Die Boko-Haram-Unruhen und die Wiederbelebung des Islam in Nigeria

From the 1980 Maitatsine uprising to the 2009 Boko Haram uprising, Nigeria was bedevilled by ethno-religious conflicts with devastating human and material losses. But the Boko Haram uprising of July 2009 was significant in that it not only set a precedent, but also reinforced the attempts by Islamic conservative elements at imposing a variant of Islamic religious ideology on a secular state. Whereas the religious sensitivity of Nigerians provided fertile ground for the breeding of the Boko Haram sect, the sect’s blossoming was also aided by the prevailing economic dislocation in Nigerian society, the advent of party politics (and the associated desperation of politicians for political power), and the ambivalence of some vocal Islamic leaders, who, though they did not actively embark on insurrection, either did nothing to stop it from fomenting, or only feebly condemned it. These internal factors coupled with growing Islamic fundamentalism around the world make a highly volatile Nigerian society prone to violence, as evidenced by the Boko Haram uprising. Given the approach of the Nigerian state to religious conflict, this violence may remain a recurring problem. This paper documents and analyses the Boko Haram uprising, as well as its links with the promotion of Islamic revivalism and the challenges it poses to the secularity of the Nigerian state.Vom Maitatsine-Aufstand 1980 bis zu den Boko-Haram-Unruhen 2009 hat die nigerianische Bevölkerung unter den verheerenden menschlichen und materiellen Kosten ethnisch-religiöser Konflikte gelitten. Die Boko-Haram-Unruhen (Juli 2009) markierten allerdings eine qualitative Veränderung, denn sie stellten einen Präzedenzfall dar und verstärkten Versuche konservativer Anhänger des Islam, im säkularen nigerianischen Staat Elemente islamischer Ideologie einzuführen. Angesichts der Empfänglichkeit der Nigerianer für religiöses Denken konnte sich die Boko-Haram-Sekte schnell ausbreiten, erleichtert durch die nach wie vor bestehende ökonomische Polarisierung der nigerianischen Gesellschaft, die erneut heftig aufgebrochene Konkurrenz der Parteien um die politische Macht und die Ambivalenz einiger lautstarker islamischer Führer, die zwar nicht explizit zum Aufstand aufriefen, aber auch nichts zur Beendigung der Hetze beitrugen und diese nur vorsichtig verurteilten. Diese internen Faktoren und der gleichzeitige weltweite Aufschwung des islamischen Fundamentalismus führten in der hoch volatilen nigerianischen Gesellschaft zu den gewaltsam ausgetragenen Boko-Haram-Unruhen. Die im nigerianischen Staat strukturell angelegte Gefahr religiöser Auseinandersetzungen legt nahe, dass solche Gewaltausbrüche ein immer wiederkehrendes Problem bleiben könnten. Der vorliegende Beitrag dokumentiert und analysiert die Boko-Haram-Unruhen und skizziert ihre Bedeutung für die Wiederbelebung des politischen Islam und die damit verbundenen Herausforderungen für den säkularen nigerianischen Staat

The geopolitics of Boko Haram and Nigeria's ‘war on terror’

The April 2014 kidnapping of the schoolgirls at Chibok, north-eastern Nigeria, has meant that Boko Haram is now widely discussed by Western governments and in Western media. Yet within Nigeria the group has been well known for several years. Boko Haram's activities, or actions attributed to the group, have developed in a range of ways, many contradictory, including bombings, kidnappings of Europeans within Nigeria and neighbouring Cameroon, killing of medical personnel, and overtures for dialogue with the Federal Government. There are recurrent reports of links to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and in the past few years the United States has taken a much more active role in the region. Some of the wider geopolitical issues relate to the French-led intervention in Mali; a country to which Nigeria has also sent troops. This article tries to disentangle these different questions. It looks first at who Boko Haram are, and their history. It situates the group within the wider context of Nigerian politics, and to discuss the biopolitical and geopolitical elements of their operations and of the actions of the Nigerian security services and other actors towards them. It ends by relating what is happening within and beyond Nigeria to the wider context of the ‘war on terror’

From Ebola to COVID-19: emergency preparedness and response plans and actions in Lagos, Nigeria

BACKGROUND: Lagos state is the industrial nerve centre of Nigeria and was the epicentre of the 2014 Ebola outbreak in Nigeria as it is now for the current Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) outbreak. This paper describes how the lessons learned from the Ebola outbreak in 2014 informed the emergency preparedness of the State ahead of the COVID-19 outbreak and guided response. DISCUSSION: Following the Ebola outbreak in 2014, the Lagos State government provided governance by developing a policy on emergency preparedness and biosecurity and provided oversight and coordination of emergency preparedness strategies. Capacities for emergency response were strengthened by training key staff, developing a robust surveillance system, and setting up a Biosafety Level 3 laboratory and biobank. Resource provision, in terms of finances and trained personnel for emergencies was prioritized by the government. With the onset of COVID-19, Lagos state was able to respond promptly to the outbreak using the centralized Incident Command Structure and the key activities of the Emergency Operations Centre. Contributory to effective response were partnerships with the private sectors, community engagement and political commitment. CONCLUSION: Using the lessons learned from the 2014 Ebola outbreak, Lagos State had gradually prepared its healthcare system for a pandemic such as COVID-19. The State needs to continue to expand its preparedness to be more resilient and future proof to respond to disease outbreaks. Looking beyond intra-state gains, lessons and identified best practices from the past and present should be shared with other states and countries

