The Obama/Romney Amendments

Occasionally, a candidate for the White House will deliver a penetrating critique of presidential assertions of authority in the realm of foreign affairs. Ohio Sen. Robert Taft, who might have made a fine president had it not been his misfortune to run against Dwight Eisenhower in the 1952 Republican primary, brought considerable constitutional knowledge to the campaign trail. He rightly criticized President Harry Truman for his usurpation of the war power in plunging the United States into the Korean War without congressional authorization, as required by the Constitution

Louis Fisher on the Constitution and the War Power

Lou Fisher\u27s prolific writings on the war power—the constitutional repository of authority to initiate war and lesser military hostilities on behalf of the American people—have informed and, for the better part of four decades, shaped discussions and debates on the respective roles of Congress and the president, from the halls of academe to the corridors of power. Widely cited and invoked on hundreds of occasions by political scientists, historians, and legal academics, his work has opened doors for serious consideration of his views by representatives in all three branches of the federal government. It has, as well, established his place in the front-rank of constitutional scholars and, almost certainly, earned for his scholarship an enduring influence on discussions about the constitutional authority to order the use of military force

The Steel Seizure Case and Inherent Presidential Power

Part of symposium: Youngstown at fifty: a symposium

The Judiciary and Presidential Power in Foreign Affairs: A Critique

The aim of the first section is to examine the judiciary\u27s contribution to executive hegemony in the area of foreign affairs as manifested in Supreme Court rulings regarding executive agreements, travel abroad, the war power, and treaty termination. In the second section of this article, I provide a brief explanation of the policy underlying the Constitutional Convention\u27s allocation of foreign affairs powers and argue that those values are as relevant and compelling today as they were two centuries ago. In the third section, I contend that a wide gulf has developed in the past fifty years between constitutional theory and governmental practice in the conduct of foreign policy. The Court has greatly facilitated the growth of presidential power in foreign affairs in three interconnected but somewhat different ways by: (1) adhering to the sole-organ doctrine as propounded in the 1036 case of United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., (2) invoking the political question doctrine and other nonjusticiable grounds, and (3) inferring congressional approval of presidential action by virtue of congressional inaction or silence. I then offer an explanation of the Court\u27s willingness to increase presidential foreign affairs powers well beyond constitutional boundaries. For a variety of reasons, the Court views its role in this area as a support function for policies already established. In this regard the judiciary has become an arm of the executive branch. Finally, I conclude with the argument that to maintain the integrity of the Constitution, the Court must police constitutional boundaries to ensure that fundamental alterations in our governmental system will occur only through the process of constitutional amendment. The judicial branch may not abdicate its function to say what the law is

The Judiciary and Presidential Power in Foreign Affairs: A Critique

The aim of the first section is to examine the judiciary\u27s contribution to executive hegemony in the area of foreign affairs as manifested in Supreme Court rulings regarding executive agreements, travel abroad, the war power, and treaty termination. In the second section of this article, I provide a brief explanation of the policy underlying the Constitutional Convention\u27s allocation of foreign affairs powers and argue that those values are as relevant and compelling today as they were two centuries ago. In the third section, I contend that a wide gulf has developed in the past fifty years between constitutional theory and governmental practice in the conduct of foreign policy. The Court has greatly facilitated the growth of presidential power in foreign affairs in three interconnected but somewhat different ways by: (1) adhering to the sole-organ doctrine as propounded in the 1036 case of United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., (2) invoking the political question doctrine and other nonjusticiable grounds, and (3) inferring congressional approval of presidential action by virtue of congressional inaction or silence. I then offer an explanation of the Court\u27s willingness to increase presidential foreign affairs powers well beyond constitutional boundaries. For a variety of reasons, the Court views its role in this area as a support function for policies already established. In this regard the judiciary has become an arm of the executive branch. Finally, I conclude with the argument that to maintain the integrity of the Constitution, the Court must police constitutional boundaries to ensure that fundamental alterations in our governmental system will occur only through the process of constitutional amendment. The judicial branch may not abdicate its function to say what the law is

A Modified Mole Cricket Lure and Description of Scapteriscus borellii (Orthoptera: Gryllotalpidae) Range Expansion and Calling Song in California

Invasive mole cricket species in the genus Scapteriscus have become significant agricultural pests and are continuing to expand their range in North America. Though largely subterranean, adults of some species, such as Scapteriscus borellii Giglio-Tos 1894, are capable of long dispersive flights and phonotaxis to male calling songs to find suitable habitats and mates. Mole crickets in the genus Scapteriscus are known to be attracted to and can be caught by audio lure traps that broadcast synthesized or recorded calling songs. We report improvements in the design and production of electronic controllers for the automation of semipermanent mole cricket trap lures as well as highly portable audio trap collection designs. Using these improved audio lure traps, we collected the first reported individuals of the pest mole cricket S. borellii in California. We describe several characteristic features of the calling song of the California population including that the pulse rate is a function of soil temperature, similar to Florida populations of S. borellii. Further, we show that other calling song characteristics (carrier frequency, intensity, and pulse rate) are significantly different between the populations

Evaluation of the pilot of domestic violence protection orders

In 2011/12, a 15 month pilot took place in three police force areas (Greater Manchester, West Mercia and Wiltshire) to test a new civil provision, Domestic Violence Protection Orders (DVPOs). DVPOs were designed to provide immediate protection for victim-survivors following a domestic violence incident in circumstances where, in the view of the police, there are no other enforceable restrictions that can be placed upon the perpetrator. DVPOs aim to give victim-survivors time, space and support to consider their options by placing conditions on perpetrators, including restricting/removing perpetrators from households, and preventing contact with, or molestation of, victim-survivors. The approach, introduced by the Crime and Security Act 2010, comprises an initial temporary notice (Domestic Violence Protection Notice, DVPN), authorised by a senior police officer and issued to the perpetrator by the police, followed by a DVPO that can last from 14 to 28 days, imposed at the magistrates’ court

Evaluation of the pilot of domestic violence protection orders

In 2011/12, a 15 month pilot took place in three police force areas (Greater Manchester, West Mercia and Wiltshire) to test a new civil provision, Domestic Violence Protection Orders (DVPOs). DVPOs were designed to provide immediate protection for victim-survivors following a domestic violence incident in circumstances where, in the view of the police, there are no other enforceable restrictions that can be placed upon the perpetrator. DVPOs aim to give victim-survivors time, space and support to consider their options by placing conditions on perpetrators, including restricting/removing perpetrators from households, and preventing contact with, or molestation of, victim-survivors. The approach, introduced by the Crime and Security Act 2010, comprises an initial temporary notice (Domestic Violence Protection Notice, DVPN), authorised by a senior police officer and issued to the perpetrator by the police, followed by a DVPO that can last from 14 to 28 days, imposed at the magistrates’ court