary incentives to discourage purely opportunistic behavior, but may cause the manager to pursue conservative courses of action to preserve his reputation. This undermines the benefits of delegating control, leading to decreased managerial authority and stronger monetary incentives. When the principal contracts with the manager repeatedly, she delegates additional authority early in the relationship in order to screen for managers of high ability. Decentralization of decision making may thus occur even if the static benefits from decentralization are negative