Recently identified university students navigate dyslexia

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to capture students’ understandings of dyslexia as a component of identity. Specifically, the journey that students embarked on in order to contribute to self-understanding of learning and how dyslexia contributes to these experiences was examined. Design/methodology/approach - This qualitative case study explored concepts of social identity theory, how students understood their dyslexia and whether or not labelling theory informed students’ identities through an arts-based phenomenological lens. Eight university students participated in a brief survey, a semi-structured interview and created artefacts representing their dyslexia, which facilitated dialogue about their individual experiences in a higher education context. Findings - Interpretive phenomenological analysis revealed that student participants associated strongly with the identity of dyslexia; however they did not consider themselves to be part of a dyslexic group. They also discussed different routes that informed their decisions to undergo diagnostic assessments for dyslexia. Students did not report dyslexia identity as a label. Nonetheless, the students expressed that creating an artefact supported them to better understand and communicate their dyslexia. Originality/value - Although visual methods are increasingly prevalent in educational research, they are not typical in the field of dyslexia in higher education. This research therefore engaged students in active self-reflection which provided valuable insight into the nature and diversity of the experiences that can emerge from identification of dyslexia at university

Self-Experience

Hume famously denied that he could experience the self. Most subsequent philosophers have concurred with this finding. I argue that if the subject is to function as a bearer of experience it must (1) lack sensory qualities in itself to be compatible with bearing sensory qualities and (2) be single so that it can unify experience. I use Douglas Harding’s first-person experiments to investigate the visual gap where one cannot see one’s own head. I argue that this open space conforms to the above criteria and hence is consistent with being the subject. I respond to the objection that this location is merely a lack of visual experience. I argue that this space also encompasses sound and touch properties and hence functions as a bearer for other sensory modalities. These first-person findings provide prima facie support for the view that the subject is a thin bearer of experience

Genetic Phenomenology and Empirical Naturalism

Husserl’s phenomenology is developed in explicit contrast to naturalism. At the same time, various scholars have attempted to overcome this opposition by naturalizing consciousness and phenomenology. In this paper, I argue that, in order to confront the issue of the relationship between phenomenology and naturalism, we must distinguish between different forms of naturalism. In fact, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is developed in contrast to a metaphysical form of naturalism, which conceives of nature as a mind-independent ontological domain that can be known as it is “in itself”, independently of the cognitive relationship. At the same time, I argue that the genetic development of phenomenology, through the investigation of the temporal structure of experiences, leads to an empirical form of naturalism, which conceives of nature as the objective pole in a process of co-constitution of the subject and the object of experience. Winner of the Philosophy Essay Prize “Vittorio Sainati” XIIth Editio

"Consciousness". Selected Bibliography 1970 - 2001

This is a bibliography of books and articles on consciousness in philosophy, cognitive science, and neuroscience over the last 30 years. There are three main sections, devoted to monographs, edited collections of papers, and articles. The first two of these sections are each divided into three subsections containing books in each of the main areas of research. The third section is divided into 12 subsections, with 10 subject headings for philosophical articles along with two additional subsections for articles in cognitive science and neuroscience. Of course the division is somewhat arbitrary, but I hope that it makes the bibliography easier to use. This bibliography has first been compiled by Thomas Metzinger and David Chalmers to appear in print in two philosophical anthologies on conscious experience (Metzinger 1995a, b). From 1995 onwards it has been continuously updated by Thomas Metzinger, and now is freely available as a PDF-, RTF-, or HTML-file. This bibliography mainly attempts to cover the Anglo-Saxon and German debates, in a non-annotated, fully formatted way that makes it easy to "cut and paste" from the original file. To a certain degree this bibliography also contains items in other languages than English and German - all submissions in other languages are welcome. Last update of current version: July 13th, 2001

Young children’s experience of visual displays of their artwork

The practice of displaying children's artwork in early childhood classrooms poses a number of questions about the child and his or her visual artwork. This paper focuses on young children’s experiences with the display of their own visual artwork. Following Giorgi's (1985a; 1985b) approach to conducting phenomenological psychological research, 13 children between the ages of 4 and 6 years attending an independent school outside metropolitan Detroit, Michigan (USA) participated in semi-structured interviews as a way of uncovering their lived experiences of seeing their artwork displayed. The study yielded 12 essential themes and from these three key issues and their implications for early childhood art education are explored

Does Visual Spatial Awareness Require the Visual Awareness of Space?

