Incentive-compatible route coordination of crowdsourced resources

Technical ReportWith the recent trend in crowdsourcing, i.e., using the power of crowds to assist in satisfying demand, the pool of resources suitable for GeoPresen-ce-capable systems has expanded to include already roaming devices, such as mobile phones, and moving vehicles. We envision an environment, in which the motion of these crowdsourced mobile resources is coordinated, according to their preexisting schedules to satisfy geo-temporal demand on a mobility field. In this paper, we propose an incentive compatible route coordination mechanism for crowdsourced resources, in which participating mobile agents satisfy geo-temporal requests in return for monetary rewards. We define the Flexible Route Coordination (FRC) problem, in which an agent’s flexibility is exploited to maximize the coverage of a mobility field, with an objective to maximize the revenue collected from satisfied paying requests. Given that the FRC problem is NP-hard, we define an optimal algorithm to plan the route of a single agent on a graph with evolving labels, then we use that algorithm to define a 1-approximation algorithm to solve the 2 problem in its general model, with multiple agents. Moreover, we define an incentive compatible, rational, and cash-positive payment mechanism, which guarantees that an agent’s truthfulness about its flexibility is an ex-post Nash equilibrium strategy. Finally, we analyze the proposed mechanisms theoretically, and evaluate their performance experimentally using real mobility traces from urban environments

What’s in it for me? Incentive-compatible route coordination of crowdsourced resources

With the recent trend in crowdsourcing, i.e., using the power of crowds to assist in satisfying demand, the pool of resources suitable for GeoPresence-capable systems has expanded to include already roaming devices, such as mobile phones, and moving vehicles. We envision an environment, in which the motion of these crowdsourced mobile resources is coordinated, according to their preexisting schedules to satisfy geo-temporal demand on a mobility field. In this paper, we propose an incentive compatible route coordination mechanism for crowdsourced resources, in which participating mobile agents satisfy geo-temporal requests in return for monetary rewards. We define the Flexible Route Coordination (FRC) problem, in which an agent’s flexibility is exploited to maximize the coverage of a mobility field, with an objective to maximize the revenue collected from satisfied paying requests. Given that the FRC problem is NP-hard, we define an optimal algorithm to plan the route of a single agent on a graph with evolving labels, then we use that algorithm to define a 1/2-approximation algorithm to solve the problem in its general model, with multiple agents. Moreover, we define an incentive compatible, rational, and cash-positive payment mechanism, which guarantees that an agent’s truthfulness about its flexibility is an ex-post Nash equilibrium strategy. Finally, we analyze the proposed mechanisms theoretically, and evaluate their performance experimentally using real mobility traces from urban environments.Supported in part by NSF Grants, #1430145, #1414119, #1347522, #1239021, and #1012798

Optimality Properties, Distributed Strategies, and Measurement-Based Evaluation of Coordinated Multicell OFDMA Transmission

The throughput of multicell systems is inherently limited by interference and the available communication resources. Coordinated resource allocation is the key to efficient performance, but the demand on backhaul signaling and computational resources grows rapidly with number of cells, terminals, and subcarriers. To handle this, we propose a novel multicell framework with dynamic cooperation clusters where each terminal is jointly served by a small set of base stations. Each base station coordinates interference to neighboring terminals only, thus limiting backhaul signalling and making the framework scalable. This framework can describe anything from interference channels to ideal joint multicell transmission. The resource allocation (i.e., precoding and scheduling) is formulated as an optimization problem (P1) with performance described by arbitrary monotonic functions of the signal-to-interference-and-noise ratios (SINRs) and arbitrary linear power constraints. Although (P1) is non-convex and difficult to solve optimally, we are able to prove: 1) Optimality of single-stream beamforming; 2) Conditions for full power usage; and 3) A precoding parametrization based on a few parameters between zero and one. These optimality properties are used to propose low-complexity strategies: both a centralized scheme and a distributed version that only requires local channel knowledge and processing. We evaluate the performance on measured multicell channels and observe that the proposed strategies achieve close-to-optimal performance among centralized and distributed solutions, respectively. In addition, we show that multicell interference coordination can give substantial improvements in sum performance, but that joint transmission is very sensitive to synchronization errors and that some terminals can experience performance degradations.Comment: Published in IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, 15 pages, 7 figures. This version corrects typos related to Eq. (4) and Eq. (28

Incentive compatible route coordination of crowdsourced resources and its application to GeoPresence-as-a-Service

