11,626 research outputs found

    Cooperation in stochastic inventory models with continuous review

    Get PDF
    Consider multiple companies that continuously review their inventories and face Poisson demand. We study cooperation strategies for these companies and analyse if there exist allocations of the joint cost such that any company has lower costs than on its own; such allocations are called stable cost allocations. We start with two companies that jointly place an order for replenishment if their joint inventory position reaches a certain reorder level. This strategy leads to a simple expression of the joint costs. However, these costs exceed the costs for non-cooperating companies. Therefore, we examine another cooperation strategy. Namely, the companies reorder as soon as one of them reaches its reorder level. This latter strategy has lower costs than for non-cooperating companies. Numerical experiments show that the gametheoretical distribution rule — a cost allocation in which the companies share the procurement cost and each pays its own holding cost — is a stable cost allocation. These results also hold for situations with multiple companies

    Strongly Polynomial Primal-Dual Algorithms for Concave Cost Combinatorial Optimization Problems

    Get PDF
    We introduce an algorithm design technique for a class of combinatorial optimization problems with concave costs. This technique yields a strongly polynomial primal-dual algorithm for a concave cost problem whenever such an algorithm exists for the fixed-charge counterpart of the problem. For many practical concave cost problems, the fixed-charge counterpart is a well-studied combinatorial optimization problem. Our technique preserves constant factor approximation ratios, as well as ratios that depend only on certain problem parameters, and exact algorithms yield exact algorithms. Using our technique, we obtain a new 1.61-approximation algorithm for the concave cost facility location problem. For inventory problems, we obtain a new exact algorithm for the economic lot-sizing problem with general concave ordering costs, and a 4-approximation algorithm for the joint replenishment problem with general concave individual ordering costs

    Computing (R, S) policies with correlated demand

    Get PDF
    This paper considers the single-item single-stocking non-stationary stochastic lot-sizing problem under correlated demand. By operating under a nonstationary (R, S) policy, in which R denote the reorder period and S the associated order-up-to-level, we introduce a mixed integer linear programming (MILP) model which can be easily implemented by using off-theshelf optimisation software. Our modelling strategy can tackle a wide range of time-seriesbased demand processes, such as autoregressive (AR), moving average(MA), autoregressive moving average(ARMA), and autoregressive with autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity process(AR-ARCH). In an extensive computational study, we compare the performance of our model against the optimal policy obtained via stochastic dynamic programming. Our results demonstrate that the optimality gap of our approach averages 2.28% and that computational performance is good

    Leader-follower Game in VMI System with Limited Production Capacity Considering Wholesale and Retail Prices

    Get PDF
    VMI (Vendor Managed Inventory) is a widely used cooperative inventory policy in supply chains in which each enterprise has its autonomy in pricing. This paper discusses a leader-follower Stackelberg game in a VMI supply chain where the manufacturer, as a leader, produces a single product with a limited production capacity and delivers it at a wholesale price to multiple different retailers, as the followers, who then sell the product in dispersed and independent markets at retail prices. An algorithm is then developed to determine the equilibrium of the Stackelberg game. Finally, a numerical study is conducted to understand the influence of the Stackelberg equilibrium and market related parameters on the profits of the manufacturer and its retailers. Through the numerical example, our research demonstrates that: (a) the market related parameters have significant influence on the manufacturer’ and its retailers’ profits; (b) a retailer’s profit may not be necessarily lowered when it is charged with a higher inventory cost by the manufacturer; (c) the equilibrium of the Stackelberg equilibrium benefits the manufacturer.Stackelberg Game;Supply Chain;Vendor Managed Inventory
    • …
    corecore