The effectiveness of evasion techniques against intrusion prevention systems

Evaasioita ja evaasiokombinaatiota käytetään naamioimaan hyökkäyksiä, jotta tietoturvalaitteet eivät havaitsisi niitä. Diplomityössä tutkitaan näiden tekniikoiden tehokkuutta uusimpia tunkeutumisenestojärjestelmiä vastaan. Yhteensä 11 tunkeutumisenestojärjestelmää tutkittiin, joista 10 on kaupallista ja yksi ilmainen. Tutkimuksessa suoritettiin neljä koetta. Jokainen koe sisälsi miljoona hyökkäystä, jotka suoritettiin jokaista tunkeutumisenestojärjestelmää vastaan satunnaisin evaasioin ja evaasiokombinaatioin. Käytetty hyökkäys pysyi samana yksittäisen kokeen aikana, mutta jokainen hyökkäys oli naamioitu eri evaasiotekniikoin. Yhtenäistettyjä konfiguraatioita käytettiin, jotta saataisiin vertailukelpoisia tuloksia. Tulokset osoittavat, että evaasiotekniikat ovat toimivia suurinta osaa testattuja tunkeutumisenestojärjestelmiä vastaan. Vaikka osa evaasiotekniikoista on peräisin 1990-luvulta, ne voidaan saada hienosäädettyä huijaamaan suurinta osaa testatuista laitteista. Yksi evaasiotekniikka ei ole aina riittävä, jotta voitaisiin välttää hyökkäyksen havainnointi. Monen eri tekniikan yhdistäminen lisää kuitenkin todennäköisyyttä löytää tapa kiertää havainnointi.Evasions and evasion combinations are used to masquerade attacks in order to avoid detection by security appliances. This thesis evaluates the effectiveness of these techniques against the state of the art intrusion prevention systems. In total, 11 intrusion prevention systems were studied, 10 commercial and 1 free solution. Four experiments were conducted in this study. Each of the experiments contained a million attacks that were performed with randomized evasions and evasion combinations against each intrusion prevention system. The used attack stayed the same during a single experiment, but each attack was disguised with different evasion techniques. Standardized configurations were used in order to produce comparable results. The results indicate that evasion techniques are effective against the majority of tested intrusion prevention systems. Even though some of the techniques are from the 1990s, they can be fine-tuned to fool most of the tested appliances. One evasion technique is not always enough to avoid detection, but combining multiple techniques increases the possibility to find a way to evade detection

Software Protection and Secure Authentication for Autonomous Vehicular Cloud Computing

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is changing every technology we deal with. Autonomy has been a sought-after goal in vehicles, and now more than ever we are very close to that goal. Vehicles before were dumb mechanical devices, now they are becoming smart, computerized, and connected coined as Autonomous Vehicles (AVs). Moreover, researchers found a way to make more use of these enormous capabilities and introduced Autonomous Vehicles Cloud Computing (AVCC). In these platforms, vehicles can lend their unused resources and sensory data to join AVCC. In this dissertation, we investigate security and privacy issues in AVCC. As background, we built our vision of a layer-based approach to thoroughly study state-of-the-art literature in the realm of AVs. Particularly, we examined some cyber-attacks and compared their promising mitigation strategies from our perspective. Then, we focused on two security issues involving AVCC: software protection and authentication. For the first problem, our concern is protecting client’s programs executed on remote AVCC resources. Such a usage scenario is susceptible to information leakage and reverse-engineering. Hence, we proposed compiler-based obfuscation techniques. What distinguishes our techniques, is that they are generic and software-based and utilize the intermediate representation, hence, they are platform agnostic, hardware independent and support different high level programming languages. Our results demonstrate that the control-flow of obfuscated code versions are more complicated making it unintelligible for timing side-channels. For the second problem, we focus on protecting AVCC from unauthorized access or intrusions, which may cause misuse or service disruptions. Therefore, we propose a strong privacy-aware authentication technique for users accessing AVCC services or vehicle sharing their resources with the AVCC. Our technique modifies robust function encryption, which protects stakeholder’s confidentiality and withstands linkability and “known-ciphertexts” attacks. Thus, we utilize an authentication server to search and match encrypted data by performing dot product operations. Additionally, we developed another lightweight technique, based on KNN algorithm, to authenticate vehicles at computationally limited charging stations using its owner’s encrypted iris data. Our security and privacy analysis proved that our schemes achieved privacy-preservation goals. Our experimental results showed that our schemes have reasonable computation and communications overheads and efficiently scalable

