Transfer of Spatial Contact Information Among Limbs and the Notion of Peripersonal Space in Insects

Internal representation of far-range space in insects is well established, as it is necessary for navigation behavior. Although it is likely that insects also have an internal representation of near-range space, the behavioral evidence for the latter is much less evident. Here, we estimate the size and shape of the spatial equivalent of a near-range representation that is constituted by somatosensory sampling events. To do so, we use a large set of experimental whole-body motion capture data on unrestrained walking, climbing and searching behavior in stick insects of the species Carausius morosus to delineate ‘action volumes’ and ‘contact volumes’ for both antennae and all six legs. As these volumes are derived from recorded sampling events, they comprise a volume equivalent to a representation of coinciding somatosensory and motor activity. Accordingly, we define this volume as the peripersonal space of an insect. It is of immediate behavioral relevance, because it comprises all potential external object locations within the action range of the body. In a next step, we introduce the notion of an affordance space as that part of peripersonal space within which contact-induced spatial estimates lie within the action ranges of more than one limb. Because the action volumes of limbs overlap in this affordance space, spatial information from one limb can be used to control the movement of another limb. Thus, it gives rise to an affordance as known for contact-induced reaching movements and spatial coordination of footfall patterns in stick insects. Finally, we probe the computational properties of the experimentally derived affordance space for pairs of neighboring legs. This is done by use of artificial neural networks that map the posture of one leg into a target posture of another leg with identical foot position

Transfer of spatial contact information among limbs and the notion of peripersonal space in insects

Dürr V, Schilling M. Transfer of spatial contact information among limbs and the notion of peripersonal space in insects. Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience. 2018;12: 101.Internal representation of far-range space in insects is well established, as it is necessary for navigation behaviour. Although it is likely that insects also have an internal representation of near-range space, the behavioural evidence for the latter is much less evident. Here, we estimate the size and shape of the spatial equivalent of a near-range representation that is constituted by somatosensory sampling events. To do so, we use a large set of experimental whole-body motion capture data on unrestrained walking, climbing and searching behaviour in stick insects of the species Carausius morosus to delineate 'action volumes' and 'contact volumes' for both antennae and all six legs. As these volumes are derived from recorded sampling events, they comprise a volume equivalent to a representation of coinciding somatosensory and motor activity. Accordingly, we define this volume as the peripersonal space of an insect. It is of immediate behavioural relevance, because it comprises all potential external object locations within the action range of the body.In a next step, we introduce the notion of an affordance space as that part of peripersonal space within which contact-induced spatial estimates lie within the action ranges of more than one limb. Because the action volumes of limbs overlap in this affordance space, spatial information from one limb can be used to control the movement of another limb. Thus, it gives rise to an affordance as known for contact-induced reaching movements and spatial coordination of footfall patterns in stick insects. Finally, we probe the computational properties of the experimentally derived affordance space for pairs of neighbouring legs. This is done by use of artificial neural networks that map the posture of one leg into a target posture of another leg with identical foot position

Integrative Biomimetics of Autonomous Hexapedal Locomotion

Dürr V, Arena PP, Cruse H, et al. Integrative Biomimetics of Autonomous Hexapedal Locomotion. Frontiers in Neurorobotics. 2019;13: 88.Despite substantial advances in many different fields of neurorobotics in general, and biomimetic robots in particular, a key challenge is the integration of concepts: to collate and combine research on disparate and conceptually disjunct research areas in the neurosciences and engineering sciences. We claim that the development of suitable robotic integration platforms is of particular relevance to make such integration of concepts work in practice. Here, we provide an example for a hexapod robotic integration platform for autonomous locomotion. In a sequence of six focus sections dealing with aspects of intelligent, embodied motor control in insects and multipedal robots—ranging from compliant actuation, distributed proprioception and control of multiple legs, the formation of internal representations to the use of an internal body model—we introduce the walking robot HECTOR as a research platform for integrative biomimetics of hexapedal locomotion. Owing to its 18 highly sensorized, compliant actuators, light-weight exoskeleton, distributed and expandable hardware architecture, and an appropriate dynamic simulation framework, HECTOR offers many opportunities to integrate research effort across biomimetics research on actuation, sensory-motor feedback, inter-leg coordination, and cognitive abilities such as motion planning and learning of its own body size

