Counting Incompossibles

We often speak as if there are merely possible people—for example, when we make such claims as that most possible people are never going to be born. Yet most metaphysicians deny that anything is both possibly a person and never born. Since our unreflective talk of merely possible people serves to draw non-trivial distinctions, these metaphysicians owe us some paraphrase by which we can draw those distinctions without committing ourselves to there being merely possible people. We show that such paraphrases are unavailable if we limit ourselves to the expressive resources of even highly infinitary first-order modal languages. We then argue that such paraphrases are available in higher-order modal languages only given certain strong assumptions concerning the metaphysics of properties. We then consider alternative paraphrase strategies, and argue that none of them are tenable. If talk of merely possible people cannot be paraphrased, then it must be taken at face value, in which case it is necessary what individuals there are. Therefore, if it is contingent what individuals there are, then the demands of paraphrase place tight constraints on the metaphysics of properties: either (i) it is necessary what properties there are, or (ii) necessarily equivalent properties are identical, and having properties does not entail even possibly being anything at all

Axiomatization and Models of Scientific Theories

In this paper we discuss two approaches to the axiomatization of scien- tific theories in the context of the so called semantic approach, according to which (roughly) a theory can be seen as a class of models. The two approaches are associated respectively to Suppes’ and to da Costa and Chuaqui’s works. We argue that theories can be developed both in a way more akin to the usual mathematical practice (Suppes), in an informal set theoretical environment, writing the set theoretical predicate in the language of set theory itself or, more rigorously (da Costa and Chuaqui), by employing formal languages that help us in writing the postulates to define a class of structures. Both approaches are called internal, for we work within a mathematical framework, here taken to be first-order ZFC. We contrast these approaches with an external one, here discussed briefly. We argue that each one has its strong and weak points, whose discussion is relevant for the philosophical foundations of science

Global supervenience without reducibility

Does the global supervenience of one class on another entail reductionism, in the sense that any property in the former class is definable from properties in the latter class? This question appears to be at the same time formally tractable and philosophically significant. It seems formally tractable because the concepts involved are susceptible to rigorous definition. It is philosophically significant because in a number of debates about inter-level relationships, there are prima facie plausible positions that presuppose that there is no such entailment: standard versions of non-reductive physicalism and of normative non-naturalism accept global supervenience while rejecting reductionism. I identify a gap in an influential argument for the entailment, due to Frank Jackson and Robert Stalnaker, and draw on the model theory of infinitary languages to argue that some globally supervening properties are not reducible

On Formalism Freeness : Implementing Gödel's 1946 Princeton Bicentennial Lecture

Peer reviewe

Infinitary Logic Has No Expressive Efficiency Over Finitary Logic

We can measure the complexity of a logical formula by counting the number of alternations between existential and universal quantifiers. Suppose that an elementary first-order formula $\varphi$ (in $\mathcal{L}_{\omega,\omega}$) is equivalent to a formula of the infinitary language $\mathcal{L}_{\infty,\omega}$ with $n$ alternations of quantifiers. We prove that $\varphi$ is equivalent to a finitary formula with $n$ alternations of quantifiers. Thus using infinitary logic does not allow us to express a finitary formula in a simpler way.Comment: 19 page

Logics of Finite Hankel Rank

We discuss the Feferman-Vaught Theorem in the setting of abstract model theory for finite structures. We look at sum-like and product-like binary operations on finite structures and their Hankel matrices. We show the connection between Hankel matrices and the Feferman-Vaught Theorem. The largest logic known to satisfy a Feferman-Vaught Theorem for product-like operations is CFOL, first order logic with modular counting quantifiers. For sum-like operations it is CMSOL, the corresponding monadic second order logic. We discuss whether there are maximal logics satisfying Feferman-Vaught Theorems for finite structures.Comment: Appeared in YuriFest 2015, held in honor of Yuri Gurevich's 75th birthday. The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-23534-9_1

The prospects for mathematical logic in the twenty-first century

The four authors present their speculations about the future developments of mathematical logic in the twenty-first century. The areas of recursion theory, proof theory and logic for computer science, model theory, and set theory are discussed independently.Comment: Association for Symbolic Logi