Nový MHP rámec pro kybernetickou válku

NOVÝ MHP RÁMEC PRO KYBERNETICKOU VÁLKU - ABSTRAKT Inspirována rostoucím počtem odhalených kybernetických útoků mířených na veřejné a vládní zařízení a instituce, tato diplomová práce si klade za cíl poodhalit stěžejní význam kybernetické války a kybernetických zbraní, poukázat na kritické právní vakuum, které v současnosti panuje v oblasti aktuálně platné úpravy mezinárodního humanitárního práva, a navrhnout doplnění tohoto rámce o MHP úmluvě, jež by regulovala použití kybernetických zbraní v mezinárodních ozbrojených konfliktech. Aby práce mohla poskytnout dobře strukturované a relevantní argumenty na podporu své hlavní teze, využívá metod kvalitativní analýzy současného MHP rámce, včetně mezinárodních smluv, zvykového práva a výstupních materiálů hlavních institucí věnovaných mezinárodní spravedlnosti spolu s prací předních autorů a odborníků v oblastech MHP a kybernetické bezpečnosti. Práce se skládá z pěti hlavních kapitol. První kapitola představuje základní principy válečného práva, včetně jeho historie, teorie a rozvoje, a zaměřuje se na jeden z jeho tří hlavních režimů - mezinárodní humanitární právo. Druhá část je věnována problematice kybernetické války a zbraní, definuje je jako počítačové útoky, vysvětluje jejich klasifikační systém, analyzuje jejich účinky a uvádí skutečné příklady takovýchto...NEW IHL FRAMEWORK FOR CYBER WARFARE - ABSTRACT Regarding the increasing number of revealed cyber-attacks aimed at public facilities including the governmental ones by who seems to be other state actors, this thesis aims to reveal the major importance of cyber warfare, point out the fatal vacuum regarding the IHL framework currently in force and suggests its completion by a new IHL convention, which would regulate cyberwarfare in International Armed Conflicts. In order to provide a well-structured and pertinent arguments to support its main points, the thesis uses methods of qualitative analysis of the current IHL sources including international treaties, customary law and work of the main institutions of international justice along with work of judicial scholars and cyber experts. The work contains five main chapters. The first chapter presents the underlining principles of Laws of Wars, including its theory, history and development; and focuses on one of its three main regimes - the International Humanitarian Law. The second part is dedicated to the topic of cyber warfare, defines its scope as computer network attacks, explains their classification system, analyses their effects and provides examples of such attacks. The third chapter focuses on the issue of the current legal vacuum in relation to cyber...Department of Public International LawKatedra mezinárodního právaPrávnická fakultaFaculty of La

Asymmetric Threats: Analyzing the Future of Nuclear Terrorism & Cyber Attacks; The Value of Deterrence Theory for Addressing the Challenges of Nuclear Terrorism in the age of 21st Century Cybersecurity

Given the rapid development and ease of access to technology, the threat of extremist organizations utilizing cyberspace as a means to target critical American strategic infrastructure is of increasing concern. The risk posed by the acquisition of fissile material, sabotage, or use of a nuclear device by an extremist organization has been exasperated due to technological development outpacing strategy. Despite policy-makers’ attempts to protect the public from cyber-attacks and nuclear terrorism, the federal policies in place have failed to account for the continual evolution of technology and the gaps in security that this advancement brings. Through examining documents from congressional and bureaucratic agencies using content analysis, this study examines whether or not policymakers, congressional or bureaucratic, use deterrence theory when they make policy, suggestions, rules, and guidelines. This thesis asks how U.S. policy regarding nuclear terrorism has changed given a rise in cyberthreats? This thesis also asks a second question: Which federal agency is most capable of dealing with cyberthreats concerning nuclear terrorism? The findings of this research concluded that as cyberthreats continued to develop, policymakers using deterrence theory shifted to using previous waves of deterrence theory, primarily dealing with rivalry and competitive threats. In addition, this research finds that intelligence agencies are the most capable federal agencies in proving guidelines and informing future policymakers

Malicious Digital Penetration of United States Weaponized Military Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Systems: A National Security Perspective Concerning the Complexity of Military UAVs and Hacking

The United States’ (US) military unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) has seen increased usage under the post 9/11 military engagements in the Middle East, Afghanistan, and within American borders. However, the very digital networks controlling these aircrafts are now enduring malicious intrusions (hacking) by America’s enemies. . The digital intrusions serve as a presage over the very digital networks the US relies upon to safeguard its national security and interests and domestic territory. The complexity surrounding the hacking of US military UAVs appears to be increasing, given the advancements in digital networks and the seemingly inauspicious nature of artificial intelligence and autonomous systems. Being most victimized by malicious digital intrusions, the US continues its military components towards growing dependence upon digital networks in advancing warfare and national security and interests. Thus, America’s netcentric warfare perspectives may perpetuate a chaotic environment where the use of military force is the sole means of safeguarding its digital networks

Cybercrime and Cyber-security Issues Associated with China: Some Economic and Institutional Considerations

China is linked to cybercrimes of diverse types, scales, motivations and objectives. The Chinese cyberspace thus provides an interesting setting for the study of cybercrimes. In this paper, we first develop typology, classification and characterization of cybercrimes associated with China, which would help us understand modus operandi, structures, profiles and personal characteristics of cybercrime organizations and potential perpetrators, the signature aspects and goals of cybercrimes, the nature and backgrounds of the criminal groups involved, characteristics of potential targets for criminal activities, the nature and extent of the damage inflicted on the victims and the implications to and responses elicited from various actors. We then examine this issue from developmental and international political economy angles. Specifically, we delineate salient features of China’s politics, culture, human capital and technological issues from the standpoint of cyber-security and analyze emerging international relations and international trade issues associated with this phenomenon. Our analysis indicates that China’s global ambition, the shift in the base of regime legitimacy from MarxLeninism to economic growth, the strong state and weak civil society explain the distinctive pattern of the country’s cyber-attack and cyber-security landscapes

