Naval Aviation Squadron Risk Analysis Predictive Bayesian Network Modeling Using Maintenance Climate Assessment Survey Results

Associated risks in flying have resulted in injury or death to aircrew and passengers, and damage or destruction of the aircraft and its surroundings. Although the Naval Aviation\u27s flight mishap rate declined over the past 60 years, the proportion of human error causal factors has stayed relatively constant at about 80%. Efforts to reduce human errors have focused attention on understanding the aircrew and maintenance actions occurring in complex systems. One such tool has been the Naval Aviation squadrons\u27 regular participation in survey questionnaires deigned to measure respondent ratings related to personal judgments or perceptions of organizational climate for meeting the extent to which a particular squadron achieved the High Reliability Organization (HRO) criteria of achieving safe and reliable operations and maintenance practices while working in hazardous environments. Specifically, the Maintenance Climate Assessment Survey (MCAS) is completed by squadron maintainers to enable leadership to assess their unit\u27s aggregated responses against those from other squadrons. Bayesian Network Modeling and Simulation provides a potential methodology to represent the relationships of MCAS results and mishap occurrences that can be used to derive and calculate probabilities of incurring a future mishap. Model development and simulation analysis was conducted to research a causal relationship through quantitative analysis of conditional probabilities based upon observed evidence of previously occurred mishaps. This application would enable Navy and Marine Corps aviation squadron leadership to identify organizational safety risks, apply focused proactive measures to mitigate related hazards characterized by the MCAS results, and reduce organizational susceptibility to future aircraft mishaps

An evaluation of the effectiveness of the crew resource management programme in naval aviation

The US Navy’s Crew Resource Management (CRM) training programme has not been evaluated within the last decade. Reactions were evaluated by analysing 51,570 responses to an item pertaining to CRM that is part of a safety climate survey. A total of 172 responses were obtained on a knowledge test. The attitudes of 553 naval aviators were assessed using an attitudes questionnaire. The CRM mishap rate from 1997 until 2007 was evaluated. It was found that naval aviators appear to think than CRM training is useful, are generally knowledgeable of, and display positive attitudes towards, the concepts addressed in the training. However, there is a lack of evidence to support the view that CRM training is having an effect on the mishap rate. As the next generation of highly automated aircraft becomes part of naval aviation, there is a need to ensure that CRM training evolves to meet this new challenge

A Comparison of Leading and Lagging Indicators of Safety in Naval Aviation

The article of record as published may be located at https://doi.org/10.3357/ASEM.2734.2010The purpose of this paper is to examine the results of two different methods of identifying human factors safety concerns in U.S. Naval aviation. In both studies, the information was collected using the Department of Defense Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (DoD-HFACS). Methods: In the first study, aviation mishap data (a lagging indictor) was obtained on 47 F/A-18 and 16 H-60 mishaps. In the second study, the responses of 68 squadrons to a survey regarding the human factors issues that they considered to be of the greatest safety concern were examined (a leading indicator). Results: First study results revealed that skill-based errors were the most commonly cited factors for both F/A-18 and H-60 mishaps (70.2% and 81.3%, respectively). More specifically, the most commonly used nanocodes were ‘over control/under control’ (27.7% and 56.3%, respectively), ‘breakdown in visual scan’ (27.7% and 12.5%, respectively), and ‘procedural errors’ (23.4% and 37.6%, respectively). The second study identified that the main concern of F/A-18 and H-60 aviators was workload and operational tempo (identified by 85% of squadrons). Discussion: It can be concluded that the nanocodes that were most commonly used to classify the causes of past mishaps were not identified as major concerns by the squadrons who responded to the survey. The findings from these studies emphasize the importance of examining a number of performance metrics to ensure that effective measures are being taken to improve safety

An analysis of human causal factors in Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) accidents

