Advertising, consensus, and ageing in multilayer Sznajd model

In the Sznajd consensus model on the square lattice, two people who agree in their opinions convince their neighbours of this opinion. We generalize it to many layers representing many age levels, and check if still a consensus among all layers is possible. Advertising sometimes but not always produces a consensus on the advertised opinion.Comment: 6 pages including 4 figures, for Int. J. Mod. Phys.

Adaptive simulation using mode identification

Adaptive simulation using modal clustering and method of potential function

Protocol Requirements for Self-organizing Artifacts: Towards an Ambient Intelligence

We discuss which properties common-use artifacts should have to collaborate without human intervention. We conceive how devices, such as mobile phones, PDAs, and home appliances, could be seamlessly integrated to provide an "ambient intelligence" that responds to the user's desires without requiring explicit programming or commands. While the hardware and software technology to build such systems already exists, as yet there is no standard protocol that can learn new meanings. We propose the first steps in the development of such a protocol, which would need to be adaptive, extensible, and open to the community, while promoting self-organization. We argue that devices, interacting through "game-like" moves, can learn to agree about how to communicate, with whom to cooperate, and how to delegate and coordinate specialized tasks. Thus, they may evolve a distributed cognition or collective intelligence capable of tackling complex tasks.Comment: To be presented at 5th International Conference on Complex System

Emotional Strategies as Catalysts for Cooperation in Signed Networks

The evolution of unconditional cooperation is one of the fundamental problems in science. A new solution is proposed to solve this puzzle. We treat this issue with an evolutionary model in which agents play the Prisoner's Dilemma on signed networks. The topology is allowed to co-evolve with relational signs as well as with agent strategies. We introduce a strategy that is conditional on the emotional content embedded in network signs. We show that this strategy acts as a catalyst and creates favorable conditions for the spread of unconditional cooperation. In line with the literature, we found evidence that the evolution of cooperation most likely occurs in networks with relatively high chances of rewiring and with low likelihood of strategy adoption. While a low likelihood of rewiring enhances cooperation, a very high likelihood seems to limit its diffusion. Furthermore, unlike in non-signed networks, cooperation becomes more prevalent in denser topologies.Comment: 24 pages, Accepted for publication in Advances in Complex System

Similarity based cooperation and spatial segregation

We analyze a cooperative game, where the cooperative act is not based on the previous behaviour of the co-player, but on the similarity between the players. This system has been studied in a mean-field description recently [A. Traulsen and H. G. Schuster, Phys. Rev. E 68, 046129 (2003)]. Here, the spatial extension to a two-dimensional lattice is studied, where each player interacts with eight players in a Moore neighborhood. The system shows a strong segregation independent on parameters. The introduction of a local conversion mechanism towards tolerance allows for four-state cycles and the emergence of spiral waves in the spatial game. In the case of asymmetric costs of cooperation a rich variety of complex behavior is observed depending on both cooperation costs. Finally, we study the stabilization of a cooperative fixed point of a forecast rule in the symmetric game, which corresponds to cooperation across segregation borders. This fixed point becomes unstable for high cooperation costs, but can be stabilized by a linear feedback mechanism.Comment: 7 pages, 9 figure

Henri Temianka Correspondence; (axelrod)

This collection contains material pertaining to the life, career, and activities of Henri Temianka, violin virtuoso, conductor, music teacher, and author. Materials include correspondence, concert programs and flyers, music scores, photographs, and books.https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/temianka_correspondence/1097/thumbnail.jp

Spatial patterns and scale freedom in a Prisoner's Dilemma cellular automata with Pavlovian strategies

A cellular automaton in which cells represent agents playing the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game following the simple "win-stay, loose-shift" strategy is studied. Individuals with binary behavior, such as they can either cooperate (C) or defect (D), play repeatedly with their neighbors (Von Neumann's and Moore's neighborhoods). Their utilities in each round of the game are given by a rescaled payoff matrix described by a single parameter Tau, which measures the ratio of 'temptation to defect' to 'reward for cooperation'. Depending on the region of the parameter space Tau, the system self-organizes - after a transient - into dynamical equilibrium states characterized by different definite fractions of C agents (2 states for the Von Neumann neighborhood and 4 for Moore neighborhood). For some ranges of Tau the cluster size distributions, the power spectrums P(f) and the perimeter-area curves follow power-law scalings. Percolation below threshold is also found for D agent clusters. We also analyze the asynchronous dynamics version of this model and compare results.Comment: Accepted for publication in JSTA

The Gift that Keeps One Living

This long-form narrative feature article reports on the shortage of living kidney donors and those in desperate need of kidney transplants. It features interviews with doctors, transplant coordinators, patients, living kidney donors, and kidney recipients. The story culminates with my own personal experience as a kidney donor to my late dad over a decade ago. The presentation includes an extensive photo component capturing characters and elements from the story through a series of detailed portraits, photo essays, and infographics.https://saxelrod718.wixsite.com/livingkidneydonor

Henri Temianka Correspondence; (axelrod)

This collection contains material pertaining to the life, career, and activities of Henri Temianka, violin virtuoso, conductor, music teacher, and author. Materials include correspondence, concert programs and flyers, music scores, photographs, and books.https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/temianka_correspondence/1098/thumbnail.jp

Social diversity and promotion of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game

The diversity in wealth and social status is present not only among humans, but throughout the animal world. We account for this observation by generating random variables that determ ine the social diversity of players engaging in the prisoner's dilemma game. Here the term social diversity is used to address extrinsic factors that determine the mapping of game pay offs to individual fitness. These factors may increase or decrease the fitness of a player depending on its location on the spatial grid. We consider different distributions of extrin sic factors that determine the social diversity of players, and find that the power-law distribution enables the best promotion of cooperation. The facilitation of the cooperative str ategy relies mostly on the inhomogeneous social state of players, resulting in the formation of cooperative clusters which are ruled by socially high-ranking players that are able to prevail against the defectors even when there is a large temptation to defect. To confirm this, we also study the impact of spatially correlated social diversity and find that coopera tion deteriorates as the spatial correlation length increases. Our results suggest that the distribution of wealth and social status might have played a crucial role by the evolution of cooperation amongst egoistic individuals.Comment: 5 two-column pages, 5 figure