EXPLAINING STATE BEHAVIOUR DURING CYBER DISPUTES

This dissertation has the objective of answering two main research questions that tackle directly when and how states employ cyber weapons and engage in cyber disputes, namely: \u201cIs there a particular context within which cyber disputes take place?\u201d and \u201cWhat are the elements that influence the mechanisms of retaliation, and possible escalation, during cyber disputes?\u201d. The when aims at researching the main condition that causes states to employ cyber weapons against each other. It starts from the hypothesis that cyber disputes are more likely to begin and end within contexts of political, military, diplomatic tension between states as an alternative mean to signal power and force posture without recurring to physical measures, intended as political accusations, economic sanctions and military interventions. The how concerns the characteristics of the behaviour or states in cyber space, and how self-restraining mechanisms and symmetry - or the lack thereof - between dyads of states involved in cyber disputes influences how states engage against each other. This research presents two main original findings. The first finding is that, indeed, a condition of political tension or hostility, stemming from conflictual strategies and postures, between states - namely, the independent variable - is a condition common to all the analysed cases, namely dyads of states exchanging hostile CNOs, which represents the dependent variable. Counterfactually, there are no recorded cases in literature of allied countries engaging in cyber disputes. The second finding is that there is a causal mechanism between the states that confront each other in cyber space and the cyber weapon employed in such disputes. Retaliation between dyads of states constitutes the dependent variable of this research, and indeed it was shown clearly by this research how it is influenced by the two independent variables taken into consideration. In situations of asymmetry the most powerful state, both as an attacker as a responder to a previous attack, will show enough power to acquire a position of escalation dominance. Against this position the counterpart will be very likely to retaliate but in a less powerful way, de-escalating the intensity of the conflict, or surrender to the attack and avoid retaliating. In a situation of symmetry, the dynamics of attack are expected to follow a tit-for-tat movement, without increasing the intensity of the conflict. This, supposedly, to avoid an escalation into the physical realm that would easily create an impasse or a prolonged crisis, given the equality in power. Due to the fact that states employ cyber weapons in an internationally unregulated environment, and the sophistication as well the number of states employing these new weapons is increasing, this dissertation will also provide policy suggestion to propose a modification of International Law in order to better address the issue under a normative point of view, for the sake of international security and stability

Cyber Law and Espionage Law as Communicating Vessels

Professor Lubin\u27s contribution is Cyber Law and Espionage Law as Communicating Vessels, pp. 203-225. Existing legal literature would have us assume that espionage operations and “below-the-threshold” cyber operations are doctrinally distinct. Whereas one is subject to the scant, amorphous, and under-developed legal framework of espionage law, the other is subject to an emerging, ever-evolving body of legal rules, known cumulatively as cyber law. This dichotomy, however, is erroneous and misleading. In practice, espionage and cyber law function as communicating vessels, and so are better conceived as two elements of a complex system, Information Warfare (IW). This paper therefore first draws attention to the similarities between the practices – the fact that the actors, technologies, and targets are interchangeable, as are the knee-jerk legal reactions of the international community. In light of the convergence between peacetime Low-Intensity Cyber Operations (LICOs) and peacetime Espionage Operations (EOs) the two should be subjected to a single regulatory framework, one which recognizes the role intelligence plays in our public world order and which adopts a contextual and consequential method of inquiry. The paper proceeds in the following order: Part 2 provides a descriptive account of the unique symbiotic relationship between espionage and cyber law, and further explains the reasons for this dynamic. Part 3 places the discussion surrounding this relationship within the broader discourse on IW, making the claim that the convergence between EOs and LICOs, as described in Part 2, could further be explained by an even larger convergence across all the various elements of the informational environment. Parts 2 and 3 then serve as the backdrop for Part 4, which details the attempt of the drafters of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 to compartmentalize espionage law and cyber law, and the deficits of their approach. The paper concludes by proposing an alternative holistic understanding of espionage law, grounded in general principles of law, which is more practically transferable to the cyber realmhttps://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facbooks/1220/thumbnail.jp

Waging Wars in Cyberspace: How International Law On Aggression And Self-Defense Falls Short Of Addressing Cyber Warfare. Could Iran Legally Retaliate For The Stuxnet Attack?

The technical capabilities of the Stuxnet worms-launched by the US and Israel against Iran\u27s nuclear facility-prove that the operation could be considered an act of aggression, as defined in the Rome Statute. Further, this paper asserts that Article 51 of the UN Charter is insufficient to addressing malignant cyber operations. The paper is organized as following: 1) Introduction, 2) Research Limitations, 3) Context: International Relations Theory and Types of International Law, 4) Understanding “Cyber” Within The Scope Of This Paper, 5) The Stuxnet Operation, 6) Historical and Legal Roots of “Aggression” and “Self-Defense”, 7) Stuxnet as an act of aggression, 8) Why Iran Cannot Legally Retaliate, 9) Conclusion, 10) Bibliography. I draw my analysis from ICJ cases, the UN Charter and other foundational documents, technical analyses of the Stuxnet operation, and other historical and political books and articles