Cyber Law and Espionage Law as Communicating Vessels

Professor Lubin\u27s contribution is Cyber Law and Espionage Law as Communicating Vessels, pp. 203-225. Existing legal literature would have us assume that espionage operations and “below-the-threshold” cyber operations are doctrinally distinct. Whereas one is subject to the scant, amorphous, and under-developed legal framework of espionage law, the other is subject to an emerging, ever-evolving body of legal rules, known cumulatively as cyber law. This dichotomy, however, is erroneous and misleading. In practice, espionage and cyber law function as communicating vessels, and so are better conceived as two elements of a complex system, Information Warfare (IW). This paper therefore first draws attention to the similarities between the practices – the fact that the actors, technologies, and targets are interchangeable, as are the knee-jerk legal reactions of the international community. In light of the convergence between peacetime Low-Intensity Cyber Operations (LICOs) and peacetime Espionage Operations (EOs) the two should be subjected to a single regulatory framework, one which recognizes the role intelligence plays in our public world order and which adopts a contextual and consequential method of inquiry. The paper proceeds in the following order: Part 2 provides a descriptive account of the unique symbiotic relationship between espionage and cyber law, and further explains the reasons for this dynamic. Part 3 places the discussion surrounding this relationship within the broader discourse on IW, making the claim that the convergence between EOs and LICOs, as described in Part 2, could further be explained by an even larger convergence across all the various elements of the informational environment. Parts 2 and 3 then serve as the backdrop for Part 4, which details the attempt of the drafters of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 to compartmentalize espionage law and cyber law, and the deficits of their approach. The paper concludes by proposing an alternative holistic understanding of espionage law, grounded in general principles of law, which is more practically transferable to the cyber realmhttps://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facbooks/1220/thumbnail.jp

Cyber Security and Critical Infrastructures

This book contains the manuscripts that were accepted for publication in the MDPI Special Topic "Cyber Security and Critical Infrastructure" after a rigorous peer-review process. Authors from academia, government and industry contributed their innovative solutions, consistent with the interdisciplinary nature of cybersecurity. The book contains 16 articles: an editorial explaining current challenges, innovative solutions, real-world experiences including critical infrastructure, 15 original papers that present state-of-the-art innovative solutions to attacks on critical systems, and a review of cloud, edge computing, and fog's security and privacy issues

The future of Cybersecurity in Italy: Strategic focus area

This volume has been created as a continuation of the previous one, with the aim of outlining a set of focus areas and actions that the Italian Nation research community considers essential. The book touches many aspects of cyber security, ranging from the definition of the infrastructure and controls needed to organize cyberdefence to the actions and technologies to be developed to be better protected, from the identification of the main technologies to be defended to the proposal of a set of horizontal actions for training, awareness raising, and risk management

Foundations of Security Analysis and Design III, FOSAD 2004/2005- Tutorial Lectures

he increasing relevance of security to real-life applications, such as electronic commerce and Internet banking, is attested by the fast-growing number of research groups, events, conferences, and summer schools that address the study of foundations for the analysis and the design of security aspects. This book presents thoroughly revised versions of eight tutorial lectures given by leading researchers during two International Schools on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design, FOSAD 2004/2005, held in Bertinoro, Italy, in September 2004 and September 2005. The lectures are devoted to: Justifying a Dolev-Yao Model under Active Attacks, Model-based Security Engineering with UML, Physical Security and Side-Channel Attacks, Static Analysis of Authentication, Formal Methods for Smartcard Security, Privacy-Preserving Database Systems, Intrusion Detection, Security and Trust Requirements Engineering

A Malware Analysis and Artifact Capture Tool

Malware authors attempt to obfuscate and hide their execution objectives in their program’s static and dynamic states. This paper provides a novel approach to aid analysis by introducing a malware analysis tool which is quick to set up and use with respect to other existing tools. The tool allows for the intercepting and capturing of malware artifacts while providing dynamic control of process flow. Capturing malware artifacts allows an analyst to more quickly and comprehensively understand malware behavior and obfuscation techniques and doing so interactively allows multiple code paths to be explored. The faster that malware can be analyzed the quicker the systems and data compromised by it can be determined and its infection stopped. This research proposes an instantiation of an interactive malware analysis and artifact capture tool

Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

The Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms sets forth standard US military and associated terminology to encompass the joint activity of the Armed Forces of the United States. These military and associated terms, together with their definitions, constitute approved Department of Defense (DOD) terminology for general use by all DOD components