148,072 research outputs found
The exchange-stable marriage problem
In this paper we consider instances of stable matching problems, namely the classical stable marriage (SM) and stable roommates (SR) problems and their variants. In such instances we consider a stability criterion that has recently been proposed, that of <i>exchange-stability</i>. In particular, we prove that ESM â the problem of deciding, given an SM instance, whether an exchange-stable matching exists â is NP-complete. This result is in marked contrast with Gale and Shapley's classical linear-time algorithm for finding a stable matching in an instance of SM. We also extend the result for ESM to the SR case. Finally, we study some variants of ESM under weaker forms of exchange-stability, presenting both polynomial-time solvability and NP-completeness results for the corresponding existence questions
Stable Roommate Problem with Diversity Preferences
In the multidimensional stable roommate problem, agents have to be allocated
to rooms and have preferences over sets of potential roommates. We study the
complexity of finding good allocations of agents to rooms under the assumption
that agents have diversity preferences [Bredereck et al., 2019]: each agent
belongs to one of the two types (e.g., juniors and seniors, artists and
engineers), and agents' preferences over rooms depend solely on the fraction of
agents of their own type among their potential roommates. We consider various
solution concepts for this setting, such as core and exchange stability, Pareto
optimality and envy-freeness. On the negative side, we prove that envy-free,
core stable or (strongly) exchange stable outcomes may fail to exist and that
the associated decision problems are NP-complete. On the positive side, we show
that these problems are in FPT with respect to the room size, which is not the
case for the general stable roommate problem. Moreover, for the classic setting
with rooms of size two, we present a linear-time algorithm that computes an
outcome that is core and exchange stable as well as Pareto optimal. Many of our
results for the stable roommate problem extend to the stable marriage problem.Comment: accepted to IJCAI'2
A Note on Distributed Stable Matching
We consider the distributed complexity of the stable mar-riage problem. In this problem, the communication graph is undirected and bipartite, and each node ranks its neigh-bors. Given a matching of the nodes, a pair of unmatched nodes is called blocking if they prefer each other to their assigned match. A matching is called stable if it does not induce any blocking pair. In the distributed model, nodes exchange messages in each round over the communication links, until they find a stable matching. We show that if mes-sages may contain at most B bits each, then any distributed algorithm that solves the stable marriage problem requires âŠ( n/B log n) communication rounds in the worst case, even for graphs of diameter O(log n), where n is the num-ber of nodes in the graph. Furthermore, the lower bound holds even if we allow the output to contain O( n) block-ing pairs. We also consider Δ-stability, where a pair is called Δ-blocking if they can improve the quality of their match by more than an Δ fraction, for some 0 †Δ †1. Our lower bound extends to Δ-stability where Δ is arbitrarily close to 1/2. We also present a simple distributed algorithm for Δ-stability whose time complexity is O(n/Δ).
Matching under Preferences
Matching theory studies how agents and/or objects from different sets can be matched with each other while taking agents\u2019 preferences into account. The theory originated in 1962 with a celebrated paper by David Gale and Lloyd Shapley (1962), in which they proposed the Stable Marriage Algorithm as a solution to the problem of two-sided matching. Since then, this theory has been successfully applied to many real-world problems such as matching students to universities, doctors to hospitals, kidney transplant patients to donors, and tenants to houses. This chapter will focus on algorithmic as well as strategic issues of matching theory.
Many large-scale centralized allocation processes can be modelled by matching problems where agents have preferences over one another. For example, in China, over 10 million students apply for admission to higher education annually through a centralized process. The inputs to the matching scheme include the students\u2019 preferences over universities, and vice versa, and the capacities of each university. The task is to construct a matching that is in some sense optimal with respect to these inputs.
Economists have long understood the problems with decentralized matching markets, which can suffer from such undesirable properties as unravelling, congestion and exploding offers (see Roth and Xing, 1994, for details). For centralized markets, constructing allocations by hand for large problem instances is clearly infeasible. Thus centralized mechanisms are required for automating the allocation process.
Given the large number of agents typically involved, the computational efficiency of a mechanism's underlying algorithm is of paramount importance. Thus we seek polynomial-time algorithms for the underlying matching problems. Equally important are considerations of strategy: an agent (or a coalition of agents) may manipulate their input to the matching scheme (e.g., by misrepresenting their true preferences or underreporting their capacity) in order to try to improve their outcome. A desirable property of a mechanism is strategyproofness, which ensures that it is in the best interests of an agent to behave truthfully
A constraint programming approach to the hospitals/residents problem
An instance I of the Hospitals/Residents problem (HR) involves a set of residents (graduating medical students) and a set of hospitals, where each hospital has a given capacity. The residents have preferences for the hospitals, as do hospitals for residents. A solution of I is a <i>stable matching</i>, which is an assignment of residents to hospitals that respects the capacity conditions and preference lists in a precise way. In this paper we present constraint encodings for HR that give rise to important structural properties. We also present a computational study using both randomly-generated and real-world instances. We provide additional motivation for our models by indicating how side constraints can be added easily in order to solve hard variants of HR
Solving stable matching problems using answer set programming
Since the introduction of the stable marriage problem (SMP) by Gale and
Shapley (1962), several variants and extensions have been investigated. While
this variety is useful to widen the application potential, each variant
requires a new algorithm for finding the stable matchings. To address this
issue, we propose an encoding of the SMP using answer set programming (ASP),
which can straightforwardly be adapted and extended to suit the needs of
specific applications. The use of ASP also means that we can take advantage of
highly efficient off-the-shelf solvers. To illustrate the flexibility of our
approach, we show how our ASP encoding naturally allows us to select optimal
stable matchings, i.e. matchings that are optimal according to some
user-specified criterion. To the best of our knowledge, our encoding offers the
first exact implementation to find sex-equal, minimum regret, egalitarian or
maximum cardinality stable matchings for SMP instances in which individuals may
designate unacceptable partners and ties between preferences are allowed.
This paper is under consideration in Theory and Practice of Logic Programming
(TPLP).Comment: Under consideration in Theory and Practice of Logic Programming
(TPLP). arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1302.725
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