Scientific Realism without Rigid Designation in Kant's Analogies

In Kant, Science, and Human Nature, Robert Hanna argues against a version of scientific realism founded on the Kripke/Putnam theory of reference, and defends a Kant-inspired manifest realism in its place. I reject Kriple/Putnam for different reasons than Hanna does, and argue that what should replace it is not manifest realism, but Kant‘s own scientific realism, which rests on a radically different theory of reference. Kant holds that we picture manifest objects by uniting manifolds of sensation using concepts-qua-inferential-rules. When these rules are demonstrated to be invalid, we replace the picture of the macroscopic world with a picture of the microscopic entities of theoretical science that unites the very same manifolds using different rules of inference. Thus, we refer to "unobservable" theoretical entities in the same way that we do manifest ones: by specifying both their determinate location in space and time and the concepts by which they are understood

Wittgenstein on rules and practices

Some readers of Wittgenstein---I discuss Robert Brandom---think that his writings contain a regress argument showing that the notion of participating in a practice is more basic than the notion of following a rule, in explanations of linguistic correctness. But the regress argument bears equally on both these notions: if there is an explanatory regress of rules, then there is an explanatory regress of practices as well. Why then does Wittgenstein invoke the notion of a practice, apparently by way of diagnosing the error on which the regress argument rests? I suggest that he invokes that notion to emphasize certain aspects of rule-following which we are apt to neglect, when we forget that rule-following is---not, rests upon---participating in a practice. When we appreciate those aspects of rule/practice-following we see the flaw in both regress arguments

Economic essence of production inventory

This study investigated 202 elementary school childrens judgements and reasoning about transgressions when school rules regulating these transgressions have been removed in hypothetical school situations. As expected, moral transgressions were judged as more wrong and less accepted than structuring, protecting and etiquette transgressions. In turn, etiquette transgressions were judged as less wrong and more accepted than moral, structuring and protecting transgressions. Structuring transgressions were judged beyond expectations as more wrong and less accepted than protecting transgressions. Judgements and justifications made by the children showed that they discriminated between transgressions as a function of school-rule category (relational/moral rules, structuring rules, protecting rules and etiquette rules). The findings confirm as well as extend previous social-cognitive domain theory research on childrens socio-moral reasoning.This is an electronic version of an article published in: Robert Thornberg, A study of children’s conceptions of school rules by investigating their judgements of transgressions in the absence of rules, 2010, Educational Psychology, (30), 5, 583-603. Educational Psychology is available online at informaworldTM: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01443410.2010.492348 Copyright: Taylor &amp; Francis http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/default.asp</p

In the Shadow of a Myth: Bargaining for Same-Sex Divorce

This Article explores a relatively new phenomenon in family law: same-sex divorce. The Article\u27s central claim is that parties to the first wave of same-sex divorces are not effectively bargaining against the backdrop of legal dissolution rules that would govern in the absence of an agreement. In other words, to use Robert Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser\u27s terminology, they are not bargaining in the shadow of the law. Instead, the Article argues, many same-sex couples today bargain in the shadow of a myth that same-sex couples are egalitarian—that there are no vulnerable parties or power differentials in same-sex divorce. The Article shows how a myth of egalitarianism undermines current bargaining for same-sex divorce. First, the myth leads to what the Article calls “divorce exceptionalism,” that is, when a party claims that existing marriage dissolution rules do not apply in same-sex divorce because they were designed to remedy the nonegalitarian conditions of different-sex marriages. Divorce exceptionalism disables effective bargaining because without default legal rules there is nothing to guide the bargaining process. Second, the myth of egalitarianism eliminates key bargaining chips: under a presumption of formal equality neither party really has anything to “give” or “get” in the bargain for divorce. Finally, the myth, combined with the general fog of uncertainty regarding how courts will treat same-sex divorces, may lead to increased strategic behavior. The Article proposes a realistic solution, arguing that the legal actors who participate in same-sex divorce, including lawyers, mediators, courts, and the parties themselves, should reject divorce exceptionalism and apply ordinary divorce rules. It also proposes to protect vulnerable parties by extending to same-sex divorce the current trend toward joint-custody presumptions. The myth of egalitarianism in same-sex couples, which was quite helpful in achieving marriage equality, is now haunting the first wave of same-sex divorces and harming vulnerable parties. It is time to let it go and address the reality of same-sex relationships

A Seventh Take on Jacques

Since Jeff Wasserstrom posted a round-up of reviews of Martin Jacques’ When China Rules the World, pieces that reference the book have continued to be published, including a column by Robert Samuelson at the Wall Street Journalthat calls Jacques’ book ”masterful.” Jacques, meanwhile, published another op-ed on China and the US last week titled ”Crouching Dragon, Weakened Eagle” in the International Herald Tribune. Below, Harald Bockman raises his concerns about the on-going attention Jacques’ book is receiving, and points out—despite that attention—the weakness in the book that most reviewers are still missing

Relationships in Financial Services: Are Anti-Tying Restrictions Out of Date?