Haptic Media Scenes

The aim of this thesis is to apply new media phenomenological and enactive embodied cognition approaches to explain the role of haptic sensitivity and communication in personal computer environments for productivity. Prior theory has given little attention to the role of haptic senses in influencing cognitive processes, and do not frame the richness of haptic communication in interaction design—as haptic interactivity in HCI has historically tended to be designed and analyzed from a perspective on communication as transmissions, sending and receiving haptic signals. The haptic sense may not only mediate contact confirmation and affirmation, but also rich semiotic and affective messages—yet this is a strong contrast between this inherent ability of haptic perception, and current day support for such haptic communication interfaces. I therefore ask: How do the haptic senses (touch and proprioception) impact our cognitive faculty when mediated through digital and sensor technologies? How may these insights be employed in interface design to facilitate rich haptic communication? To answer these questions, I use theoretical close readings that embrace two research fields, new media phenomenology and enactive embodied cognition. The theoretical discussion is supported by neuroscientific evidence, and tested empirically through case studies centered on digital art. I use these insights to develop the concept of the haptic figura, an analytical tool to frame the communicative qualities of haptic media. The concept gauges rich machine- mediated haptic interactivity and communication in systems with a material solution supporting active haptic perception, and the mediation of semiotic and affective messages that are understood and felt. As such the concept may function as a design tool for developers, but also for media critics evaluating haptic media. The tool is used to frame a discussion on opportunities and shortcomings of haptic interfaces for productivity, differentiating between media systems for the hand and the full body. The significance of this investigation is demonstrating that haptic communication is an underutilized element in personal computer environments for productivity and providing an analytical framework for a more nuanced understanding of haptic communication as enabling the mediation of a range of semiotic and affective messages, beyond notification and confirmation interactivity

On the psychological origins of tool use

The ubiquity of tool use in human life has generated multiple lines of scientific and philosophical investigation to understand the development and expression of humans' engagement with tools and its relation to other dimensions of human experience. However, existing literature on tool use faces several epistemological challenges in which the same set of questions generate many different answers. At least four critical questions can be identified, which are intimately intertwined-(1) What constitutes tool use? (2) What psychological processes underlie tool use in humans and nonhuman animals? (3) Which of these psychological processes are exclusive to tool use? (4) Which psychological processes involved in tool use are exclusive to Homo sapiens? To help advance a multidisciplinary scientific understanding of tool use, six author groups representing different academic disciplines (e.g., anthropology, psychology, neuroscience) and different theoretical perspectives respond to each of these questions, and then point to the direction of future work on tool use. We find that while there are marked differences among the responses of the respective author groups to each question, there is a surprising degree of agreement about many essential concepts and questions. We believe that this interdisciplinary and intertheoretical discussion will foster a more comprehensive understanding of tool use than any one of these perspectives (or any one of these author groups) would (or could) on their own

From locomotion to cognition: Bridging the gap between reactive and cognitive behavior in a quadruped robot

