Whole-Page Optimization and Submodular Welfare Maximization with Online Bidders

In the context of online ad serving, display ads may appear on different types of webpages, where each page includes several ad slots and therefore multiple ads can be shown on each page. The set of ads that can be assigned to ad slots of the same page needs to satisfy various prespecified constraints including exclusion constraints, diversity constraints, and the like. Upon arrival of a user, the ad serving system needs to allocate a set of ads to the current webpage respecting these per-page allocation constraints. Previous slot-based settings ignore the important concept of a page and may lead to highly suboptimal results in general. In this article, motivated by these applications in display advertising and inspired by the submodular welfare maximization problem with online bidders, we study a general class of page-based ad allocation problems, present the first (tight) constant-factor approximation algorithms for these problems, and confirm the performance of our algorithms experimentally on real-world datasets. A key technical ingredient of our results is a novel primal-dual analysis for handling free disposal, which updates dual variables using a “level function” instead of a single level and unifies with previous analyses of related problems. This new analysis method allows us to handle arbitrarily complicated allocation constraints for each page. Our main result is an algorithm that achieves a 1 &minus frac 1 e &minus o(1)-competitive ratio. Moreover, our experiments on real-world datasets show significant improvements of our page-based algorithms compared to the slot-based algorithms. Finally, we observe that our problem is closely related to the submodular welfare maximization (SWM) problem. In particular, we introduce a variant of the SWM problem with online bidders and show how to solve this problem using our algorithm for whole-page optimization.postprin

Whole-page Optimization and Submodular Welfare Maximization with Online Bidders

In the context of online ad serving, display ads may appear on different types of web-pages, where each page includes several ad slots and therefore multiple ads can be shown on each page. The set of ads that can be assigned to ad slots of the same page needs to satisfy various pre-specified constraints including exclusion constraints, diversity constraints, and the like. Upon arrival of a user, the ad serving system needs to allocate a set of ads to the current web-page respecting these per-page allocation constraints. Previous slot-based settings ignore the important concept of a page, and may lead to highly suboptimal results in general. In this paper, motivated by these applications in display advertising and inspired by the submodular welfare maximization problem with online bidders, we study a general class of page-based ad allocation problems, present the first (tight) constant-factor approximation algorithms for these problems, and confirm the performance of our algorithms experimentally on real-world data sets. A key technical ingredient of our results is a novel primal-dual analysis for handling free-disposal, which updates dual variables using a "level function" instead of a single level, and unifies with previous analyses of related problems. This new analysis method allows us to handle arbitrarily complicated allocation constraints for each page. Our main result is an algorithm that achieves a 1 − 1 e − o(1) competitive ratio. Moreover, our experiments on real-world data sets show significant improvements of our page-based algorithms compared to the slot-based algorithms. Finally, we observe that our problem is closely related to the submodular welfare maximization (SWM) problem. In particular, we introduce a variant of the SWM problem with online bidders, and show how to solve this problem using our algorithm for whole page optimization

Implementation in Advised Strategies: Welfare Guarantees from Posted-Price Mechanisms When Demand Queries Are NP-Hard

State-of-the-art posted-price mechanisms for submodular bidders with $m$ items achieve approximation guarantees of $O((\log \log m)^3)$ [Assadi and Singla, 2019]. Their truthfulness, however, requires bidders to compute an NP-hard demand-query. Some computational complexity of this form is unavoidable, as it is NP-hard for truthful mechanisms to guarantee even an $m^{1/2-\varepsilon}$-approximation for any $\varepsilon > 0$ [Dobzinski and Vondr\'ak, 2016]. Together, these establish a stark distinction between computationally-efficient and communication-efficient truthful mechanisms. We show that this distinction disappears with a mild relaxation of truthfulness, which we term implementation in advised strategies, and that has been previously studied in relation to "Implementation in Undominated Strategies" [Babaioff et al, 2009]. Specifically, advice maps a tentative strategy either to that same strategy itself, or one that dominates it. We say that a player follows advice as long as they never play actions which are dominated by advice. A poly-time mechanism guarantees an $\alpha$-approximation in implementation in advised strategies if there exists poly-time advice for each player such that an $\alpha$-approximation is achieved whenever all players follow advice. Using an appropriate bicriterion notion of approximate demand queries (which can be computed in poly-time), we establish that (a slight modification of) the [Assadi and Singla, 2019] mechanism achieves the same $O((\log \log m)^3)$-approximation in implementation in advised strategies

A Tight Competitive Ratio for Online Submodular Welfare Maximization

In this paper we consider the online Submodular Welfare (SW) problem. In this problem we are given $n$ bidders each equipped with a general (not necessarily monotone) submodular utility and $m$ items that arrive online. The goal is to assign each item, once it arrives, to a bidder or discard it, while maximizing the sum of utilities. When an adversary determines the items' arrival order we present a simple randomized algorithm that achieves a tight competitive ratio of \nicefrac{1}{4}. The algorithm is a specialization of an algorithm due to [Harshaw-Kazemi-Feldman-Karbasi MOR`22], who presented the previously best known competitive ratio of $3-2\sqrt{2}\approx 0.171573$ to the problem. When the items' arrival order is uniformly random, we present a competitive ratio of $\approx 0.27493$, improving the previously known \nicefrac{1}{4} guarantee. Our approach for the latter result is based on a better analysis of the (offline) Residual Random Greedy (RRG) algorithm of [Buchbinder-Feldman-Naor-Schwartz SODA`14], which we believe might be of independent interest

