Consciousness and liability of non-human intelligence

The legal liability of non-human intelligence is a complicated matter that has concerned philosophers for a long time. Nevertheless, with the current advances in research and technology, the problem grows ever closer. This paper analyzes the legal desirability of assorting legal liability to a non-human intelligence. It argues that the question of the liability of such agents is defined, primarily, through the meeting of psychosomatic conditionals. Moreover, it poses that these conditionals are, partially, determined by consciousness. It concludes that to define whether legal liability is desirable or not one must set standards for non-human consciousness and, depending on the level of consciousness of that non-human intelligence, judge if the agent should be legally liable or not

Concepts, contents, and consciousness.

In his paper 'Are we ever aware of concepts? A critical question for the Global Neuronal Workspace, Integrated Information, and Attended Intermediate-Level Representation theories of consciousness' (2015, this journal), Kemmerer defends a conservative account of consciousness, according to which concepts and thoughts do not characterize the contents of consciousness, and then uses that account to argue against both the Global Neuronal Workspace theory of consciousness and Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness, and as a point in favour of Prinz's Attended Intermediate-level Representations theory. We argue that there are a number of respects in which the contrast between conservative and liberal conceptions of the admissible contents of consciousness is more complex than Kemmerer's discussion suggests. We then consider Kemmerer's case for conservatism, arguing that it lumbers liberals with commitments that they need not - and in our view should not - endorse. We also argue that Kemmerer's attempt to use his case for conservatism against the Global Neuronal Workspace and Integrated Information theories of consciousness on the one hand, and as a point in favour of Prinz's Attended Intermediate Representations theory on the other hand, is problematic. Finally, we consider Kemmerer's overall strategy of using an account of the admissible contents of consciousness to evaluate theories of consciousness, and suggest that here too there are complications that Kemmerer's discussion overlooks

Thou Art That and Other Essays: Reflections of an Algorithmic Scientist on an Era Between Gods

This book lies at the intersection of religion, science, and philosophy. It builds a bridge between the "perennial philosophy" of the past, which has inspired and provides the foundation for the world's major religions, and the "natural philosophy of organism" of four great philosopher-scientists of the 19th and 20th centuries---Gustav Theodor Fechner, William James, Henri Bergson, and Alfred North Whitehead---who were widely celebrated during their lifetimes, but now have fallen into relative obscurity. Their profound philosophical insights could greatly facilitate our scientific understanding of the natural world and, in particular, the scientific effort currently under way to unravel the mystery of consciousness. They can also help to address the deep spiritual malaise of our present day, which the novelist, John Updike, has aptly characterized as an "Era Between Gods." An overarching theme of this book is that the broadened Cartesian dictum governing much of modern science, namely, "I compute, algorithmically, therefore I think, symbolically, therefore I am, experientially," is today being reversed in a Copernican-like scientific revolution. Only through the acceptance of a new governing scientific principle, which can be stated compactly as "I experience therefore I symbolize therefore I compute," will science be able to progress beyond its current focus on the physical world of "things," and develop a deeper understanding of the psychological and phenomenological realms of nature. The author bases this thesis on the foregoing "natural philosophy of organism," and, over the course of its elaboration, he provides the reader with a survey of a fascinating literature, covering philosophical, spiritual, and scientific works, and ranging from ancient to modern. In particular, he presents a unified and intentionally-poetic introduction to the writings of Fechner, James, Bergson, and Whitehead, the aforementioned four great philosopher-scientists of our modern era

OpenCog Hyperon: A Framework for AGI at the Human Level and Beyond

An introduction to the OpenCog Hyperon framework for Artificiai General Intelligence is presented. Hyperon is a new, mostly from-the-ground-up rewrite/redesign of the OpenCog AGI framework, based on similar conceptual and cognitive principles to the previous OpenCog version, but incorporating a variety of new ideas at the mathematical, software architecture and AI-algorithm level. This review lightly summarizes: 1) some of the history behind OpenCog and Hyperon, 2) the core structures and processes underlying Hyperon as a software system, 3) the integration of this software system with the SingularityNET ecosystem's decentralized infrastructure, 4) the cognitive model(s) being experimentally pursued within Hyperon on the hopeful path to advanced AGI, 5) the prospects seen for advanced aspects like reflective self-modification and self-improvement of the codebase, 6) the tentative development roadmap and various challenges expected to be faced, 7) the thinking of the Hyperon team regarding how to guide this sort of work in a beneficial direction ... and gives links and references for readers who wish to delve further into any of these aspects

Living in a natural world

Die Dissertation besteht aus drei Teilen: der erste behandelt Rationalität und deren Bedeutung für alle Fragen des Lebens, nicht nur für einen reduzierten – für wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen reservierten – Teilbereich der Welt; der zweite Teil ist metaphysischer Natur und skizziert den postulierten Aufbau der Welt anhand der im ersten Teil erläuterten Prinzipien. Im dritten Teil frage ich – und gebe vorläufige Antworten – wie die Ergebnisse der vorherigen Teile unseren Blickwinkel auf empfindsame Wesen des Universums – darunter Menschen – ändern. Nur wenn wir rational sind können wir das Maximum an Information aus unserer Umwelt extrahieren. Unser beste Weg zum Erkenntnisgewinn sollte auch Leitfaden für unsere Spiritualität, Ethik, unsere Ansichten über den Sinn des Lebens etc sein. Es ist wichtig die sich mit unserem Erkenntnisstand ändernden Standards der Rationalität auf alle menschlichen Unterfangen anzuwenden. Für Individuen bedeutet Wissen gute mentale Modelle der Welt zu besitzen: je genauer effektive Faktoren in der Welt gespiegelt werden, umso besser können angestrebte Ziele erreicht werden. Unwissenheit führt zu Inaktivität und Passivität. Die Bewährungsprobe für Wissen und Philosophie ist die: werden durch sie die Art und Weise wie wir die Welt, unser Leben, und – letztlich am Wichtigsten – die Art und Weise wie wir handeln, verändert?The thesis consists of three parts: the first being on rationality and its import in tackling all questions facing us in our lives, not only a reduced domain of scientific investigation; the second, metaphysical in nature, forming an essay on the nature of the world, especially as informed by the principles of rationality sketched in the previous part; and the third, applying the findings of the previous sections to sentient agents – among them humans – in this universe. I argue that the rational approach is the best way to approach all questions facing us in our lives. Only by being rational can we extract as much information from our environment as possible. Our best way of gaining knowledge should quite naturally also influence our spirituality, our ethics, our view of the meaning of life and so on. It is important to apply the open standards of rationality to all areas of interest to humans. The agent centric approach is central to the thesis. For individuals, knowledge means having a good mental model of the world: the closer to the actual effective factors in the world, the more potential there is for action leading to achievement of goals. Ignorance condemns one to inaction and passivity. The litmus test for knowledge – and philosophy – is this: does it change the way we view the world, our life, and, ultimately and most importantly, the way we act