MBA Professional ReportHuman error has been identified as the major contributor in many severe aviation mishaps, even for accidents involving Unmanned Aircraft (UA) systems. The Department of Defense (DOD) has used the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) taxonomy successfully for ten years to discover the human error in UA mishaps. It is important not to ignore the indisputable human presence in UA and the possible human-related causal factors in UA mishaps so we might be better able to reduce and prevent possible incidents. HFACS with its four main and 19 subcategories is a useful framework for identifying which factors have arisen historically, and which of them should have priority. The results of this study reveals that among 287 causal factors attributed to 68 accidents, 65 percent of the factors were associated with humans. Moreover, this study also discloses that the rater who categorizes the factors can differently observe, understand, and interpret the findings of mishap investigation; thus, human error may even impact the categorization phase due to the rater’s perception. The research concluded that even though HFACS carried out its functionality well, further study is needed to conduct intense statistical analysis with unlimited data and to validate HFACS with more case studies and various raters.http://archive.org/details/annalysisofhumca1094544637Captain, Turkish Air Force1st Lieutenant, Turkish ArmyApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited

The development of a prototype behavioral marker system for US Navy officers of the deck

The officer of the deck (OOD) of a US Navy ship is in charge of the safe and proper operation of the ship, and accountable to the commanding officer for every event that occurs during his or her OOD watch. This paper discusses the development of a prototype behavioral marker system to evaluate, and provide feedback on, the nontechnical (cognitive, social, and personal resource) skills of OODs. An initial set of 17 categories of nontechnical skills were identified from a literature review. A focus group with four qualified OODs used the skills identified from the literature review to develop an initial taxonomy of five categories, each with two or three corresponding behavioral elements. This taxonomy was then used to classify 149 statements concerned with the nontechnical skills of OODs collected from 16 critical incident interviews. After three iterations of adaptations to the taxonomy, two independent raters were able to reach acceptable levels of reliability in using the taxonomy to classify the statements. Although further development work is required, it is suggested that the prototype behavioral marker system has implications for improving safety and performance on military and civilian ships

The development of a prototype behavioral marker system of US Navy officers of the deck

The article of record as published may be found at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.201105.009The officer of the deck (OOD) of a US Navy ship is in charge of the safe and proper operation of the ship, and acountable to the commanding officer for every event that occurs during his or her OOD watch. This paper discusses the development of a prototype behavioral marker system to evaluate, and provide feedback on, the nontechnical (cognitive, social and personal resource) skills of ODDs. An initial set of 17 categories of nontechnical skills were identified from a literature review. A focus group with four qualified OODs used the skills identified from the literature review to develop an initial taxonomy of five categories, each with two or three corresponding behavioral elements. This taxonomy was then used to classify 149 statements concenred with the nontechnical skills of OODs collected from 16 critical incident interviews. After three iterations of adaptations to the taxonomy, two independent raters were able to reach acceptable levels of reliability in using the taxonomy to classify the statements. Although further development work is required, it is suggested that the prototype behavioral marker system has implications for improving safety and performance on military and civilian ships

CIRCADIAN ENTRAINMENT IN MILITARY PILOTS: TRANSITIONING FROM DAY TO NIGHT FLIGHTS

This study assessed the effectiveness of light exposure in transitioning aviation schedules from days to nights. We hypothesized that a single night of light treatment will delay melatonin onset and improve performance in a simulated flight task. Study participants were military pilots who flew four simulated flights: one baseline daytime flight and three consecutive night flights. Pilots were exposed to four hours of high energy visible (HEV) light (1,000 lux) on the second night but remained in dim light on the first and third nights. Saliva samples for determining melatonin levels were collected every half hour during the three nighttime data collections. Participants also completed questionnaires to include the Bedford Workload Scale and the Karolinska Sleepiness Scale. We tracked each participant’s circadian rhythm using their melatonin onset profiles over the three nights of the study. Pilot performance in a flight simulator was assessed for each of the three data collection sessions using three flight profiles of progressing difficulty. Results showed an average delay in melatonin onset mean of 1.33 hr (SD = .36 hr). Flight performance over the testing period did not show any significant changes. This study showed that light can be used to effectively delay the onset of melatonin, potentially providing a substantive advantage to personnel who must rapidly transition to new work schedules. Further study is recommended before implementing in operational conditions.Lieutenant Commander, United States Coast GuardApproved for public release. Distribution is unlimited

A review of the safety climate literature as it relates to naval aviation.

