Intellectualism and the argument from cognitive science

Intellectualism is the claim that practical knowledge or ‘know-how’ is a kind of propositional knowledge. The debate over Intellectualism has appealed to two different kinds of evidence, semantic and scientific. This paper concerns the relationship between Intellectualist arguments based on truth-conditional semantics of practical knowledge ascriptions, and anti-Intellectualist arguments based on cognitive science and propositional representation. The first half of the paper argues that the anti-Intellectualist argument from cognitive science rests on a naturalistic approach to metaphysics: its proponents assume that findings from cognitive science provide evidence about the nature of mental states. We demonstrate that this fact has been overlooked in the ensuing debate, resulting in inconsistency and confusion. Defenders of the semantic approach to Intellectualism engage with the argument from cognitive science in a way that implicitly endorses this naturalistic metaphysics, and even rely on it to claim that cognitive science support Intellectualism. In the course of their arguments, however, they also reject that scientific findings can have metaphysical import. We argue that this situation is preventing productive debate about Intellectualism, which would benefit from both sides being more transparent about their metaphilosophical assumptions

The aggregation of propositional attitudes: towards a general theory

How can the propositional attitudes of several individuals be aggregated into overall collective propositional attitudes? Although there are large bodies of work on the aggregation of various special kinds of propositional attitudes, such as preferences, judgments, probabilities and utilities, the aggregation of propositional attitudes is seldom studied in full generality. In this paper, we seek to contribute to filling this gap in the literature. We sketch the ingredients of a general theory of propositional attitude aggregation and prove two new theorems. Our first theorem simultaneously characterizes some prominent aggregation rules in the cases of probability, judgment and preference aggregation, including linear opinion pooling and Arrovian dictatorships. Our second theorem abstracts even further from the specific kinds of attitudes in question and describes the properties of a large class of aggregation rules applicable to a variety of belief-like attitudes. Our approach integrates some previously disconnected areas of investigation.mathematical economics;

Saying Without Knowing What or How

In response to Stephen Neale (2016), I argue that aphonic expressions, such as PRO, are intentionally uttered by normal speakers of natural language, either by acts of omitting to say something explicitly, or by acts of giving phonetic realization to aphonics. I argue, also, that Gricean intention-based semantics should seek divorce from Cartesian assumptions of transparent access to propositional attitudes and, consequently, that Stephen Schiffer's so-called meaning-intention problem is not powerful enough to banish alleged cases of over-intellectualization in contemporary philosophy of language and mind

Reasoning about Knowledge and Belief: A Syntactical Treatment

The study of formal theories of agents has intensified over the last couple of decades, since such formalisms can be viewed as providing the specifications for building rational agents and multi-agent systems. Most of the proposed approaches are based upon the well-understood framework of modal logics and possible world semantics. Although intuitive and expressive, these approaches lack two properties that can be considered important to a rational agent's reasoning: quantification over the propositional attitudes, and self-referential statements. This paper presents an alternative framework which is different from those found in the literature in two ways: Firstly, a syntactical approach for the representation of the propositional attitudes is adopted. This involves the use of a truth predicate and syntactic modalities which are defined in terms of the truth predicate itself and corresponding modal operators. Secondly, an agent's information state includes both knowledge and beliefs. Independent modal operators for the two notions are introduced and based on them syntactic modalities are defined. Furthermore, the relation between knowledge and belief is thoroughly explored and three different connection axiomatisations for the modalities and the syntactic modalities are proposed and their properties investigated

Multi-dimensional Type Theory: Rules, Categories, and Combinators for Syntax and Semantics

We investigate the possibility of modelling the syntax and semantics of natural language by constraints, or rules, imposed by the multi-dimensional type theory Nabla. The only multiplicity we explicitly consider is two, namely one dimension for the syntax and one dimension for the semantics, but the general perspective is important. For example, issues of pragmatics could be handled as additional dimensions. One of the main problems addressed is the rather complicated repertoire of operations that exists besides the notion of categories in traditional Montague grammar. For the syntax we use a categorial grammar along the lines of Lambek. For the semantics we use so-called lexical and logical combinators inspired by work in natural logic. Nabla provides a concise interpretation and a sequent calculus as the basis for implementations.Comment: 20 page

The Pragmatics of Arabic Religious Posts on Facebook: A Relevance-Theoretic Account

Despite growing interest in the impact of computer-mediated communication on our lives, linguistic studies on such communication conducted in the Arabic language are scarce. Grounded in Relevance Theory, this paper seeks to fill this void by analysing the linguistic structure of Arabic religious posts on Facebook. First, I discuss communication on Facebook, treating it as a relevance-seeking process of writing or sharing posts, with the functions of ‘Like’ and ‘Share’ seen as cues for communicating propositional attitude. Second, I analyse a corpus of around 80 posts, revealing an interesting use of imperatives, interrogatives and conditionals which manipulate the interpretation of such posts between descriptive and interpretive readings. I also argue that a rigorous system of incentives is employed in such posts in order to boost their relevance. Positive, negative and challenging incentives link the textual to the visual message in an attempt to raise more cognitive effects for the readers

Classical and Connectionist Models: Levels of Description

To begin, I introduce an analysis of interlevel relations that allows us to offer an initial characterization of the debate about the way classical and connectionist models relate. Subsequently, I examine a compatibility thesis and a conditional claim on this issue. With respect to the compatibility thesis, I argue that, even if classical and connectionist models are not necessarily incompatible, the emergence of the latter seems to undermine the best arguments for the Language of Thought Hypothesis, which is essential to the former. I attack the conditional claim of connectionism to eliminativism, presented by Ramsey et al. (1990), by discrediting their discrete characterization of common-sense psychological explanations and pointing to the presence of a moderate holistic constraint. Finally, I conclude that neither of the arguments considered excludes the possibility of viewing connectionist models as forming a part of a representational theory of cognition that dispenses with the Language of Thought Hypothesis

Synchronous Online Philosophy Courses: An Experiment in Progress

There are two main ways to teach a course online: synchronously or asynchronously. In an asynchronous course, students can log on at their convenience and do the course work. In a synchronous course, there is a requirement that all students be online at specific times, to allow for a shared course environment. In this article, the author discusses the strengths and weaknesses of synchronous online learning for the teaching of undergraduate philosophy courses. The author discusses specific strategies and technologies he uses in the teaching of online philosophy courses. In particular, the author discusses how he uses videoconferencing to create a classroom-like environment in an online class

Anaphora and the Logic of Change

This paper shows how the dynamic interpretation of natural language introduced in work by Hans Kamp and Irene Heim can be modeled in classical type logic. This provides a synthesis between Richard Montague's theory of natural language semantics and the work by Kamp and Heim