158 research outputs found
On Detection of Current and Next-Generation Botnets.
Botnets are one of the most serious security threats to the Internet and its end users. A botnet consists of compromised computers that are remotely coordinated by a botmaster under a
Command and Control (C&C) infrastructure. Driven by financial incentives, botmasters leverage botnets to conduct various cybercrimes such as spamming, phishing, identity theft and
Distributed-Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks. There are three main challenges facing botnet detection. First, code obfuscation is widely employed by current botnets, so signature-based detection is insufficient. Second, the C&C
infrastructure of botnets has evolved rapidly. Any detection solution targeting one botnet instance can hardly keep up with this change. Third, the proliferation of powerful smartphones presents a new platform for future botnets. Defense
techniques designed for existing botnets may be outsmarted when botnets invade smartphones.
Recognizing these challenges, this dissertation proposes behavior-based botnet detection solutions at three different levels---the end host, the edge network and the Internet infrastructure---from a small scale to a large scale, and investigates the next-generation botnet targeting smartphones.
It (1) addresses the problem of botnet seeding by devising a per-process containment scheme for end-host systems; (2) proposes a hybrid botnet detection framework for edge networks
utilizing combined host- and network-level information; (3) explores the structural properties of botnet topologies and
measures network components' capabilities of large-scale botnet detection at the Internet infrastructure level; and (4)
presents a proof-of-concept mobile botnet employing SMS messages as the C&C and P2P as the topology to facilitate future research on countermeasures against next-generation
botnets.
The dissertation makes three primary contributions. First, the detection solutions proposed utilize intrinsic and fundamental
behavior of botnets and are immune to malware obfuscation and traffic encryption. Second, the solutions are general enough to identify different types of botnets, not a specific botnet
instance. They can also be extended to counter next-generation botnet threats. Third, the detection solutions function at
multiple levels to meet various detection needs. They each take a different perspective but are highly complementary to each other, forming an integrated botnet detection framework.Ph.D.Computer Science & EngineeringUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/91382/1/gracez_1.pd
Using Context and Interactions to Verify User-Intended Network Requests
Client-side malware can attack users by tampering with applications or user
interfaces to generate requests that users did not intend. We propose Verified
Intention (VInt), which ensures a network request, as received by a service, is
user-intended. VInt is based on "seeing what the user sees" (context). VInt
screenshots the user interface as the user interacts with a security-sensitive
form. There are two main components. First, VInt ensures output integrity and
authenticity by validating the context, ensuring the user sees correctly
rendered information. Second, VInt extracts user-intended inputs from the
on-screen user-provided inputs, with the assumption that a human user checks
what they entered. Using the user-intended inputs, VInt deems a request to be
user-intended if the request is generated properly from the user-intended
inputs while the user is shown the correct information. VInt is implemented
using image analysis and Optical Character Recognition (OCR). Our evaluation
shows that VInt is accurate and efficient
Novel Attacks and Defenses in the Userland of Android
In the last decade, mobile devices have spread rapidly, becoming more and more part of our everyday lives; this is due to their feature-richness, mobility, and affordable price. At the time of writing, Android is the leader of the market among operating systems, with a share of 76% and two and a half billion active Android devices around the world. Given that such small devices contain a massive amount of our private and sensitive information, the economic interests in the mobile ecosystem skyrocketed. For this reason, not only legitimate apps running on mobile environments have increased dramatically, but also malicious apps have also been on a steady rise. On the one hand, developers of mobile operating systems learned from security mistakes of the past, and they made significant strides in blocking those threats right from the start. On the other hand, these high-security levels did not deter attackers. In this thesis, I present my research contribution about the most meaningful attack and defense scenarios in the userland of the modern Android operating system. I have emphasized "userland'' because attack and defense solutions presented in this thesis are executing in the userspace of the operating system, due to the fact that Android is slightly different from traditional operating systems. After the necessary technical background, I show my solution, RmPerm, in order to enable Android users to better protect their privacy by selectively removing permissions from any app on any Android version. This operation does not require any modification to the underlying operating system because we repack the original application. Then, using again repackaging, I have developed Obfuscapk; it is a black-box obfuscation tool that can work with every Android app and offers a free solution with advanced state of the art obfuscation techniques -- especially the ones used by malware authors. Subsequently, I present a machine learning-based technique that focuses on the identification of malware in resource-constrained devices such as Android smartphones. This technique has a very low resource footprint and does not rely on resources outside the protected device. Afterward, I show how it is possible to mount a phishing attack -- the historically preferred attack vector -- by exploiting two recent Android features, initially introduced in the name of convenience. Although a technical solution to this problem certainly exists, it is not solvable from a single entity, and there is the need for a push from the entire community. But sometimes, even though there exists a solution to a well-known vulnerability, developers do not take proper precautions. In the end, I discuss the Frame Confusion vulnerability; it is often present in hybrid apps, and it was discovered some years ago, but I show how it is still widespread. I proposed a methodology, implemented in the FCDroid tool, for systematically detecting the Frame Confusion vulnerability in hybrid Android apps. The results of an extensive analysis carried out through FCDroid on a set of the most downloaded apps from the Google Play Store prove that 6.63% (i.e., 1637/24675) of hybrid apps are potentially vulnerable to Frame Confusion. The impact of such results on the Android users' community is estimated in 250.000.000 installations of vulnerable apps
Attacking and Defending Android Browsers
Android permission is a system of safeguards designed to restrict access to potentially sensitive data
and privileged components. While third-party applications are restricted from accessing privileged resources
without appropriate permissions, mobile browsers are treated by Android OS differently. Android mobile
browsers are the privileged applications that have access to sensitive data based on the permissions implicitly
granted to them.
