Vector network equilibrium problems with elastic demands

We consider vector models for complex systems with spatially distributed elements which arise in communication and transportation networks. In order to describe the flow distribution within such a network, we utilize the equilibrium approach, which extends the shortest path one. Being based on this approach, we investigate several networking control problems, with taking into account many factors. As a result, general vector equilibrium problems models with complex behavior of elements are suggested. In particular, they involve elastic demand functions. Due to the presence of many factors, we utilize multicriteria models with respect to different preference relations. The corresponding problems admit efficient solution methods within optimization and equilibrium frameworks. © 2011 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC

Application of Market Models to Network Equilibrium Problems

We present a general two-side market model with divisible commodities and price functions of participants. A general existence result on unbounded sets is obtained from its variational inequality re-formulation. We describe an extension of the network flow equilibrium problem with elastic demands and a new equilibrium type model for resource allocation problems in wireless communication networks, which appear to be particular cases of the general market model. This enables us to obtain new existence results for these models as some adjustments of that for the market model. Under certain additional conditions the general market model can be reduced to a decomposable optimization problem where the goal function is the sum of two functions and one of them is convex separable, whereas the feasible set is the corresponding Cartesian product. We discuss some versions of the partial linearization method, which can be applied to these network equilibrium problems.Comment: 18 pages, 3 table

Sensitivity analysis of the variable demand probit stochastic user equilibrium with multiple user classes

This paper presents a formulation of the multiple user class, variable demand, probit stochastic user equilibrium model. Sufficient conditions are stated for differentiability of the equilibrium flows of this model. This justifies the derivation of sensitivity expressions for the equilibrium flows, which are presented in a format that can be implemented in commercially available software. A numerical example verifies the sensitivity expressions, and that this formulation is applicable to large networks

Equilibrium bandwidth and buffer allocations for elastic traffics

Consider a set of users sharing a network node under an allocation scheme that provides each user with a fixed minimum and a random extra amount of bandwidth and buffer. Allocations and prices are adjusted to adapt to resource availability and user demands. Equilibrium is achieved when all users optimize their utility and demand equals supply for nonfree resources. We analyze two models of user behavior. We show that at equilibrium expected return on purchasing variable resources can be higher than that on fixed resources. Thus users must balance the marginal increase in utility due to higher return on variable resources and the marginal decrease in utility due to their variability. For the first user model we further show that at equilibrium where such tradeoff is optimized all users hold strictly positive amounts of variable bandwidth and buffer. For the second model we show that if both variable bandwidth and buffer are scarce then at equilibrium every user either holds both variable resources or none

Bounding the efficiency of road pricing

This paper deals with the following question associated with congestion pricing in a general network with either fixed or elastic travel demand: what is the maximum efficiency loss of a general second-best pricing scheme due to inexact marginal-cost pricing in comparison with the first-best pricing or system optimum case? A formal answer to this question is provided by establishing an inefficiency bound associated with a given road pricing scheme. An application of the methods is provided for the practical trial-and-error implementation of marginal-cost pricing with unknown demand functions

Price of Anarchy for Non-atomic Congestion Games with Stochastic Demands

We generalize the notions of user equilibrium and system optimum to non-atomic congestion games with stochastic demands. We establish upper bounds on the price of anarchy for three different settings of link cost functions and demand distributions, namely, (a) affine cost functions and general distributions, (b) polynomial cost functions and general positive-valued distributions, and (c) polynomial cost functions and the normal distributions. All the upper bounds are tight in some special cases, including the case of deterministic demands.Comment: 31 page