71 research outputs found

    Ongoing Research Areas in Symmetric Cryptography

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    This report is a deliverable for the ECRYPT European network of excellence in cryptology. It gives a brief summary of some of the research trends in symmetric cryptography at the time of writing. The following aspects of symmetric cryptography are investigated in this report: • the status of work with regards to different types of symmetric algorithms, including block ciphers, stream ciphers, hash functions and MAC algorithms (Section 1); • the recently proposed algebraic attacks on symmetric primitives (Section 2); • the design criteria for symmetric ciphers (Section 3); • the provable properties of symmetric primitives (Section 4); • the major industrial needs in the area of symmetric cryptography (Section 5)

    D.STVL.9 - Ongoing Research Areas in Symmetric Cryptography

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    This report gives a brief summary of some of the research trends in symmetric cryptography at the time of writing (2008). The following aspects of symmetric cryptography are investigated in this report: • the status of work with regards to different types of symmetric algorithms, including block ciphers, stream ciphers, hash functions and MAC algorithms (Section 1); • the algebraic attacks on symmetric primitives (Section 2); • the design criteria for symmetric ciphers (Section 3); • the provable properties of symmetric primitives (Section 4); • the major industrial needs in the area of symmetric cryptography (Section 5)

    Efficient Computation and FPGA implementation of Fully Homomorphic Encryption with Cloud Computing Significance

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    Homomorphic Encryption provides unique security solution for cloud computing. It ensures not only that data in cloud have confidentiality but also that data processing by cloud server does not compromise data privacy. The Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) scheme proposed by Lopez-Alt, Tromer, and Vaikuntanathan (LTV), also known as NTRU(Nth degree truncated polynomial ring) based method, is considered one of the most important FHE methods suitable for practical implementation. In this thesis, an efficient algorithm and architecture for LTV Fully Homomorphic Encryption is proposed. Conventional linear feedback shift register (LFSR) structure is expanded and modified for performing the truncated polynomial ring multiplication in LTV scheme in parallel. Novel and efficient modular multiplier, modular adder and modular subtractor are proposed to support high speed processing of LFSR operations. In addition, a family of special moduli are selected for high speed computation of modular operations. Though the area keeps the complexity of O(Nn^2) with no advantage in circuit level. The proposed architecture effectively reduces the time complexity from O(N log N) to linear time, O(N), compared to the best existing works. An FPGA implementation of the proposed architecture for LTV FHE is achieved and demonstrated. An elaborate comparison of the existing methods and the proposed work is presented, which shows the proposed work gains significant speed up over existing works

    Cryptanalysis of Symmetric Cryptographic Primitives

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    Symmetric key cryptographic primitives are the essential building blocks in modern information security systems. The overall security of such systems is crucially dependent on these mathematical functions, which makes the analysis of symmetric key primitives a goal of critical importance. The security argument for the majority of such primitives in use is only a heuristic one and therefore their respective security evaluation continually remains an open question. In this thesis, we provide cryptanalytic results for several relevant cryptographic hash functions and stream ciphers. First, we provide results concerning two hash functions: HAS-160 and SM3. In particular, we develop a new heuristic for finding compatible differential paths and apply it to the the Korean hash function standard HAS-160. Our heuristic leads to a practical second order collision attack over all of the HAS-160 function steps, which is the first practical-complexity distinguisher on this function. An example of a colliding quartet is provided. In case of SM3, which is a design that builds upon the SHA-2 hash and is published by the Chinese Commercial Cryptography Administration Office for the use in the electronic authentication service system, we study second order collision attacks over reduced-round versions and point out a structural slide-rotational property that exists in the function. Next, we examine the security of the following three stream ciphers: Loiss, SNOW 3G and SNOW 2.0. Loiss stream cipher is designed by Dengguo Feng et al. aiming to be implemented in byte-oriented processors. By exploiting some differential properties of a particular component utilized in the cipher, we provide an attack of a practical complexity on Loiss in the related-key model. As confirmed by our experimental results, our attack recovers 92 bits of the 128-bit key in less than one hour on a PC with 3 GHz Intel Pentium 4 processor. SNOW 3G stream cipher is used in 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) and the SNOW 2.0 cipher is an ISO/IEC standard (IS 18033-4). For both of these two ciphers, we show that the initialization procedure admits a sliding property, resulting in several sets of related-key pairs. In addition to allowing related-key key recovery attacks against SNOW 2.0 with 256-bit keys, the presented properties reveal non-random behavior of the primitives, yield related-key distinguishers for the two ciphers and question the validity of the security proofs of protocols based on the assumption that these ciphers behave like perfect random functions of the key-IV. Finally, we provide differential fault analysis attacks against two stream ciphers, namely, HC-128 and Rabbit. In this type of attacks, the attacker is assumed to have physical influence over the device that performs the encryption and is able to introduce random faults into the computational process. In case of HC-128, the fault model in which we analyze the cipher is the one in which the attacker is able to fault a random word of the inner state of the cipher but cannot control its exact location nor its new faulted value. Our attack requires about 7968 faults and recovers the complete internal state of HC-128 by solving a set of 32 systems of linear equations over Z2 in 1024 variables. In case of Rabbit stream cipher, the fault model in which the cipher is analyzed is the one in which a random bit of the internal state of the cipher is faulted, however, without control over the location of the injected fault. Our attack requires around 128 − 256 faults, precomputed table of size 2^41.6 bytes and recovers the complete internal state of Rabbit in about 2^38 steps