In this research, we present a novel attack approach that allows a zero-permission app to access sensitive
data and privileged resources using mobile browsers as a proxy with the aid of toast overlay. We demonstrate
the effectiveness of our proxy attack on 8 mobile browsers across 12 Android devices ranging from Android 8.1
to Android 13. Our findings show that all current versions of Android mobile browsers are susceptible to this
attack. Despite Android touch prevention mechanisms for external apps, internal apps and those sharing the
same userID remain susceptible. Contrary to Android’s claims, devices continue to exhibit background toasts
opening an opportunity window for these overlay attacks and posing a threat to browser apps and webview
activities within the same app. We propose a detection approach that leverages a blend of static detection
and activity behavior analysis. Our detection approach enhances Android device security by addressing
overlay vulnerabilities and their potential impact on user privacy and data security. Overall, the findings of
this study highlight the need for improved security measures in Android browsers to protect against privilege
escalation and privacy leakag
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Robust behavioral malware detection
Computer security attacks evolve to evade deployed defenses. Recent attacks have ranged from exploiting generic software vulnerabilities in memory-unsafe languages such as buffer overflows and format string vulnerabilities to exploiting logic errors in web applications, through means such as SQL injection and cross-site scripting. Furthermore, recent attacks have focused on escalating privileges
and stealing sensitive information by exploiting new hardware or operating system (OS) interfaces. Computer security attacks are also now relying on social engineering techniques to run malicious programs on victims' machines; instances of such abuse include phishing and watering hole attacks, both of which trick people into running malicious code or divulging confidential information. Thus, traditional computer security methods, such as OS confinement and program analysis, will not prevent new attacks that do not violate OS confinement or present illegal program behaviors.
Another challenge is that traditional security approaches have large trusted code bases (TCBs), which include hardware, OSs, and other software components that implement authentication and authorization logic across a distributed system. This is a vulnerable area because these components are complex and often contain vulnerabilities that undermine the overall system's integrity or confidentiality.
Evasive attacks on vulnerable systems -- especially in instances where trusted components turn malicious -- inspire the creation of defenses that can augment formally specified mechanisms against known threats. Specifically, this thesis advances the state of the art in behavioral malware detection -- detecting previously unknown malware in the very early stages of infection within an enterprise network.
Here we assess three fundamental insights of modern-day attacks and then describe a cross-layer defense against such attacks. First, we make a low-level machine state visible to behavioral analysis, significantly minimizing the TCB and its associated vulnerabilities. Specifically, our behavioral detector utilizes an executable code's dynamic properties, with architectural and micro-architectural states as input. Second, we evaluate behavioral detectors against adaptive adversaries. For this purpose, we introduce a new metric to determine a detector's robustness against malware modifications, which serves as a step toward explainability of machine learning-based malware detectors. Finally, we exploit the fact that attacks spread through only a limited number of vectors and propose new techniques to analyze the resulting dynamic correlations created among machines. These insights show that behavioral detectors can efficiently protect both individual devices and end hosts within enterprise networks. We present three types of such behavioral detectors.
Sherlock protects resource-constrained devices, such as mobile phones and Internet-of-things (IoT) devices, without modifying the software/hardware stack. Sherlock's supervised and unsupervised versions outperform prior work by 24.7% and 12.5% (area under the curve (AUC) metric), respectively, and detects stealthy malware that often evades static analysis tools.
The second behavioral detector, Shape-GD, protects devices within an enterprise network. It monitors devices on the network, aggregates data from weak local detectors, overlays that with network-level information, and then makes early, robust predictions regarding malicious activity. Shape-GD achieves its goals by exploiting latent attack semantics. Specifically, it analyzes communication patterns across multiple devices, partitioning them into neighborhoods. Devices within the same neighborhood are likely to be exposed to the same attack vector. Furthermore, we hypothesize that the conditional distribution of false positives is different from that of true positives; i.e., given a neighborhood of nodes, we can compute the aggregate distributional shape of alert feature vectors from the neighborhood itself and provide robust labels.