The purpose of this literature review is to provide the background to an evaluation of the utility of the Command Safety Assessment Survey (CSAS) as a valid predictor of future mishaps. The end goal is to be able to use the survey to identify at risk U.S. Naval squadrons prior to the occurrence of mishaps. Safety climate describes employees' perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs about risk and safety (Mearns & Flin, 1999). Safety climate is most commonly evaluated using questionnaires. Although assessments of safety climate are not widespread in civil aviation, the United States Navy has been using the CSAS since 2000 to measure the safety climate of aviation squadrons. This review argues that a comprehensive assessment of the construct (the extent to which the questionnaire measures what it is intended to measure) and discriminate validity (correlate the data from the questionnaire with a criterion variable, such as accidents) of the CSAS should be carried out. This assessment is necessary to ensure that squadron Commanding Officers, and senior leadership, are being provided with valid and reliable information on squadron safety climate.Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

A Feasibility Study of a Persistent Monitoring System for the Flight Deck of U.S. Navy Aircraft Carriers

This research analyzes the use of modern Real Time Locating Systems (RTLS), such as the Global Positioning System (GPS), to improve the safety of aircraft, equipment, and personnel onboard a United States Navy (USN) aircraft carrier. The results of a detailed analysis of USN safety records since 1980 show that mishaps which could potentially be prevented by a persistent monitoring system result in the death of a sailor nearly every other year and account for at least $92,486,469, or 5.55% of the total cost of all flight deck and hangar bay related mishaps. A system to continually monitor flight deck operations is proposed with four successive levels of increasing capability. A study of past and present work in the area of aircraft carrier flight deck operations is performed. This research conducted a study of the movements of USN personnel and an FA-18C aircraft being towed at NAS Oceana, VA. Using two precision GPS recorders mounted on the aircraft wingtips, the position and orientation of the aircraft, in two-dimensions, are calculated and the errors in this solution are explored. The distance between personnel and the aircraft is calculated in the nearest neighbor sense. Pseudospectral motion planning techniques are presented to provide route prediction for aircraft, support equipment, and personnel. Concepts for system components, such as aircraft and personnel receivers, are described. Methods to recognize and communicate the presence of hazardous situations are discussed. The end result of this research is the identification of performance requirements, limitations, and definition of areas of further research for the development of a flight deck persistent monitoring system with the capability to warn of hazardous situations, ease the incorporation of UAVs, and reduce the risk of death or injury faced by sailors on the flight deck

Manned Versus Unmanned Aircraft Accidents, Including Causation and Rates

Many consider aircraft reliability a primary deterrent to the further integration of unmanned aircraft into civil airspace. Discussions of unmanned aircraft reliability often include comparisons of accident rates of medium and large unmanned aircraft (like the MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper) to those of manned aircraft. These comparisons, however, often consider a recent period only but do not consider platform maturity. While this approach is valid—and worthy of discussion—it does not present a complete picture of the unmanned aircraft safety record. This paper employs a chi-square goodness-of-fit approach to compare the progression of the U.S. Air Force MQ-9 mishap rate to that of six manned aircraft flown by the same service. The analysis found that the MQ-9 did not have a significantly different Class A mishap rate progression from the comparison aircraft. The only exception was the F-16, which had a considerably higher rate. In addition, to better understand mishap causation, a comparison of manned to unmanned aircraft mishap causal factors was conducted, primarily relying on journal articles that use the Human Factors and Classification System (HFACS) taxonomy. The analysis found that, like manned aircraft, crew errors contributed to a significant portion of unmanned aircraft accidents, and further, that skill-based errors were often the type of the crew error. The studies also indicated that increasing autonomous control, Human Machine Interface (HMI) design, and crew training will continue to play a significant role in unmanned aircraft mishap causation. Two case studies were also analyzed to highlight differences in manned and unmanned aircraft accident causation