Monetary Policies in Interdependent Economies with Stochastic Disturbances: A Strategic Approach

This paper analyzes strategic monetary policies using a standard two country stochastic macro model. Three noncooperative equilibria, namely Cournot, Stackelberg, and Consistent Conjectural Variations, are considered.The Pareto Optimal equilibrium, where aggregate joint costs are minimizedis also considered, and all strategic equilibria are compared to the perfectly fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes. The main conclusions obtained are:(i) Demand shocks are much less problematical than supply disturbances from the viewpoint of macro stabilization; (ii) the gains from cooperation are typically small; (iii) the strategic equilibria all show substantial margins of superiority over the fixed and flexible regimes.

Equilibrium in Generalized Cournot and Stackelberg Models

A model of an oligopolistic market with a homogeneous product is examined. Each subject of the model uses a conjecture about the market response to variations of its production volume. The conjecture value depends upon both the current total volume of production at the market and the subject's contribution into it. Under general enough assumptions, the equilibrium existence and uniqueness theorems are proven. Furthermore, a particular assumption { namely, constant elasticity, { is considered, and the generalized Stackelberg model comprising several leaders is investigated.oligopolistic market;conjectural variations;equilibrium;leaders and followers

ON THE COINCIDENCE OF THE FEEDBACK NASH AND STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIA IN ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENTIAL GAMES

In this paper the scope of the applicability of the Stackelberg equilibrium concept in differential games is investigated. Firstly, it is showed that for a class of differential games with state-interdependence the stationary feedback Nash equilibrium coincides with the stationary feedback Stackelberg equilibrium independently of the player being the leader of the game. Secondly, sufficient conditions for obtaining the coincidence between the two equilibria are defined. A review of different economic models shows that this coincidence is going to occur for a good number of economic applications of differential games. This result appears because of the continuous-time setting in which differential games are defined. In this setting the first movement advantage of the leader may disappears and then both equilibria coincide.Differential Games; Stationary Feedback Nash Equilibrium; Stationary Feedback Stackelberg Equilibrium; Coincidence.

Equilibrium in Generalized Cournot and Stackelberg Models

A model of an oligopolistic market with a homogeneous product is examined. Each subject of the model uses a conjecture about the market response to variations of its production volume. The conjecture value depends upon both the current total volume of production at the market and the subject's contribution into it. Under general enough assumptions, the equilibrium existence and uniqueness theorems are proven. Furthermore, a particular assumption { namely, constant elasticity, { is considered, and the generalized Stackelberg model comprising several leaders is investigated.

Network-constrained models of liberalized electricity markets: the devil is in the details

Numerical models for electricity markets are frequently used to inform and support decisions. How robust are the results? Three research groups used the same, realistic data set for generators, demand and transmission network as input for their numerical models. The results coincide when predicting competitive market results. In the strategic case in which large generators can exercise market power, the predicted prices differed significantly. The results are highly sensitive to assumptions about market design, timing of the market and assumptions about constraints on the rationality of generators. Given the same assumptions the results coincide. We provide a checklist for users to understand the implications of different modelling assumptions

Programación binivel y equilibrios conjeturados: resultados teóricos y algoritmos numéricos.

This thesis presents the fruit of 3 years of research. During this time 3 works were developed, each one with its own mathematical formulations and results. These works are, of course, related to each other and will be further developed in the near future. The first work of this thesis is presented in chapter 1 and addresses the problem of defining an optimality criterion for a semi-public company in a semi-mixed duopoly model. Here, we have two agents competing, the semi-public company and a private firm, both producing a homogeneous good to satisfy the demand in the market. The private firm, as usual, seeks to maximize its net profit, while the semi-public company has a commitment to watch over the economy of the population, but at the same time, does not neglect its own profit. The compromise between these two objectives for the semipublic company is described by a parameter β ∈ (0, 1], where β → 0 represents that the semi-public company thinks only for its own net profit, and β = 1 represents that the semi-public company cares solely for the economy of the population without seeking its own benefit

Network-constrained models of liberalized electricity markets: the devil is in the details

Numerical models for electricity markets are frequently used to inform and support decisions. How robust are the results? Three research groups used the same, realistic data set for generators, demand and transmission network as input for their numerical models. The results coincide when predicting competitive market results. In the strategic case in which large generators can exercise market power, the predicted prices differed significantly. The results are highly sensitive to assumptions about market design, timing of the market and assumptions about constraints on the rationality of generators. Given the same assumptions the results coincide. We provide a checklist for users to understand the implications of different modelling assumptions.Market power, Electricity, Networks, Numeric models, Model comparison

The Effect of oligopolistic competition on economic welfare in the Finnish food manufacturing

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