Is there a connection between the tax administration and the political power?

This paper offers empirical evidence from Spain of a connection between the tax administration and the political power. Firstly, the regional tax administration is not immune to the budgetary situation of regional government, and tends to exert a greater (or lesser) effort in tax collection the greater (or lower) the (expected) public deficit. At the same time, the system of unconditional grants from the central layer of government provokes an ¿income effect¿ which disincentivises the efforts of the tax administration. Secondly, these efforts also decrease when the margin to lose a parliamentary seat in an electoral district is cut, although the importance of this disincentive decreases according to the parliamentary strength of the incumbent- Aquest article oferix proves empíriques d'Espanya d'una connexió entre l'administració fiscal i el poder polític. En primer lloc, l'administració regional fiscal no és immune a la situació pressupostària de govern regional, i tendeix a exercir un major (o menor) l'esforç en la col·lecció fiscal el major (o més baix) el dèficit (esperat) públic. Al mateix temps, el sistema de subvencions incondicionals de la capa central de govern provoca " un efecte d'ingrés " que el desànim es disminuïx segons la força parlamentària de l'encarregat

Is there a connection between the tax administration and the political power?

This paper offers empirical evidence from Spain of a connection between the tax administration and the political power. Firstly, the regional tax administration is not immune to the budgetary situation of regional government, and tends to exert a greater (or lesser) effort in tax collection the greater (or lower) the (expected) public deficit. At the same time, the system of unconditional grants from the central layer of government provokes an income effect which disincentivises the efforts of the tax administration. Secondly, these efforts also decrease when the margin to lose a parliamentary seat in an electoral district is cut, although the importance of this disincentive decreases according to the parliamentary strength of the incumbent.political economy, tax administration

Tax Evasion in Interrelated Taxes

In 1969, Shoup postulated that the presence of interrelated taxes in a tax system would reinforce the system of tax penalty ("self-reinforcing penalty system of taxes"). In this paper, we have tried to formally develop this idea. We find that in order that tax re-enforcement holds, it is necessary that the interrelated taxes are administered by a single tax administration, or in the case that they are administered by different tax administrations, the level of collaboration between them has to be high enough. If that is the case, tax evasion in interrelated taxes might be considered as an alternative explanation of the existing gap between the levels of tax evasion that can be guessed in practice and those much lower predicted by the classical theory of tax evasion (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Yitzhaki, 1974). Otherwise, the result expected by Shoup might even reverse. Moreover, as long as collaboration is imperfect, the classical results of the comparative statics might change, since in some cases although global tax compliance increases in front of a variation in a tax parameter, it can decrease in a tax.Tax Evasion

The Politics of Tax Administration: Evidence from Spain

Does there exist a connection between the political power and the tax administration? In this paper, we offer empirical evidence from Spain that there exists. First, the Spanish regional tax administration is not immune to the budgetary situation of the regional government, and tends to exert a greater (lower) effort in tax collection as the (expected) public deficit is greater (lower). At the same time, the system of unconditional grants provokes an “income effect” that disincentives the efforts carried out by the tax administration. Second, when the margin to lose a parliamentary seat in an electoral district decreases, the efforts also diminish, though this disincentive is lessened according to the parliamentary strength of the incumbent (evidence of electoral competition).Tax Administration, Political Economy

US Excise Tax Horizontal Interdependence: Yardstick vs. Tax Competition

US excise tax rates are state interdependent. For example, a one-cent increase in the cigarette tax rate implies a contemporaneous cigarette tax increase of 0.18 cents in the neighboring state, while in the case of gasoline taxation the reaction to the same rise is just 0.11 cents. However, identifying the source of this interaction is key to its normative assessment. Our empirical analysis – spanning the period 1992 to 2006 – finds that interdependence in the case of gasoline taxation is driven just by the (fear of) base mobility. By contrast, in the case of cigarette taxation, it is politically driven: only states with non-term limited governors react (providing evidence of yardstick competition), especially as the election year approaches. Additionally, cigarette taxes tend to be lower when the election year approaches, but again only under non-term limited governors, while the existence of smokers in the state tends to reduce the level of cigarette taxation independently of the electoral cycle and of the presence of a term limited governor.vertical tax competition; yardstick competition; termlimit; election year

Vertical income tax externalities and fiscal interdependence: evidence from the US