Mechanism Design for Perturbation Stable Combinatorial Auctions

Motivated by recent research on combinatorial markets with endowed valuations by (Babaioff et al., EC 2018) and (Ezra et al., EC 2020), we introduce a notion of perturbation stability in Combinatorial Auctions (CAs) and study the extend to which stability helps in social welfare maximization and mechanism design. A CA is $\gamma\textit{-stable}$ if the optimal solution is resilient to inflation, by a factor of $\gamma \geq 1$, of any bidder's valuation for any single item. On the positive side, we show how to compute efficiently an optimal allocation for 2-stable subadditive valuations and that a Walrasian equilibrium exists for 2-stable submodular valuations. Moreover, we show that a Parallel 2nd Price Auction (P2A) followed by a demand query for each bidder is truthful for general subadditive valuations and results in the optimal allocation for 2-stable submodular valuations. To highlight the challenges behind optimization and mechanism design for stable CAs, we show that a Walrasian equilibrium may not exist for $\gamma$-stable XOS valuations for any $\gamma$, that a polynomial-time approximation scheme does not exist for $(2-\epsilon)$-stable submodular valuations, and that any DSIC mechanism that computes the optimal allocation for stable CAs and does not use demand queries must use exponentially many value queries. We conclude with analyzing the Price of Anarchy of P2A and Parallel 1st Price Auctions (P1A) for CAs with stable submodular and XOS valuations. Our results indicate that the quality of equilibria of simple non-truthful auctions improves only for $\gamma$-stable instances with $\gamma \geq 3$

The Power of Verification for Greedy Mechanism Design

Greedy algorithms are known to provide near optimal approximation guarantees for Combinatorial Auctions (CAs) with multidimensional bidders, ignoring incentive compatibility. Borodin and Lucier [5] however proved that truthful greedy-like mechanisms for CAs with multi-minded bidders do not achieve good approximation guarantees. In this work, we seek a deeper understanding of greedy mechanism design and investigate under which general assumptions, we can have efficient and truthful greedy mechanisms for CAs. Towards this goal, we use the framework of priority algorithms and weak and strong verification, where the bidders are not allowed to overbid on their winning set or on any subsets of this set, respectively. We provide a complete characterization of the power of weak verification showing that it is sufficient and necessary for any greedy fixed priority algorithm to become truthful with the use of money or not, depending on the ordering of the bids. Moreover, we show that strong verification is sufficient and necessary for the greedy algorithm of [20], which is 2-approximate for submodular CAs, to become truthful with money in finite bidding domains. Our proof is based on an interesting structural analysis of the strongly connected components of the declaration graph

Matroid Online Bipartite Matching and Vertex Cover

The Adwords and Online Bipartite Matching problems have enjoyed a renewed attention over the past decade due to their connection to Internet advertising. Our community has contributed, among other things, new models (notably stochastic) and extensions to the classical formulations to address the issues that arise from practical needs. In this paper, we propose a new generalization based on matroids and show that many of the previous results extend to this more general setting. Because of the rich structures and expressive power of matroids, our new setting is potentially of interest both in theory and in practice. In the classical version of the problem, the offline side of a bipartite graph is known initially while vertices from the online side arrive one at a time along with their incident edges. The objective is to maintain a decent approximate matching from which no edge can be removed. Our generalization, called Matroid Online Bipartite Matching, additionally requires that the set of matched offline vertices be independent in a given matroid. In particular, the case of partition matroids corresponds to the natural scenario where each advertiser manages multiple ads with a fixed total budget. Our algorithms attain the same performance as the classical version of the problems considered, which are often provably the best possible. We present $1-1/e$-competitive algorithms for Matroid Online Bipartite Matching under the small bid assumption, as well as a $1-1/e$-competitive algorithm for Matroid Online Bipartite Matching in the random arrival model. A key technical ingredient of our results is a carefully designed primal-dual waterfilling procedure that accommodates for matroid constraints. This is inspired by the extension of our recent charging scheme for Online Bipartite Vertex Cover.Comment: 19 pages, to appear in EC'1

Near-Optimal Asymmetric Binary Matrix Partitions

We study the asymmetric binary matrix partition problem that was recently introduced by Alon et al. (Proceedings of the 9th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), pp 1–14, 2013). Instances of the problem consist of an n× m binary matrix A and a probability distribution over its columns. A partition schemeB= (B1, … , Bn) consists of a partition Bifor each row i of A. The partition Biacts as a smoothing operator on row i that distributes the expected value of each partition subset proportionally to all its entries. Given a scheme B that induces a smooth matrix AB, the partition value is the expected maximum column entry of AB. The objective is to find a partition scheme such that the resulting partition value is maximized. We present a 9/10-approximation algorithm for the case where the probability distribution is uniform and a (1 - 1 / e) -approximation algorithm for non-uniform distributions, significantly improving results of Alon et al. Although our first algorithm is combinatorial (and very simple), the analysis is based on linear programming and duality arguments. In our second result we exploit a nice relation of the problem to submodular welfare maximization