Since 1970, U.S. law has prohibited banks from tying their loans to other non-banking products, even if the bundle of services is offered at a discount to customers. Sometimes in the temporary zeal to enforce a particular law, policymakers forget to ask the basic question of whether the underlying law makes sense. In this case, it doesn't. Robert Litan argues that the time clearly has come for the flat prohibition against bank tying of loans to be replaced by the rules of the antitrust laws. Of course, the law requiring banks to book their loans at arms-length market terms should remain in force to prevent banks from under-pricing their loans in order to land other business. Too radical, you might say. Then, Litan recommendsinitially replace the tying prohibition with an antitrust rule only for the large, publicly held companies that already have issued or want to issue commercial paper, the market's best alternative to bank lending. Why shouldn't these borrowers get the same benefits that they can get when purchasing other goods and services? Also, viewDr. Litan's press releasefor this article.Technology and Industry, Regulatory Reform

The Role and Responsibility of Defense Counsel

How does a defense attorney\u27s role change when defending a high-profile client? Beyond traditional legal defense, must a modern defense attorney seek to protect a client\u27s public image? When speaking with the media, what rules, if any, should constrain a defense attorney\u27s behavior? Does media coverage affect the fairness of a trial? These are some of the questions dealt with in Panel #4: The Role Of Defense Counsel, moderated by Robert Mosteller, and featuring Laurie Levenson, Michael Tigar and Harold Haddon. Laurie Levenson begins the discussion by outlining some of the rules governing attorney behavior in the media, with special emphasis on the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Next, Michael Tigar discusses how the press has traditionally served as a watchdog against government misconduct in high-profile cases, and how media coverage of cases from his own career has helped his clients. Lastly, Harold Haddon provides a word of caution about the dangers attorneys face in using the media in high-profile cases and discusses how media coverage can hurt defendants by leading to premature public judgment. Questions/themes/discussion topics ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6: Trial Publicity Attorney conduct not prohibited by ABA MRPC 3.6 Media gag orders Allowing video cameras in the courtroom Proposed rules to govern legal commentators unconnected to a proceeding Historic instances of media coverage acting as a judicial watchdog Examples of media coverage aiding defendants in high-profile cases The effect of defense attorney\u27 statements on the public perception of defendants The difficulty of changing public perception of a defendant\u27s guilt or innocenc

The rules verses discretion debate over monetary policy in the 1920s

The question of whether monetary policy should be guided by legislated rules or left to the discretion of the policymaker has been a subject of debate since the early days of central banking. An important episode of the debate occurred in the 1920s when Kansas Congressman James Strong introduced legislation (the Strong bill) which was intended to institutionalize the price level stabilization policy that Benjamin Strong had implicitly followed as head of the New York Federal Reserve Bank from 1923 to 1927. In this article, Robert Hetzel reviews the debate which took place in the congressional hearings on the Strong bill. The hearings indicate that Benjamin Strong’s policy was based on his belief that the Fed had the ability to influence the price level by controlling levels of bank reserves. However, the Board of Governors represented by Adolph Miller denied the causal influence of the supply of money on the price level. Miller instead advocated a policy based on the Real Bills Doctrine, according to which the Fed need only be concerned with “speculative” extensions of bank credit. Hetzel points out that an understanding of these fundamental disagreements is essential if one is to appreciate fully the impact that Benjamin Strong’s death and the resulting shift in power from the New York Fed to the Board in Washington had on monetary policy during the Depression.Monetary policy

The Still Questionable Role of Private Legislatures

In 1995, Robert Scott and I published the first formally analyzed private law making bodies such as the American Law Institute ( ALI ) and the National Conference ofCommissioners on Uniform State Laws ( NCCUSL ) function. Adapting models drawn from the modem positive political theory literature, we predicted that a private legislature (a PL ) would: (a) have a status quo bias, rejecting serious reforms; (b) adopt rules (as opposed to standards) when lobbied by a single interest group; and (c) adopt standards, or succumb to paralysis, when lobbied by competing groups. The impressionistic evidence and a content analysis of the U.C.C. and the ALI Corporate Governance rules were consistent with the models\u27 results. Because we focused on private legislatures, we did not make a serious comparison between the competencies of these legislatures and ordinary legislative bodies. Nevertheless, we speculated that an ordinary legislature would perform well relative to a PL because it would have better mechanisms for resolving the claims of competing interest groups, and would be better able to find facts relevant to proposed laws. We did not recommend that the ALI and NCCUSL be abolished. Rather, we argued that these bodies should return to their original mission-to treat only subjects where society had reached a consensus on the relevant values, if that consensus could be translated into law with the use of traditional legal expertise alone. Our article attracted a fair amount of criticism which focused primarily on the accuracy of certain assumptions of the assumptions models. No critic has shown, however, that the models were solved incorrectly, nor has any critic provided a competing theory that accurately predicts, as our theoretical results did, that an Article 2 revision, if it passed, would contain mainly standards; that the revised Article 9 would contain mainly rules; and that the Products Liability Restatement would choose standards so vacuous as to retain the status quo. Our conclusions were tentatively stated, however, because our formal work was preliminary and our data was impressionistically assembled. Thus, we concluded by remarking the need for more theory and more evidence relating to how private law-making groups function before a conclusivejudgment could be drawn regarding just when, if ever, a PL would function well. Robert Rasmussen\u27s paper for this Symposium contains numerous interesting insights, but it does not respond to this need