We evaluate Shape-GD by emulating a large community of Windows systems using the system call traces from a few thousand malicious and benign applications; we simulate both a phishing attack in a corporate email network as well as a watering hole attack through a popular website. In both scenarios, Shape-GD identifies malware early on (~100 infected nodes in a ~100K-node system for watering hole attacks, and ~10 of ~1,000 for phishing attacks) and robustly (with ~100% global true-positive and ~1% global false-positive rates).
The third behavioral detector, Centurion, detects malware across machines monitored by an anti-virus company. It is able to analyze behavior from 5 million Symantec client machines in real time and discovers malware by correlating file downloads across multiple machines. Compared with a recent local detector that analyzes metadata from file downloads, Centurion reduced the number of false positives from ~1M to ~110K and increased the true-positive rate by a factor of ~2.5. In addition, on average, Centurion detects malware 345 days earlier than commercial anti-virus products.Electrical and Computer Engineerin
Trustworthy Wireless Personal Area Networks
In the Internet of Things (IoT), everyday objects are equipped with the ability to compute and communicate. These smart things have invaded the lives of everyday people, being constantly carried or worn on our bodies, and entering into our homes, our healthcare, and beyond. This has given rise to wireless networks of smart, connected, always-on, personal things that are constantly around us, and have unfettered access to our most personal data as well as all of the other devices that we own and encounter throughout our day. It should, therefore, come as no surprise that our personal devices and data are frequent targets of ever-present threats. Securing these devices and networks, however, is challenging. In this dissertation, we outline three critical problems in the context of Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPANs) and present our solutions to these problems.
First, I present our Trusted I/O solution (BASTION-SGX) for protecting sensitive user data transferred between wirelessly connected (Bluetooth) devices. This work shows how in-transit data can be protected from privileged threats, such as a compromised OS, on commodity systems. I present insights into the Bluetooth architecture, Intel’s Software Guard Extensions (SGX), and how a Trusted I/O solution can be engineered on commodity devices equipped with SGX.
Second, I present our work on AMULET and how we successfully built a wearable health hub that can run multiple health applications, provide strong security properties, and operate on a single charge for weeks or even months at a time. I present the design and evaluation of our highly efficient event-driven programming model, the design of our low-power operating system, and developer tools for profiling ultra-low-power applications at compile time.
Third, I present a new approach (VIA) that helps devices at the center of WPANs (e.g., smartphones) to verify the authenticity of interactions with other devices. This work builds on past work in anomaly detection techniques and shows how these techniques can be applied to Bluetooth network traffic. Specifically, we show how to create normality models based on fine- and course-grained insights from network traffic, which can be used to verify the authenticity of future interactions
A11y and Privacy don’t have to be mutually exclusive: Constraining Accessibility Service Misuse on Android
Accessibility features of Android are crucial in assisting people with disabilities or impairment to navigate their devices. However, the same, powerful features are commonly misused by shady apps for malevolent purposes, such as stealing data from other apps. Unfortunately, existing defenses do not allow apps to protect themselves and at the same time to be fully inclusive to users with accessibility needs.
To enhance the privacy protection of the user while preserving the accessibility features for assistive apps, we introduce an extension to Android’s accessibility framework. Our design is based on a study of how accessibility features are used in 95 existing accessibility apps of different types (malware, utility, and a11y). Based on those insights, we propose to model the usage of the accessibility framework as a pipeline of code modules, which are all sandboxed on the system-side. By policing the data flows of those modules, we achieve a more fine-grained control over the access to accessibility features and the way they are used in apps, allowing a balance between accessibility functionality for dependent users and reduced privacy risks. We demonstrate the feasibility of our solution by migrating two real-world apps to our privacy-enhanced accessibility framework
Understanding and Measuring Privacy and Security Assertions of Mobile and VR Applications
The emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic has catalysed a profound transformation in the way mobile applications are utilised and engaged with by consumers. There has been a noticeable surge in people relying on applications for various purposes such as entertainment, remote work, and daily activities. These services collect large amounts of users’ personal information and use them in many areas, such as in medical and financial systems, but they also pose an unprecedented threat to users’ privacy and security. Many international jurisdictions have enacted privacy laws and regulations to restrict the behaviour of apps and define the obligations of app developers. Although various privacy assertions are required in app stores, such as the permission list and the privacy policies, it is usually difficult for regular users to understand the potential threats the app may pose, let alone identify undesired or malicious application behaviours. In this thesis, I have developed a comprehensive framework to assess the current privacy practices of mobile applications. The framework first establishes a knowledge base (including datasets) to model privacy and security assertions. It then builds a sound evaluation system to analyse the privacy practices of mobile applications. Large-scale privacy evaluations were conducted on different realworld datasets, including privacy policies, contact tracing apps, and children’s apps, with the aim of revealing the risks associated with mobile application privacy. Lastly, a novel approach to applying differential privacy on streamed spatial data in VR applications is proposed. This thesis provides a comprehensive guideline for the mobile software industry and legislators to build a stronger and safer privacy ecosystem.Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, School of Computer and Mathematical Sciences, 202
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