    On Message Authentication in 4G LTE System

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    After decades of evolution, the cellular system has become an indispensable part of modern life. Together with the convenience brought by the cellular system, many security issues have arisen. Message integrity protection is one of the urgent problems. The integrity of a message is usually protected by message authentication code (MAC). Forgery attacks are the primary threat to message integrity. By Simon's definition, forgery is twofold. The first is impersonation forgery, in which the opponent can forge a MAC without knowing any message-MAC pairs. The second is substitution forgery, in which the opponent can forge a MAC by knowing certain message-MAC pairs. In the 4G LTE system, MAC is applied not only to RRC control messages and user data, but also to authentication of the identities in the radio network during the authentication and key agreement (AKA) procedure. There is a set of functions used in AKA, which is called A3/A8. Originally, only one cipher suite called MILENAGE followed the definition of A3/A8. Recently, Vodafone has proposed another candidate called TUAK. This thesis first analyzes a MAC algorithm of the 4G LTE system called EIA1. The analysis shows that because of its linear structure, given two valid message-MAC pairs generated by EIA1, attackers can forge up to 2322^{32} valid MACs by the algorithm called linear forgery attack proposed in this thesis. This thesis also proposes a well-designed scenario, in which attackers can apply the linear forgery attack to the real system. The second work presented in this thesis fixes the gap between the almost XOR universal property and the substitution forgery probability, and assesses the security of EIA1 under different attack models. After the security analysis, an optimized EIA1 using an efficient polynomial evaluation method is proposed. This polynomial evaluation method is analog to the fast Fourier transform. Compared with Horner's rule, which is used in the official implementation of EIA1, this method reduces the number of multiplications over finite field dramatically. The improvement is shown by the experiment results, which suggests that the optimized code is much faster than the official implementation, and the polynomial evaluation method is better than Horner's rule. The third work in this thesis assesses the security of TUAK, and proves TUAK is a secure algorithm set, which means f1f_1, f1∗f_1^*, and f2f_2 are resistant to forgery attacks, and key recovery attacks; f3f_3 - f5f_5, and f5∗f_5^* are resistant to key recovery attacks and collision. A novel technique called multi-output filtering model is proposed in this work in order to study the non-randomness property of TUAK and other cryptographic primitives, such as AES, KASUMI, and PRESENT. A multi-output filtering model consists of a linear feedback shift register (LFSR) and a multi-output filtering function. The contribution of this research is twofold. First, an attack technique under IND-CPA using the multi-output filtering model is proposed. By introducing a distinguishing function, we theoretically determine the success rate of this attack. In particular, we construct a distinguishing function based on the distribution of the linear complexity of component sequences, and apply it on studying TUAK's f1f_1 algorithm, AES, KASUMI and PRESENT. The experiments demonstrate that the success rate of the attack on KASUMI and PRESENT is non-negligible, but f1f_1 and AES are resistant to this attack. Second, this research studies the distribution of the cryptographic properties of component functions of a random primitive in the multi-output filtering model. The experiments show some non-randomness in the distribution of the algebraic degree and nonlinearity for KASUMI. The last work is constructing two MACs. The first MAC called WGIA-128 is a variant of EIA1, and requires the underlying stream cipher to generate uniform distributed key streams. WG-16, a stream cipher with provable security, is a good choice to be the underlying cipher of WGIA-128 because it satisfies the requirement. The second MAC called AMAC is constructed upon APN functions. we propose two different constructions of AMAC, and both of these two constructions have provable security. The probability of substitution forgery attacks against both constructions of AMAC is upper bounded by a negligible value. Compared with EIA1 and EIA3, two message authentication codes used in the 4G LTE system, both constructions of AMAC are slower than EIA3, but much faster than EIA1. Moreover, both constructions of AMAC are resistant to cycling and linear forgery attacks, which can be applied to both EIA1 and EIA3

