Egalitarianism in convex fuzzy games

In this paper the egalitarian solution for convex cooperative fuzzy games is introduced. The classical Dutta-Ray algorithm for finding the constrained egalitarian solution for convex crisp games is adjusted to provide the egalitarian solution of a convex fuzzy game. This adjusted algorithm is also a finite algorithm, because the convexity of a fuzzy game implies in each step the existence ∗This paper was written while the authors were research fellows at the ZiF (Bielefeld) for the project “Procedural Approaches to Conflict Resolution”, 2002. We thank our hosts for their hospitality

Equity and economic theory: reflections on methodology and scope

This paper provides an introduction to the recent literature on ordinal distributive justice. Its objetive is to explain the process of the mathematical analysis of fairness and to consider its potential for solving real allocative problems by means of several illustrative examples

EGALITARIAN RULES IN CLAIMS PROBLEMS WITH INDIVISIBLE GOODS

In this work we deal with rationing problems. In particular with claims problems with indivisible goods, that is, problems in which a certain amount of indivisible units (of an homogeneous good), has to be distributed among a group of agents, when this amount is not enough to satisfy agents' demands. We define discrete rules to solve those problems that involve notions of fairness similar to those supporting the constrained-equal awards and the constrained-equal losses rules in the continuous case. Axiomatic characterizations of those solutions are provided.indivisible goods, claims problems, equal awards solution, equal losses solution.

Why Global Inequality Matters: Derivative Global Egalitarianism

This article integrates empirical and normative discussions about why global economic inequalities matter in critically examining an approach known as derivative global egalitarianism (DGE). DGE is a burgeoning perspective that opposes excessive global economic inequality not based on the intrinsic value of equality but inequality\u27s negative repercussions on other values. The article aims to advance the research agenda by identifying and critically evaluating four primary varieties of DGE arguments from related but distinct literatures, which span a number of disciplines, including economics, international relations, and political philosophy. Overall, DGE offers a number of persuasive arguments as to why current levels of global inequality are of concern, but aspects of DGE beg further philosophical and empirical examination. By situating DGE within the wider theoretical and empirical contexts, this article provides resources for its critical assessment and theoretical development

Equity and economic theory: reflections on methodology and scope.

This paper provides an introduction to the recent literature on ordinal distributive justice. Its objetive is to explain the process of the mathematical analysis of fairness and to consider its potential for solving real allocative problems by means of several illustrative examples.Fairness; Equity; Distributive justice;

The probability to reach an agreement as a foundation for axiomatic bargaining

We revisit the Nash bargaining model and axiomatize a procedural solution that maximizes the probability of successful bargaining. Our characterization spans several known solution concepts, including the special cases of the Nash, egalitarian, and utilitarian solutions. Using a probability-based language, we offer a natural interpretation for the product operator underlying the Nash solution: when the bargainers’ individual acceptance probabilities are independent, their product recovers the joint acceptance probability

Copmment on Egalitarianism under Incomplete Information

The paper aims at extending the egalitarian principle to environments with incomplete information. The approach is primarily axiomatic, focusing on the characteristic property of monotonicity: no member of the society should be worse off when more collective decisions are available. I start by showing the incompat- ibility of this property with incentive efficiency, even in quasi-linear environments. This serious impossibility result does not follow from the mere presence of incentive constraints, but instead from the fact that information is incomplete (asymmetric information at the time of making a decision). I then weaken the monotonicity property so as to require it only when starting from incentive compatible mecha- nisms at which interim utilities are transferable (in a weak sense). Adding other axioms in the spirit of Kalai's (Econometrica, 1977, Theorem 1) classical character- ization of the egalitarian principle under complete information, I obtain a partial characterization of a natural extension of the lex-min solution to problems with incomplete information. Next, I prove that, in each social choice problem, there is a unique way of rescaling the participants' interim utilities so as to make this solu- tion compatible with the ex-ante utilitarian principle. These two criteria coincides in the rescaled utilities exactly at the incentive ecient mechanisms that maxi- mize Harsanyi and Selten's (Management Science, 1972) weighted Nash product. These concepts are illustrated on classical examples of profit-sharing, public good production and bilateral trade. The richness of the topic of social choice under in- complete information is illustrated by considering two alternative extensions of the egalitarian principle { one based on an idea of equity from the point of view of the individuals themselves (given their private information) instead of an uninformed third party (social planner or arbitrator), and another notion based on the idea of

A Normative Framework of Justice in Climate Change

The more the various dimensions of climate change are just, the more an international agreement is in principle attainable. That is the reason why justice plays a major role in favouring collective action against global warming. In this article I spell out the dominant notions of justice and the consequent criteria of equity for the main domains of global warming negotiations, in order to identify a normative ethical framework. As far as mitigation is concerned, for the definition of a just initial allocation of endowments the reference point should be a per capita distribution corrected by a factor which takes into account all undeserved inequalities, as suggested by Rawls’ theory of justice. With regard to the subsequent exchange of endowments, I consider the Pareto principle supplemented by the envy-freeness one as the most viable option. Turning to adaptation, my point is that the criterion of responsibility based on historical accountability is inevitable. The related underpinning of justice can be found in principle I of Rawls’ theory of justice. Finally, for the issues raised by the just allocation of compensations for climate related damages I consider Sen’s capability approach the soundest option.adaptation, climate change, equity, justice, international climate agreements, mitigation