The Underpinnings of Workload in Unmanned Vehicle Systems

This paper identifies and characterizes factors that contribute to operator workload in unmanned vehicle systems. Our objective is to provide a basis for developing models of workload for use in design and operation of complex human-machine systems. In 1986, Hart developed a foundational conceptual model of workload, which formed the basis for arguably the most widely used workload measurement techniquethe NASA Task Load Index. Since that time, however, there have been many advances in models and factor identification as well as workload control measures. Additionally, there is a need to further inventory and describe factors that contribute to human workload in light of technological advances, including automation and autonomy. Thus, we propose a conceptual framework for the workload construct and present a taxonomy of factors that can contribute to operator workload. These factors, referred to as workload drivers, are associated with a variety of system elements including the environment, task, equipment and operator. In addition, we discuss how workload moderators, such as automation and interface design, can be manipulated in order to influence operator workload. We contend that workload drivers, workload moderators, and the interactions among drivers and moderators all need to be accounted for when building complex, human-machine systems

Ethical Control of Unmanned Systems: lifesaving/lethal scenarios for naval operations

Prepared for: Raytheon Missiles & Defense under NCRADA-NPS-19-0227This research in Ethical Control of Unmanned Systems applies precepts of Network Optional Warfare (NOW) to develop a three-step Mission Execution Ontology (MEO) methodology for validating, simulating, and implementing mission orders for unmanned systems. First, mission orders are represented in ontologies that are understandable by humans and readable by machines. Next, the MEO is validated and tested for logical coherence using Semantic Web standards. The validated MEO is refined for implementation in simulation and visualization. This process is iterated until the MEO is ready for implementation. This methodology is applied to four Naval scenarios in order of increasing challenges that the operational environment and the adversary impose on the Human-Machine Team. The extent of challenge to Ethical Control in the scenarios is used to refine the MEO for the unmanned system. The research also considers Data-Centric Security and blockchain distributed ledger as enabling technologies for Ethical Control. Data-Centric Security is a combination of structured messaging, efficient compression, digital signature, and document encryption, in correct order, for round-trip messaging. Blockchain distributed ledger has potential to further add integrity measures for aggregated message sets, confirming receipt/response/sequencing without undetected message loss. When implemented, these technologies together form the end-to-end data security that ensures mutual trust and command authority in real-world operational environments—despite the potential presence of interfering network conditions, intermittent gaps, or potential opponent intercept. A coherent Ethical Control approach to command and control of unmanned systems is thus feasible. Therefore, this research concludes that maintaining human control of unmanned systems at long ranges of time-duration and distance, in denied, degraded, and deceptive environments, is possible through well-defined mission orders and data security technologies. Finally, as the human role remains essential in Ethical Control of unmanned systems, this research recommends the development of an unmanned system qualification process for Naval operations, as well as additional research prioritized based on urgency and impact.Raytheon Missiles & DefenseRaytheon Missiles & Defense (RMD).Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

Robotic equipment carrying RN detectors: requirements and capabilities for testing

77 pags., 32 figs., 5 tabs.-- ERNCIP Radiological and Nuclear Threats to Critical Infrastructure Thematic Group . -- This publication is a Technical report by the Joint Research Centre (JRC) . -- JRC128728 . -- EUR 31044 ENThe research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union as part of the European Reference Network for Critical Infrastructure Protection (ERNCIP) projec

Architecture and Information Requirements to Assess and Predict Flight Safety Risks During Highly Autonomous Urban Flight Operations

As aviation adopts new and increasingly complex operational paradigms, vehicle types, and technologies to broaden airspace capability and efficiency, maintaining a safe system will require recognition and timely mitigation of new safety issues as they emerge and before significant consequences occur. A shift toward a more predictive risk mitigation capability becomes critical to meet this challenge. In-time safety assurance comprises monitoring, assessment, and mitigation functions that proactively reduce risk in complex operational environments where the interplay of hazards may not be known (and therefore not accounted for) during design. These functions can also help to understand and predict emergent effects caused by the increased use of automation or autonomous functions that may exhibit unexpected non-deterministic behaviors. The envisioned monitoring and assessment functions can look for precursors, anomalies, and trends (PATs) by applying model-based and data-driven methods. Outputs would then drive downstream mitigation(s) if needed to reduce risk. These mitigations may be accomplished using traditional design revision processes or via operational (and sometimes automated) mechanisms. The latter refers to the in-time aspect of the system concept. This report comprises architecture and information requirements and considerations toward enabling such a capability within the domain of low altitude highly autonomous urban flight operations. This domain may span, for example, public-use surveillance missions flown by small unmanned aircraft (e.g., infrastructure inspection, facility management, emergency response, law enforcement, and/or security) to transportation missions flown by larger aircraft that may carry passengers or deliver products. Caveat: Any stated requirements in this report should be considered initial requirements that are intended to drive research and development (R&D). These initial requirements are likely to evolve based on R&D findings, refinement of operational concepts, industry advances, and new industry or regulatory policies or standards related to safety assurance