    Contributions to Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms for 5G

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    The confidentiality and integrity algorithms in cellular networks protect the transmission of user and signaling data over the air between users and the network, e.g., the base stations. There are three standardised cryptographic suites for confidentiality and integrity protection in 4G, which are based on the AES, SNOW 3G, and ZUC primitives, respectively. These primitives are used for providing a 128-bit security level and are usually implemented in hardware, e.g., using IP (intellectual property) cores, thus can be quite efficient. When we come to 5G, the innovative network architecture and high-performance demands pose new challenges to security. For the confidentiality and integrity protection, there are some new requirements on the underlying cryptographic algorithms. Specifically, these algorithms should: 1) provide 256 bits of security to protect against attackers equipped with quantum computing capabilities; and 2) provide at least 20 Gbps (Gigabits per second) speed in pure software environments, which is the downlink peak data rate in 5G. The reason for considering software environments is that the encryption in 5G will likely be moved to the cloud and implemented in software. Therefore, it is crucial to investigate existing algorithms in 4G, checking if they can satisfy the 5G requirements in terms of security and speed, and possibly propose new dedicated algorithms targeting these goals. This is the motivation of this thesis, which focuses on the confidentiality and integrity algorithms for 5G. The results can be summarised as follows.1. We investigate the security of SNOW 3G under 256-bit keys and propose two linear attacks against it with complexities 2172 and 2177, respectively. These cryptanalysis results indicate that SNOW 3G cannot provide the full 256-bit security level. 2. We design some spectral tools for linear cryptanalysis and apply these tools to investigate the security of ZUC-256, the 256-bit version of ZUC. We propose a distinguishing attack against ZUC-256 with complexity 2236, which is 220 faster than exhaustive key search. 3. We design a new stream cipher called SNOW-V in response to the new requirements for 5G confidentiality and integrity protection, in terms of security and speed. SNOW-V can provide a 256-bit security level and achieve a speed as high as 58 Gbps in software based on our extensive evaluation. The cipher is currently under evaluation in ETSI SAGE (Security Algorithms Group of Experts) as a promising candidate for 5G confidentiality and integrity algorithms. 4. We perform deeper cryptanalysis of SNOW-V to ensure that two common cryptanalysis techniques, guess-and-determine attacks and linear cryptanalysis, do not apply to SNOW-V faster than exhaustive key search. 5. We introduce two minor modifications in SNOW-V and propose an extreme performance variant, called SNOW-Vi, in response to the feedback about SNOW-V that some use cases are not fully covered. SNOW-Vi covers more use cases, especially some platforms with less capabilities. The speeds in software are increased by 50% in average over SNOW-V and can be up to 92 Gbps.Besides these works on 5G confidentiality and integrity algorithms, the thesis is also devoted to local pseudorandom generators (PRGs). 6. We investigate the security of local PRGs and propose two attacks against some constructions instantiated on the P5 predicate. The attacks improve existing results with a large gap and narrow down the secure parameter regime. We also extend the attacks to other local PRGs instantiated on general XOR-AND and XOR-MAJ predicates and provide some insight in the choice of safe parameters

