Indirect Directness

In “Teleological Dispositions,” Nick Kroll appeals to teleology to account for the way that dispositions seem to be directed toward their merely possible manifestations. He argues that his teleological account of dispositions (TAD) does a better job of making sense of this directedness than rival approaches that appeal to conditional statements or physical intentionality. In this short critique, I argue that, without satisfactory clarification of a number of issues, TAD does not adequately account for the directedness of dispositions. I focus on two aspects of TAD: the Activation Principle, and the proposed necessary and sufficient conditions for being a dispositional property

OBML - Ontologies in Biomedicine and Life Sciences

The OBML 2010 workshop, held at the University of Mannheim on September 9-10, 2010, is the 2(nd) in a series of meetings organized by the Working Group “Ontologies in Biomedicine and Life Sciences” of the German Society of Computer Science (GI) and the German Society of Medical Informatics, Biometry and Epidemiology (GMDS). Integrating, processing and applying the rapidly expanding information generated in the life sciences — from public health to clinical care and molecular biology — is one of the most challenging problems that research in these fields is facing today. As the amounts of experimental data, clinical information and scientific knowledge increase, there is a growing need to promote interoperability of these resources, support formal analyses, and to pre-process knowledge for further use in problem solving and hypothesis formulation. The OBML workshop series pursues the aim of gathering scientists who research topics related to life science ontologies, to exchange ideas, discuss new results and establish relationships. The OBML group promotes the collaboration between ontologists, computer scientists, bio-informaticians and applied logicians, as well as the cooperation with physicians, biologists, biochemists and biometricians, and supports the establishment of this new discipline in research and teaching. Research topics of OBML 2010 included medical informatics, Semantic Web applications, formal ontology, bio-ontologies, knowledge representation as well as the wide range of applications of biomedical ontologies to science and medicine. A total of 14 papers were presented, and from these we selected four manuscripts for inclusion in this special issue. An interdisciplinary audience from all areas related to biomedical ontologies attended OBML 2010. In the future, OBML will continue as an annual meeting that aims to bridge the gap between theory and application of ontologies in the life sciences. The next event emphasizes the special topic of the ontology of phenotypes, in Berlin, Germany on October 6-7, 2011

Real Potential

There\u27s a student in my philosophy class who has real potential. I might express this thought in any of the following ways: She is potentially a philosopher ; She is a potential philosopher ; She has the potential to be a philosopher. The first way uses a cognate of potential as an adverb to modify is. The second ways uses potential as an adjective to modify philosopher. However, the third way uses potential as a noun to refer to something that the student has. What kind of thing is this potential? One worry about even asking this question is that this nominalization of the adjective potential suggests a metaphysical picture that is an artifact of language. This is even more strongly suggested by the less ambiguous nominalization potentiality. Once we have the term potentiality, we have a new kind of entity to countenance, and questions about its nature arise. One might argue, just because we use the word potentiality, we should not think that it refers to a thing that someone can have. There is something disingenuous about such an argument. It proceeds as if the adverbial and adjectival uses of potential are unproblematic, and questions only arise with the nominalization. But it is not obvious what it means to potentially be something, or what it means to be a potential something. To say that someone is potentially a philosopher is to talk about a way of being that falls short of actuality. And a potential philosopher is not a kind of philosopher at all. So what is it? Each of the three above formulations is a modal claim. If there is anything philosophical puzzling about a potentiality claim, it is not going to go away by translating it into an equivalent modal claim. In this chapter I defend the existence of potentialities against anti-realist arguments, and make a proposal as to their nature. The proposal, in short, is that potentialities are properties, specifically dispositions, though more needs to be said about properties and dispositions. I will do this in Part I. In Part II, I will address two lines of argument against potentialities: that they are reducible, and that they are causally inert

Disposition Ascriptions

I argue that disposition ascriptions - claims like ‘the glass is fragile’ - are semantically equivalent to possibility claims: they are true when the given object manifests the disposition in at least one of the relevant possible worlds

Construction, Reformation, and the Rule Against Perpetuities

Not long ago, in all the commotion about the doctrine of wait-and-see, a different principle for dealing with the pitfalls in perpetuities law unobtrusively emerged. This was an adaptation of the principle of cy pres to require that provisions, void under the Rule Against Perpetuities, be reformed within the limits of that Rule so as to give effect as closely as possible to the intention of the donor