Symbol grounding and its implications for artificial intelligence

In response to Searle's well-known Chinese room argument against Strong AI (and more generally, computationalism), Harnad proposed that if the symbols manipulated by a robot were sufficiently grounded in the real world, then the robot could be said to literally understand. In this article, I expand on the notion of symbol groundedness in three ways. Firstly, I show how a robot might select the best set of categories describing the world, given that fundamentally continuous sensory data can be categorised in an almost infinite number of ways. Secondly, I discuss the notion of grounded abstract (as opposed to concrete) concepts. Thirdly, I give an objective criterion for deciding when a robot's symbols become sufficiently grounded for "understanding" to be attributed to it. This deeper analysis of what symbol groundedness actually is weakens Searle's position in significant ways; in particular, whilst Searle may be able to refute Strong AI in the specific context of present-day digital computers, he cannot refute computationalism in general

What is a digital state?

There is much discussion about whether the human mind is a computer, whether the human brain could be emulated on a computer, and whether at all physical entities are computers (pancomputationalism). These discussions, and others, require criteria for what is digital. I propose that a state is digital if and only if it is a token of a type that serves a particular function - typically a representational function for the system. This proposal is made on a syntactic level, assuming three levels of description (physical, syntactic, semantic). It suggests that being digital is a matter of discovery or rather a matter of how we wish to describe the world, if a functional description can be assumed. Given the criterion provided and the necessary empirical research, we should be in a position to decide on a given system (e.g. the human brain) whether it is a digital system and can thus be reproduced in a different digital system (since digital systems allow multiple realization)

Plato and the Internet: Liberating Knowledge From Our Heads

My aim in this paper is to look at corporate knowledge engineering and see what it tells us about the philosophy of knowledge. The question I am asking is whether there is anything specific in engineering that could change our understanding of what or how we know. I am interested less in generating a theory of the relationship, rather more in raising a set of questions which I hope will stimulate a dialogue between the disciplines of knowledge and engineering. The distinguished computer scientist Edsger Dijkstra, once said that “Computer science is no more about computers than astronomy is about telescopes”, and in that spirit I want to argue that epistemology is no more about people than astronomy is about telescopes. This paper is in five sections. To begin with, I will provide a caricature of the philosophy of knowledge. Second, I want to look at where traditional epistemology fails to connect with people’s actual problems concerning knowledge. Third, I will look at the situation in reverse and think about who - or what - is the knowing subject and what epistemology would look like if actual practical problems were its starting point. Next will come a brief digression on knowledge technologies, before some tentatively-expressed (but no less firmly held) conclusions about the relationship between engineering and philosophy

Electronic Persons?

To describe computers and sophisticated robots, many people today have no problem using personal attributes. Alan Turing published his famous intelligence test in 1950. From that time onwards, computers have gained increasingly higher status in this regard. Computers and robots nowadays are not only intelligent. They perceive, they remember, they understand, they decide, they play and so on. Recently, another such step has occurred but, this time, many researchers are seriously concerned. In February 2017, the European Parliament passed a Resolution to attribute legal personhood to intelligent robots. If this is accepted as law, it will have very serious consequences for our self-understanding and for the way we live together as a community. The EU Resolution has stimulated various studies, arising mainly from the area of legal studies. It is urgent that the response include also a philosophical evaluation regarding the fundamental concepts at play. This paper seeks to make a contribution precisely in this area. It explores the attribution of legal personhood to machines by focusing on what is happening at the level of meaning. It explores crucial concepts like responsibility, autonomy, person and quasi-person by drawing inspiration from the seminal works of Aristotle and L. Wittgenstein and from the ensuing debates between current philosophers like P. Hacker and D. Dennett. The results of this paper indicate what dangers could lie ahead and what could be the right way to avoid them

Using an interactive whiteboard and a computer-programming tool to support the development of the key competencies in the New Zealand curriculum

Does children’s use of the software Scratch provide potential for the enhancement of key competencies as they work in pairs at the interactive whiteboard (IWB)? This article looks at how children using Scratch collaborated and managed their projects as they set about designing, constructing, testing and evaluating a game for others to play, a task that provided a sustained challenge over six weeks and beyond. The findings showed that the key competencies of participating, contributing, and relating to others were enhanced by the collaborative use of Scratch at the IWB, and that creative and conceptual thinking processes were sustained. Children became increasingly adept at using Scratch, and some children, previously thought to have poor social skills, began to articulate their understandings to others. While a guiding and scaffolding role was evident in teachers’ actions, close monitoring of group progress and direct input from teachers is required to keep the challenge high but achievable, and to extend children’s knowledge and thinking as they use Scratch at the IWB

The "Artificial Mathematician" Objection: Exploring the (Im)possibility of Automating Mathematical Understanding

Reuben Hersh confided to us that, about forty years ago, the late Paul Cohen predicted to him that at some unspecified point in the future, mathematicians would be replaced by computers. Rather than focus on computers replacing mathematicians, however, our aim is to consider the (im)possibility of human mathematicians being joined by “artificial mathematicians” in the proving practice—not just as a method of inquiry but as a fellow inquirer

Quantum Computing: Pro and Con

I assess the potential of quantum computation. Broad and important applications must be found to justify construction of a quantum computer; I review some of the known quantum algorithms and consider the prospects for finding new ones. Quantum computers are notoriously susceptible to making errors; I discuss recently developed fault-tolerant procedures that enable a quantum computer with noisy gates to perform reliably. Quantum computing hardware is still in its infancy; I comment on the specifications that should be met by future hardware. Over the past few years, work on quantum computation has erected a new classification of computational complexity, has generated profound insights into the nature of decoherence, and has stimulated the formulation of new techniques in high-precision experimental physics. A broad interdisciplinary effort will be needed if quantum computers are to fulfill their destiny as the world's fastest computing devices. (This paper is an expanded version of remarks that were prepared for a panel discussion at the ITP Conference on Quantum Coherence and Decoherence, 17 December 1996.)Comment: 17 pages, LaTeX, submitted to Proc. Roy. Soc. Lond. A, minor correction

Popular education and the digital citizen: a genealogical analysis

This paper historicises and problematises the concept of the digital citizen and how it is constructed in Sweden today. Specifically, it examines the role of popular education in such an entanglement. It makes use of a genealogical analysis to produce a critical ‘history of the present’ by mapping out the debates and controversies around the emergence of the digital citizen in the 1970s and 1980s, and following to its manifestations in contemporary debates. This article argues that free and voluntary adult education (popular education) is and has been fundamental in efforts to construe the digital citizen. A central argument of the paper is that popular education aiming for digital inclusion is not a 21st century phenomenon; it actually commenced in the 1970s. However, this digitisation of citizens has also changed focus dramatically since the 1970s. During the 1970s, computers and computerisation were described as disconcerting, and as requiring popular education in order to counter the risk of the technology “running wild”. In current discourses, digitalisation is constructed in a non-ideological and post-political way. These post-political tendencies of today can be referred to as a post-digital present where computers have become so ordinary, domesticized and ubiquitous in everyday life that they are thereby also beyond criticism. (DIPF/Orig.

The Annotation Game: On Turing (1950) on Computing, Machinery, and Intelligence

This quote/commented critique of Turing's classical paper suggests that Turing meant -- or should have meant -- the robotic version of the Turing Test (and not just the email version). Moreover, any dynamic system (that we design and understand) can be a candidate, not just a computational one. Turing also dismisses the other-minds problem and the mind/body problem too quickly. They are at the heart of both the problem he is addressing and the solution he is proposing