From Ebola to COVID-19: emergency preparedness and response plans and actions in Lagos, Nigeria

Background Lagos state is the industrial nerve centre of Nigeria and was the epicentre of the 2014 Ebola outbreak in Nigeria as it is now for the current Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) outbreak. This paper describes how the lessons learned from the Ebola outbreak in 2014 informed the emergency preparedness of the State ahead of the COVID-19 outbreak and guided response. Discussion Following the Ebola outbreak in 2014, the Lagos State government provided governance by developing a policy on emergency preparedness and biosecurity and provided oversight and coordination of emergency preparedness strategies. Capacities for emergency response were strengthened by training key staff, developing a robust surveillance system, and setting up a Biosafety Level 3 laboratory and biobank. Resource provision, in terms of finances and trained personnel for emergencies was prioritized by the government. With the onset of COVID-19, Lagos state was able to respond promptly to the outbreak using the centralized Incident Command Structure and the key activities of the Emergency Operations Centre. Contributory to effective response were partnerships with the private sectors, community engagement and political commitment. Conclusion Using the lessons learned from the 2014 Ebola outbreak, Lagos State had gradually prepared its healthcare system for a pandemic such as COVID-19. The State needs to continue to expand its preparedness to be more resilient and future proof to respond to disease outbreaks. Looking beyond intra-state gains, lessons and identified best practices from the past and present should be shared with other states and countries

Progressive Unions and the Competition for Community Development in Nigeria: A Study of Ifon, Ilobu and Erin Progressive Unions, 1940-1970

Ifon, Ilobu and Erin are three closely located Yoruba communities that emerged at different times. The circumstances of their emergence and growth determined, to a very large extent, the pattern of their relationship, which was characterized by suspicion and mutual antagonism. This situation was particularly true of Ifon and Ilobu. The colonial government's management of the relationship among the communities reinforced the antagonism. It was into this hostile pattern that the Ifon, Ilobu and Erin Progressive Unions emerged in the 1940s. The desire of the unions to advance their respective communities resulted in the competition to draw the greatest benefits to each of those communities. This development sped up the rate of development in the three communities. It nonetheless reinforced the problem of mutual antagonism and accusations of marginalization and alienation by the aggrieved parties. This paper examines the emergence of the progressive unions in Ifon, Ilobu, and Erin, their activities vis-a-vis their objectives and how these have served to promote the competition for communal development in the three communities. The paper also considers the impact of their activities on the promotion of community development and concludes that healthy competition could bring about speedy development, while possibly generating some negative developments by the way such competition is engaged in

Newspapers and the Sharia Debate in Nigeria: Contexts, Issues and Trends

That the adoption of strict Sharia is generating issues around the world is obvious. Given the various manifestations of the adoption or implementation of Sharia in different societies, the situation could not have been otherwise. Newspapers’ coverage of the Sharia debate in Nigeria brings out the different dimensions of the issues and the contexts in which they arise. This paper examines the issues and trends in the debate as reflected in the Nigerian Newspapers and situates them in the context in which they are understood. Pertinent is the study of New York Times, London Times, and The Globe and Mail of Canada’s coverage of the Sharia issue in Nigeria which provides a comparative basis for the study of the Nigerian newspapers’ coverage. It concludes that the nature of religion and the disposition to religion in Nigeria as well as the nature of the Nigerian society contribute to the content, patterns, and dimensions of the debate