    CONSTRUCTION OF EFFICIENT AUTHENTICATION SCHEMES USING TRAPDOOR HASH FUNCTIONS

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    In large-scale distributed systems, where adversarial attacks can have widespread impact, authentication provides protection from threats involving impersonation of entities and tampering of data. Practical solutions to authentication problems in distributed systems must meet specific constraints of the target system, and provide a reasonable balance between security and cost. The goal of this dissertation is to address the problem of building practical and efficient authentication mechanisms to secure distributed applications. This dissertation presents techniques to construct efficient digital signature schemes using trapdoor hash functions for various distributed applications. Trapdoor hash functions are collision-resistant hash functions associated with a secret trapdoor key that allows the key-holder to find collisions between hashes of different messages. The main contributions of this dissertation are as follows: 1. A common problem with conventional trapdoor hash functions is that revealing a collision producing message pair allows an entity to compute additional collisions without knowledge of the trapdoor key. To overcome this problem, we design an efficient trapdoor hash function that prevents all entities except the trapdoor key-holder from computing collisions regardless of whether collision producing message pairs are revealed by the key-holder. 2. We design a technique to construct efficient proxy signatures using trapdoor hash functions to authenticate and authorize agents acting on behalf of users in agent-based computing systems. Our technique provides agent authentication, assurance of agreement between delegator and agent, security without relying on secure communication channels and control over an agent’s capabilities. 3. We develop a trapdoor hash-based signature amortization technique for authenticating real-time, delay-sensitive streams. Our technique provides independent verifiability of blocks comprising a stream, minimizes sender-side and receiver-side delays, minimizes communication overhead, and avoids transmission of redundant information. 4. We demonstrate the practical efficacy of our trapdoor hash-based techniques for signature amortization and proxy signature construction by presenting discrete log-based instantiations of the generic techniques that are efficient to compute, and produce short signatures. Our detailed performance analyses demonstrate that the proposed schemes outperform existing schemes in computation cost and signature size. We also present proofs for security of the proposed discrete-log based instantiations against forgery attacks under the discrete-log assumption

    On Some Symmetric Lightweight Cryptographic Designs

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    This dissertation presents cryptanalysis of several symmetric lightweight primitives, both stream ciphers and block ciphers. Further, some aspects of authentication in combination with a keystream generator is investigated, and a new member of the Grain family of stream ciphers, Grain-128a, with built-in support for authentication is presented. The first contribution is an investigation of how authentication can be provided at a low additional cost, assuming a synchronous stream cipher is already implemented and used for encryption. These findings are then used when presenting the latest addition to the Grain family of stream ciphers, Grain-128a. It uses a 128-bit key and a 96-bit initialization vector to generate keystream, and to possibly also authenticate the plaintext. Next, the stream cipher BEAN, superficially similar to Grain, but notably using a weak output function and two feedback with carry shift registers (FCSRs) rather than linear and (non-FCSR) nonlinear feedback shift registers, is cryptanalyzed. An efficient distinguisher and a state-recovery attack is given. It is shown how knowledge of the state can be used to recover the key in a straightforward way. The remainder of this dissertation then focuses on block ciphers. First, a related-key attack on KTANTAN is presented. The attack notably uses only a few related keys, runs in less than half a minute on a current computer, and directly contradicts the designers' claims. It is discussed why this is, and what can be learned from this. Next, PRINTcipher is subjected to linear cryptanalysis. Several weak key classes are identified and it is shown how several observations of the same statistical property can be made for each plaintext--ciphertext pair. Finally, the invariant subspace property, first observed for certain key classes in PRINTcipher, is investigated. In particular, its connection to large linear biases is studied through an eigenvector which arises inside the cipher and leads to trail clustering in the linear hull which, under reasonable assumptions, causes a significant number of large linear biases. Simulations on several versions of PRINTcipher are compared to the theoretical findings