Many philosophers have held that it is not possible to experience a spatial object, property, or relation except against the background of an intact awareness of a space that is somehow ‘absolute’. This paper challenges that claim, by analyzing in detail the case of a brain-damaged subject whose visual experiences seem to have violated this condition: spatial objects and properties were present in his visual experience, but space itself was not. I go on to suggest that phenomenological argumentation can give us a kind of evidence about the nature of the mind even if this evidence is not absolutely incorrigible

Socio-phenomenology and conversation analysis: interpreting video lifeworld healthcare interactions

This article uses a socio-phenomenological methodology to develop knowledge and understanding of the healthcare consultation based on the concept of the lifeworld. It concentrates its attention on social action rather than strategic action and a systems approach. This article argues that patient-centred care is more effective when it is informed through a lifeworld conception of human mutual shared interaction. Videos offer an opportunity for a wide audience to experience the many kinds of conversations and dynamics that take place in consultations. Visual sociology used in this article provides a method to organize video emotional, knowledge and action conversations as well as dynamic typical consultation situations. These interactions are experienced through the video materials themselves unlike conversation analysis where video materials are first transcribed and then analysed. Both approaches have the potential to support intersubjective learning but this article argues that a video lifeworld schema is more accessible to health professionals and the general public. The typical interaction situations are constructed through the analysis of video materials of consultations in a London walk-in centre. Further studies are planned in the future to extend and replicate results in other healthcare services. This method of analysis focuses on the ways in which the everyday lifeworld informs face-to-face person-centred health care and supports social action as a significant factor underpinning strategic action and a systems approach to consultation practice

Imaginative Vividness

How are we to understand the phenomenology of imagining? Attempts to answer this question often invoke descriptors concerning the “vivacity” or “vividness” of our imaginative states. Not only are particular imaginings often phenomenologically compared and contrasted with other imaginings on grounds of how vivid they are, but such imaginings are also often compared and contrasted with perceptions and memories on similar grounds. Yet however natural it may be to use “vividness” and cognate terms in discussions of imagination, it does not take much reflection to see that these terms are ill understood. In this paper, I review both some relevant empirical literature as well as the philosophical literature attempt to get a handle on what it could mean, in an imaginative context, to talk of vividness. As I suggest, this notion ultimately proves to be so problematic as to be philosophically untenable

Visual and ultraviolet flux variability of the bright CP star θ\theta Aur

Chemically peculiar stars of the upper part of the main sequence show periodical variability in line intensities and continua, modulated by the stellar rotation, which is attributed to the existence of chemical spots on the surface of these stars. The flux variability is caused by the changing redistribution rate of the radiative flux predominantly from the short-wavelength part of the spectra to the long-wavelength part, which is a result of abundance anomalies. We study the nature of the multi-spectral variability of one of the brightest chemically peculiar stars, $\theta$ Aur. We predict the flux variability of $\theta$ Aur from the emerging intensities calculated for individual surface elements of the star taking into account horizontal variation of chemical composition derived from Doppler abundance maps. The simulated optical variability in the Str\"omgren photometric system and the ultraviolet flux variability agree well with observations. The IUE flux distribution is reproduced in great detail by our models. The resonance lines of magnesium and possibly also some lines of silicon are relatively weak in the ultraviolet domain, which indicates non-negligible vertical abundance gradients in the atmosphere. We also derive a new period of the star, $P=3.618\,664(10)$ d, from all available photometric and magnetic measurements and show that the observed rotational period is constant over decades. The ultraviolet and visual variability of $\theta$ Aur is mostly caused by silicon bound-free absorption and chromium and iron line absorption. These elements redistribute the flux mainly from the far-ultraviolet region to the near-ultraviolet and optical regions in the surface abundance spots. The light variability is modulated by the stellar rotation. The ultraviolet domain is key for understanding the properties of chemically peculiar stars. (abridged)Comment: 12 pages, accepted for publication in Astronomy & Astrophysic

Colour Relations in Form

The orthodox monadic determination thesis holds that we represent colour relations by virtue of representing colours. Against this orthodoxy, I argue that it is possible to represent colour relations without representing any colours. I present a model of iconic perceptual content that allows for such primitive relational colour representation, and provide four empirical arguments in its support. I close by surveying alternative views of the relationship between monadic and relational colour representation