Concurrent taxation is a feature of many federal systems. As a consequence of this fact, the tax policy of one level of government affects the tax base of the other. This paper carries out a theoretical analysis of the interdependent tax-setting decisions of federal and regional governments, paying special attention to institutional features that characterise the U.S. federal system in practice and that formally link the taxes employed at various levels of government (i.e.: tax deductibility). The developed hypotheses are tested with data corresponding to the U.S. personal income taxes for the last decade. We find that when the federal government increases taxes, there is a significant positive response of regional taxes. --

An empirical analysis of wealth taxation: Equity Vs.tax compliance

Capital taxation is currently under debate, basically due to problems of administrative control and proper assessment of the levied assets. We analyze both problems focusing on a capital tax, the annual wealth tax (WT), which is only applied in five OECD countries, being Spain one of them. We concentrate our analysis on top 1% adult population, which permits us to describe the evolution of wealth concentration in Spain along 1983-2001. On average top 1% holds about 18% of total wealth, which rises to 19% when tax incompliance and under-assessment is corrected for housing, the main asset. The evolution suggests wealth concentration has risen. Regarding WT, we analyze whether it helps to reduce wealth inequality or, on the contrary, it reinforces vertical inequity (due to especial concessions) and horizontal inequity (due to the de iure and to de facto different treatment of assets). We analyze in detail housing and equity shares. By means of a time series analysis, we relate the reported values with reasonable price indicators and proxies of the propensity to save. We infer net tax compliance is extremely low, which includes both what we commonly understand by (gross) tax compliance and the degree of under-assessment due to fiscal legislation (for housing). That is especially true for housing, whose level of net tax compliance is well below 50%. Hence, we corroborate the difficulties in taxing capital, and so cast doubts on the current role of the WT in Spain in reducing wealth inequality.Wealth tax, wealth distribution, tax compliance.

El debat alemany sobre els mitjans públics

El debat alemany sobre els mitjans públic

Forecasting limits in personalised medicine

La medicina personalitzada significa trobar el tractament adequat per al pacient adequat en el moment adequat. Per bé que aquesta és una idea molt global i molt simple, és molt difícil d'aconseguir. Fer-ho requereix un esforç conjunt dels professionals de tots els àmbits: científics, polítics, advocats, economistes, etcètera, així com de sinergies entre investigadors, companyies farmacèutiques i biotecnològiques, i entre el sector públic i el privat. En la medicina personalitzada del càncer, un tumor s'analitza segons la genòmica, genètica, epigenòmica, característiques cel·lulars i bioquímiques que té, i se cerca la baula més feble per a millorar la probabilitat que el pacient respongui bé a la teràpia escollida. Els nombrosos avantatges d'aquest enfocament fan que sigui crucial per a donar suport a la investigació que conduirà al descobriment de nous biomarcadors, capaços de predir la sensibilitat d'un pacient als medicaments, per al seu ús en la medicina personalitzada.Personalised medicine means finding the right treatment for the right patient at the right time. Although this is a very global, very simple idea, it is nonetheless very difficult to achieve. To do so requires a concerted effort from professionals in all fields: scientists, politicians, lawyers, economists, etc., as well as synergies between researchers, pharmaceutical and biotech companies, and between the public and private sectors. In personalised cancer medicine, a tumour is analysed according to its genomics, genetics, epigenetics, epigenomics cellular features, and biochemistry, and searches for its weakest link in order to improve the likelihood that the patient will respond to the therapy chosen accordingly. The numerous advantages of this approach make it crucial to support the research that will lead to the discovery of new markers ,capable of predicting a patient’s sensitivity to drugs, for their use in personalised medicine

The army in Septimio Severo’s politic : some considerations

El III de la era cristiana, siglo en que se sitúa el comienzo de la dinastía severa, fue y es considerado uno de los períodos más críticos de la historia de Roma debido a la difícil crisis coyuntural que atravesó el Imperio. El gobierno de los emperadores severos quedó caracterizado políticamente, por la vasta historiografía especializada, como "monarquía militar", con clara connotación negativa. Es la intención del presente trabajo investigar sobre la importancia que el ejército cumplió en la conformación de la política del primer emperador de la dinastía severa, Lucio Septimio Severo.The third century of the Christian era, when the beginning of the Severe dynasty is dated, was and is considered one of the most critical periods in the history of Rome, due to the diff icult conjuncture crisis that crossed the Empire. The Severe emperors’ government remained characterized politically for the vast specialized historiography, like a “military monarchy", with clear negative connotation. This study tends to investigate the importance fulfi lled by the army in shaping imperial policy of the fi rst emperor of the Severe dynasty, Lucius Septimius Severus.Fil: Esteller, Lorena. Instituto Superior del Profesorado N°2 Dr. Joaquín V. González (Rafaela, Santa Fe, Argentina