    Design and Analysis of Security Schemes for Low-cost RFID Systems

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    With the remarkable progress in microelectronics and low-power semiconductor technologies, Radio Frequency IDentification technology (RFID) has moved from obscurity into mainstream applications, which essentially provides an indispensable foundation to realize ubiquitous computing and machine perception. However, the catching and exclusive characteristics of RFID systems introduce growing security and privacy concerns. To address these issues are particularly challenging for low-cost RFID systems, where tags are extremely constrained in resources, power and cost. The primary reasons are: (1) the security requirements of low-cost RFID systems are even more rigorous due to large operation range and mass deployment; and (2) the passive tags' modest capabilities and the necessity to keep their prices low present a novel problem that goes beyond the well-studied problems of traditional cryptography. This thesis presents our research results on the design and the analysis of security schemes for low-cost RFID systems. Motivated by the recent attention on exploiting physical layer resources in the design of security schemes, we investigate how to solve the eavesdropping, modification and one particular type of relay attacks toward the tag-to-reader communication in passive RFID systems without requiring lightweight ciphers. To this end, we propose a novel physical layer scheme, called Backscatter modulation- and Uncoordinated frequency hopping-assisted Physical Layer Enhancement (BUPLE). The idea behind it is to use the amplitude of the carrier to transmit messages as normal, while to utilize its periodically varied frequency to hide the transmission from the eavesdropper/relayer and to exploit a random sequence modulated to the carrier's phase to defeat malicious modifications. We further improve its eavesdropping resistance through the coding in the physical layer, since BUPLE ensures that the tag-to-eavesdropper channel is strictly noisier than the tag-to-reader channel. Three practical Wiretap Channel Codes (WCCs) for passive tags are then proposed: two of them are constructed from linear error correcting codes, and the other one is constructed from a resilient vector Boolean function. The security and usability of BUPLE in conjunction with WCCs are further confirmed by our proof-of-concept implementation and testing. Eavesdropping the communication between a legitimate reader and a victim tag to obtain raw data is a basic tool for the adversary. However, given the fundamentality of eavesdropping attacks, there are limited prior work investigating its intension and extension for passive RFID systems. To this end, we firstly identified a brand-new attack, working at physical layer, against backscattered RFID communications, called unidirectional active eavesdropping, which defeats the customary impression that eavesdropping is a ``passive" attack. To launch this attack, the adversary transmits an un-modulated carrier (called blank carrier) at a certain frequency while a valid reader and a tag interacts at another frequency channel. Once the tag modulates the amplitude of reader's signal, it causes fluctuations on the blank carrier as well. By carefully examining the amplitude of the backscattered versions of the blank carrier and the reader's carrier, the adversary could intercept the ongoing reader-tag communication with either significantly lower bit error rate or from a significantly greater distance away. Our concept is demonstrated and empirically analyzed towards a popular low-cost RFID system, i.e., EPC Gen2. Although active eavesdropping in general is not trivial to be prohibited, for a particular type of active eavesdropper, namely a greedy proactive eavesdropper, we propose a simple countermeasure without introducing extra cost to current RFID systems. The needs of cryptographic primitives on constraint devices keep increasing with the growing pervasiveness of these devices. One recent design of the lightweight block cipher is Hummingbird-2. We study its cryptographic strength under a novel technique we developed, called Differential Sequence Attack (DSA), and present the first cryptanalytic result on this cipher. In particular, our full attack can be divided into two phases: preparation phase and key recovery phase. During the key recovery phase, we exploit the fact that the differential sequence for the last round of Hummingbird-2 can be retrieved by querying the full cipher, due to which, the search space of the secret key can be significantly reduced. Thus, by attacking the encryption (decryption resp.) of Hummingbird-2, our algorithm recovers 36-bit (another 28-bit resp.) out of 128-bit key with 2682^{68} (2602^{60} resp.) time complexity if particular differential conditions of the internal states and of the keys at one round can be imposed. Additionally, the rest 64-bit of the key can be exhaustively searched and the overall time complexity is dominated by 2682^{68}. During the preparation phase, by investing 2812^{81} effort in time, the adversary is able to create the differential conditions required in the key recovery phase with at least 0.5 probability. As an additional effort, we examine the cryptanalytic strength of another lightweight candidate known as A2U2, which is the most lightweight cryptographic primitive proposed so far for low-cost tags. Our chosen-plaintext-attack fully breaks this cipher by recovering its secret key with only querying the encryption twice on the victim tag and solving 32 sparse systems of linear equations (where each system has 56 unknowns and around 28 unknowns can be directly obtained without computation) in the worst case, which takes around 0.16 second on a Thinkpad T410 laptop
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