With the recent trend in crowdsourcing, i.e., using the power of crowds to assist in satisfying demand, the pool of resources suitable for GeoPresen- ce-capable systems has expanded to include already roaming devices, such as mobile phones, and moving vehicles. We envision an environment, in which the motion of these crowdsourced mobile resources is coordinated, according to their preexisting schedules to satisfy geo-temporal demand on a mobility field. In this paper, we propose an incentive compatible route coordination mechanism for crowdsourced resources, in which participating mobile agents satisfy geo-temporal requests in return for monetary rewards. We define the Flexible Route Coordination (FRC) problem, in which an agent's exibility is exploited to maximize the coverage of a mo- bility field, with an objective to maximize the revenue collected from sat- isfied paying requests. Given that the FRC problem is NP-hard, we define an optimal algorithm to plan the route of a single agent on a graph with evolving labels, then we use that algorithm to define a 1 2 -approximation algorithm to solve the problem in its general model, with multiple agents. Moreover, we define an incentive compatible, rational, and cash-positive payment mechanism, which guarantees that an agent's truthfulness about its exibility is an ex-post Nash equilibrium strategy. Finally, we analyze the proposed mechanisms theoretically, and evaluate their performance experimentally using real mobility traces from urban environments.Supported in part by NSF Grants, #1430145, #1414119, #1347522, #1239021, and #1012798

A Distributed Demand-Side Management Framework for the Smart Grid

This paper proposes a fully distributed Demand-Side Management system for Smart Grid infrastructures, especially tailored to reduce the peak demand of residential users. In particular, we use a dynamic pricing strategy, where energy tariffs are function of the overall power demand of customers. We consider two practical cases: (1) a fully distributed approach, where each appliance decides autonomously its own scheduling, and (2) a hybrid approach, where each user must schedule all his appliances. We analyze numerically these two approaches, showing that they are characterized practically by the same performance level in all the considered grid scenarios. We model the proposed system using a non-cooperative game theoretical approach, and demonstrate that our game is a generalized ordinal potential one under general conditions. Furthermore, we propose a simple yet effective best response strategy that is proved to converge in a few steps to a pure Nash Equilibrium, thus demonstrating the robustness of the power scheduling plan obtained without any central coordination of the operator or the customers. Numerical results, obtained using real load profiles and appliance models, show that the system-wide peak absorption achieved in a completely distributed fashion can be reduced up to 55%, thus decreasing the capital expenditure (CAPEX) necessary to meet the growing energy demand

Relating Knowledge and Coordinated Action: The Knowledge of Preconditions Principle

The Knowledge of Preconditions principle (KoP) is proposed as a widely applicable connection between knowledge and action in multi-agent systems. Roughly speaking, it asserts that if some condition is a necessary condition for performing a given action A, then knowing that this condition holds is also a necessary condition for performing A. Since the specifications of tasks often involve necessary conditions for actions, the KoP principle shows that such specifications induce knowledge preconditions for the actions. Distributed protocols or multi-agent plans that satisfy the specifications must ensure that this knowledge be attained, and that it is detected by the agents as a condition for action. The knowledge of preconditions principle is formalised in the runs and systems framework, and is proven to hold in a wide class of settings. Well-known connections between knowledge and coordinated action are extended and shown to derive directly from the KoP principle: a "common knowledge of preconditions" principle is established showing that common knowledge is a necessary condition for performing simultaneous actions, and a "nested knowledge of preconditions" principle is proven, showing that coordinating actions to be performed in linear temporal order requires a corresponding form of nested knowledge.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2015, arXiv:1606.0729

Solving DCOPs with Distributed Large Neighborhood Search

The field of Distributed Constraint Optimization has gained momentum in recent years, thanks to its ability to address various applications related to multi-agent cooperation. Nevertheless, solving Distributed Constraint Optimization Problems (DCOPs) optimally is NP-hard. Therefore, in large-scale, complex applications, incomplete DCOP algorithms are necessary. Current incomplete DCOP algorithms suffer of one or more of the following limitations: they (a) find local minima without providing quality guarantees; (b) provide loose quality assessment; or (c) are unable to benefit from the structure of the problem, such as domain-dependent knowledge and hard constraints. Therefore, capitalizing on strategies from the centralized constraint solving community, we propose a Distributed Large Neighborhood Search (D-LNS) framework to solve DCOPs. The proposed framework (with its novel repair phase) provides guarantees on solution quality, refining upper and lower bounds during the iterative process, and can exploit domain-dependent structures. Our experimental results show that D-LNS outperforms other incomplete DCOP algorithms on both structured and unstructured problem instances