The Boko Haram uprising and Islamic revivalism in Nigeria

From the 1980 Maitatsine uprising to the 2009 Boko Haram uprising, Nigeria was bedevilled by ethno-religious conflicts with devastating human and material losses. But the Boko Haram uprising of July 2009 was significant in that it not only set a precedent, but also reinforced the attempts by Islamic conservative elements at imposing a variant of Islamic religious ideology on a secular state. Whereas the religious sensitivity of Nigerians provided fertile ground for the breeding of the Boko Haram sect, the sect’s blossoming was also aided by the prevailing economic dislocation in Nigerian society, the advent of party politics (and the associated desperation of politicians for political power), and the ambivalence of some vocal Islamic leaders, who, though they did not actively embark on insurrection, either did nothing to stop it from fomenting, or only feebly condemned it. These internal factors coupled with growing Islamic fundamentalism around the world make a highly volatile Nigerian society prone to violence, as evidenced by the Boko Haram uprising. Given the approach of the Nigerian state to religious conflict, this violence may remain a recurring problem. This paper documents and analyses the Boko Haram uprising, as well as its links with the promotion of Islamic revivalism and the challenges it poses to the secularity of the Nigerian state.Vom Maitatsine-Aufstand 1980 bis zu den Boko-Haram-Unruhen 2009 hat die nigerianische Bevölkerung unter den verheerenden menschlichen und materiellen Kosten ethnisch-religiöser Konflikte gelitten. Die Boko-Haram-Unruhen (Juli 2009) markierten allerdings eine qualitative Veränderung, denn sie stellten einen Präzedenzfall dar und verstärkten Versuche konservativer Anhänger des Islam, im säkularen nigerianischen Staat Elemente islamischer Ideologie einzuführen. Angesichts der Empfänglichkeit der Nigerianer für religiöses Denken konnte sich die Boko-Haram-Sekte schnell ausbreiten, erleichtert durch die nach wie vor bestehende ökonomische Polarisierung der nigerianischen Gesellschaft, die erneut heftig aufgebrochene Konkurrenz der Parteien um die politische Macht und die Ambivalenz einiger lautstarker islamischer Führer, die zwar nicht explizit zum Aufstand aufriefen, aber auch nichts zur Beendigung der Hetze beitrugen und diese nur vorsichtig verurteilten. Diese internen Faktoren und der gleichzeitige weltweite Aufschwung des islamischen Fundamentalismus führten in der hoch volatilen nigerianischen Gesellschaft zu den gewaltsam ausgetragenen Boko-Haram-Unruhen. Die im nigerianischen Staat strukturell angelegte Gefahr religiöser Auseinandersetzungen legt nahe, dass solche Gewaltausbrüche ein immer wiederkehrendes Problem bleiben könnten. Der vorliegende Beitrag dokumentiert und analysiert die Boko-Haram-Unruhen und skizziert ihre Bedeutung für die Wiederbelebung des politischen Islam und die damit verbundenen Herausforderungen für den säkularen nigerianischen Staat

The subversion of labour militancy in Nigeria: a case study of the Nigeria labour congress

No Abstract. The Nigerian Journal of Economic History Vol. 5&6 2003: 42-5

Die Boko-Haram-Unruhen und die Wiederbelebung des Islam in Nigeria

From the 1980 Maitatsine uprising to the 2009 Boko Haram uprising, Nigeria was bedevilled by ethno-religious conflicts with devastating human and material losses. But the Boko Haram uprising of July 2009 was significant in that it not only set a precedent, but also reinforced the attempts by Islamic conservative elements at imposing a variant of Islamic religious ideology on a secular state. Whereas the religious sensitivity of Nigerians provided fertile ground for the breeding of the Boko Haram sect, the sect’s blossoming was also aided by the prevailing economic dislocation in Nigerian society, the advent of party politics (and the associated desperation of politicians for political power), and the ambivalence of some vocal Islamic leaders, who, though they did not actively embark on insurrection, either did nothing to stop it from fomenting, or only feebly condemned it. These internal factors coupled with growing Islamic fundamentalism around the world make a highly volatile Nigerian society prone to violence, as evidenced by the Boko Haram uprising. Given the approach of the Nigerian state to religious conflict, this violence may remain a recurring problem. This paper documents and analyses the Boko Haram uprising, as well as its links with the promotion of Islamic revivalism and the challenges it poses to the secularity of the Nigerian state.Vom Maitatsine-Aufstand 1980 bis zu den Boko-Haram-Unruhen 2009 hat die nigerianische Bevölkerung unter den verheerenden menschlichen und materiellen Kosten ethnisch-religiöser Konflikte gelitten. Die Boko-Haram-Unruhen (Juli 2009) markierten allerdings eine qualitative Veränderung, denn sie stellten einen Präzedenzfall dar und verstärkten Versuche konservativer Anhänger des Islam, im säkularen nigerianischen Staat Elemente islamischer Ideologie einzuführen. Angesichts der Empfänglichkeit der Nigerianer für religiöses Denken konnte sich die Boko-Haram-Sekte schnell ausbreiten, erleichtert durch die nach wie vor bestehende ökonomische Polarisierung der nigerianischen Gesellschaft, die erneut heftig aufgebrochene Konkurrenz der Parteien um die politische Macht und die Ambivalenz einiger lautstarker islamischer Führer, die zwar nicht explizit zum Aufstand aufriefen, aber auch nichts zur Beendigung der Hetze beitrugen und diese nur vorsichtig verurteilten. Diese internen Faktoren und der gleichzeitige weltweite Aufschwung des islamischen Fundamentalismus führten in der hoch volatilen nigerianischen Gesellschaft zu den gewaltsam ausgetragenen Boko-Haram-Unruhen. Die im nigerianischen Staat strukturell angelegte Gefahr religiöser Auseinandersetzungen legt nahe, dass solche Gewaltausbrüche ein immer wiederkehrendes Problem bleiben könnten. Der vorliegende Beitrag dokumentiert und analysiert die Boko-Haram-Unruhen und skizziert ihre Bedeutung für die Wiederbelebung des politischen Islam und die damit verbundenen Herausforderungen für den säkularen nigerianischen Staat