12,432 research outputs found
Robust stability in matching markets
In a matching problem between students and schools, a mechanism is said to be robustly stable if it is stable, strategy-proof, and immune to a combined manipulation, where a student first misreports her preferences and then blocks the matching that is produced by the mechanism. We find that even when school priorities are publicly known and only students can behave strategically, there is a priority structure for which no robustly stable mechanism exists. Our main result shows that there exists a robustly stable mechanism if and only if the priority structure of schools is acyclic (Ergin, 2002), and in that case, the student-optimal stable mechanism is the unique robustly stable mechanism.Matching, stability, strategy-proofness, robust stability, acyclicity
A Multi-Game Framework for Harmonized LTE-U and WiFi Coexistence over Unlicensed Bands
The introduction of LTE over unlicensed bands (LTE-U) will enable LTE base
stations (BSs) to boost their capacity and offload their traffic by exploiting
the underused unlicensed bands. However, to reap the benefits of LTE-U, it is
necessary to address various new challenges associated with LTE-U and WiFi
coexistence. In particular, new resource management techniques must be
developed to optimize the usage of the network resources while handling the
interdependence between WiFi and LTE users and ensuring that WiFi users are not
jeopardized. To this end, in this paper, a new game theoretic tool, dubbed as
\emph{multi-game} framework is proposed as a promising approach for modeling
resource allocation problems in LTE-U. In such a framework, multiple,
co-existing and coupled games across heterogeneous channels can be formulated
to capture the specific characteristics of LTE-U. Such games can be of
different properties and types but their outcomes are largely interdependent.
After introducing the basics of the multi-game framework, two classes of
algorithms are outlined to achieve the new solution concepts of multi-games.
Simulation results are then conducted to show how such a multi-game can
effectively capture the specific properties of LTE-U and make of it a
"friendly" neighbor to WiFi.Comment: Accepted for publication at IEEE Wireless Communications Magazine,
Special Issue on LTE in Unlicensed Spectru
The Causes of Political Integration: An Application to School Districts
This paper examines the forces behind political integration through the lens of school district consolidations, which reduced the number of school districts in the United States from around 130,000 in 1930 to under 15,000 at present. Despite this large observed decline, many districts resisted consolidation before ultimately merging and others never merged, choosing to remain at enrollment levels that nearly any education cost function would deem inefficiently small. Why do some districts voluntarily integrate while others remain small, and how do those districts that do merge choose with which of their neighbors to do so? In addressing these questions, we empirically examine the role of potential economies and diseconomies of scale, heterogeneity between merger partners, and the role of state governments. We first develop a simulation-based estimator that is rooted in the economics of matching and thus accounts for three important features of typical merger protocol: two-sided decision making, multiple potential partners, and spatial interdependence. We then apply this methodology to a wave of school district mergers in the state of Iowa during the 1990s. Our results highlight the importance of economies of scale, diseconomies of scale, state financial incentives for consolidation, and a variety of heterogeneity measures.
A dominant strategy, double clock auction with estimation-based tatonnement
The price mechanism is fundamental to economics but difficult to reconcile with incentive compatibility and individual rationality. We introduce a double clock auction for a homogeneous good market with multidimensional private information and multiunit traders that is deficit‐free, ex post individually rational, constrained efficient, and makes sincere bidding a dominant strategy equilibrium. Under a weak dependence and an identifiability condition, our double clock auction is also asymptotically efficient. Asymptotic efficiency is achieved by estimating demand and supply using information from the bids of traders that have dropped out and following a tâtonnement process that adjusts the clock prices based on the estimates
Social status in economic theory: a review.
Social distinction or status is an important motivation of human behaviour. This paper provides a selective survey of recent advances in the economic analysis of the origins and consequences of social status. First, a selection of empirical research from a variety of scientific disciplines is discussed to underpin the further theoretical analysis. I then consider the origins and determinants of tastes for status, discuss the endogenous derivation of such a preferences for relative standing and assess the different formalisations these preferences. Subsequently, the consequences of preferences for status are studied for a variety of problems and settings. The last section discusses a number of implications of status concerns for normative economics and public policy.
A solution concept for housing market problems with externalities
Since the core of a housing market with externalities may be empty, we propose as a solution concept the set of allocations that satisfy two basic properties: Pareto efficiency and the No-regret condition. Our main result shows that for any instance of the housing market problem, there always exists at least one allocation that satisfies both properties.Housing markets, the core, externalities, Pareto efficiency, No-regret condition
Cell Selection in Wireless Two-Tier Networks: A Context-Aware Matching Game
The deployment of small cell networks is seen as a major feature of the next
generation of wireless networks. In this paper, a novel approach for cell
association in small cell networks is proposed. The proposed approach exploits
new types of information extracted from the users' devices and environment to
improve the way in which users are assigned to their serving base stations.
Examples of such context information include the devices' screen size and the
users' trajectory. The problem is formulated as a matching game with
externalities and a new, distributed algorithm is proposed to solve this game.
The proposed algorithm is shown to reach a stable matching whose properties are
studied. Simulation results show that the proposed context-aware matching
approach yields significant performance gains, in terms of the average utility
per user, when compared with a classical max-SINR approach.Comment: 11 pages, 11 figures, Journal article in ICST Wireless Spectrum, 201
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