The cognitivistic paradigm, which states that cognition is a result of computation with symbols that represent the world, has been challenged by many. The opponents have primarily criticized the detachment from direct interaction with the world and pointed to some fundamental problems (for instance the symbol grounding problem). Instead, they emphasized the constitutive role of embodied interaction with the environment. This has motivated the advancement of synthetic methodologies: the phenomenon of interest (cognition) can be studied by building and investigating whole brain-body-environment systems. Our work is centered around a compliant quadruped robot equipped with a multimodal sensory set. In a series of case studies, we investigate the structure of the sensorimotor space that the application of different actions in different environments by the robot brings about. Then, we study how the agent can autonomously abstract the regularities that are induced by the different conditions and use them to improve its behavior. The agent is engaged in path integration, terrain discrimination and gait adaptation, and moving target following tasks. The nature of the tasks forces the robot to leave the ``here-and-now'' time scale of simple reactive stimulus-response behaviors and to learn from its experience, thus creating a ``minimally cognitive'' setting. Solutions to these problems are developed by the agent in a bottom-up fashion. The complete scenarios are then used to illuminate the concepts that are believed to lie at the basis of cognition: sensorimotor contingencies, body schema, and forward internal models. Finally, we discuss how the presented solutions are relevant for applications in robotics, in particular in the area of autonomous model acquisition and adaptation, and, in mobile robots, in dead reckoning and traversability detection

Multisensory integration, predictive coding and the Bayesian brain: reintegrating the body image and body schema distinction into cognitive science

The classic distinction between the body schema and the body image received renewed interest in cognitive psychology, in part because of the attempts by the leading psychologist Charles Spence and his co-authors to synthesise a mounting body of research into the multisensory nature and functional properties of the neural structures in primate cortex that are sensitive and responsive to cross-modal stimuli generated from the body and objects located close to the body, and the famous rubber hand illusion which purported to illustrate how the perception and understanding of what counts as one’s body, i.e., our body image, can be manipulated to include foreign, body-part-like, objects such as a rubber hand. This approach was intended to settle age old questions about how the body schema – the system sub-personal sensorimotor system that shapes, facilitates and regulates motor control – is implemented in the brain and address historic confusions about how the body schema should be understood as an explanatory concept, as well as the problems surrounding the body schema and image distinction on the grounds of the persistent conflation between the two concepts. However, after offering several proposals as to how the body schema should be used to organise and interpret the empirical data, the distinction fell out of favour with Spence and his colleagues on the grounds of the very problems they intended to resolve. The proposed solution is an alternative theoretical framework that, I shall argue, never materialised. Instead, the various definitions they disseminate, I will claim, simply serve to further perpetuate the same problems and confusions about the body schema. Thus, the current state of the literature on the body image and schema in cognitive psychology is in dire need of a conceptual framework that would help us situate and interpret the important empirical data. I propose that we revisit the philosophical debates that were inspired by the philosopher Shaun Gallagher as part of his project to provide a conceptual analysis of the body schema and image distinction and vindicate its status as an important explanatory device for the explanatory ambitions of embodied cognition. Gallagher’s analysis opens up important questions about how the sub-personal multisensory processes of the body schema not only facilitate moment-by-moment motor behaviours, but how they shape and optimise motor control across developmental timelines, as well the importance of the embodied configuration of an agent and its particular eco-niche for shaping and facilitating its motor behaviours. The second important argument of the thesis is that the response to Gallagher’s analysis has simply served to suppress the line of research that Gallagher inspired because the questions his analysis raises have been overshadowed by more general disputes between Gallagher and his opponents about the shape an analysis of the body schema from the perspective of embodied cognition should take. As such, potentially promising lines of research in relation to the body schema have since dried up. As part of my attempt to make progress on the issues that are laid out at the first and second stages of the thesis, the third stage will involve an exploration into the seminal Bayesian approach to understanding cross-modal cue optimisation as it applies to object perception (Banks & Ernst, 2002) and the recent extension of this paradigm to the multimodal sensorimotor processes that underpin motor behaviour in action-oriented cognitive science (e.g., Friston, 2010). The conclusion of the thesis is that the move from an embodied to an action-oriented analysis of the body schema, and the conceptual distinction of which it is part, provides us with the right kind of theoretical resources to begin to pursue fruitful avenues of research that allow us to begin to address the questions set out by Gallagher’s analysis whilst avoiding (some of) the pitfalls that beset the embodied approach. In the final chapter I use this model of the body schema to illustrate how it can provide the basis for working back up towards a comprehensive theory of the body image and schema distinction, which I then bring to bear on current, as-yet-unaddressed, issues in developmental psychology