More on the Interactive Indexing Semantic Theory

This article further explains and develops a recent, comprehensive semantic naturalization theory, namely the interactive indexing (II) theory as described in my 2008 Minds and Machines article Semantic Naturalization via Interactive Perceptual Causality (Vol. 18, pp. 527–546). Folk views postulate a concrete intentional relation between cognitive states and the worldly states they are about. The II theory eliminates any such concrete intentionality, replacing it with purely causal relations based on the interactive theory of perception. But intentionality is preserved via purely abstract propositions about the world that index, or correlate with, appropriate cognitive states. Further reasons as to why intentionality must be abstract are provided, along with more details of an II-style account of representation, language use and propositional attitudes. All cognitive representation is explained in terms of classification or sorting dispositions indexed by appropriate propositions. The theory is also related to Fodor’s representational theory of mind, with some surprisingly close parallels being found in spite of the purely dispositional basis of the II theory. In particular, Fodor’s insistence that thinking about an item cannot be reduced to sorting dispositions is supported via a novel two-level account of cognition—upper level propositional attitudes involve significant intermediate processing of a broadly normative epistemic kind prior to the formation of sorting dispositions. To conclude, the weak intentional realism of the II theory—which makes intentional descriptions of the world dispensable—is related to Dennett’s ‘intentional stance’ view, and distinguished from strong (indispensable) intentional realist views. II-style dispositions are also defended

The Functional and Identity Indispensability Scale (FIIS)

This research further elaborated the concept of indispensability by developing and testing a new measure, the Functional and Identity Indispensability Scale (FIIS), to assess two dimensions on which groups can claim indispensability: functional indispensability and identity indispensability. In Study 1 we developed and validated the FIIS with a sample of 452 American college students. Results showed the expected two-factor structure and supported the prediction that identity and functional are two distinct, but related, forms of indispensability. FIIS showed a consistent structure across majority and minority members and the reliability of the two subscales was good. In Study 2, a sample of 154 White-American citizens evaluated the perceived indispensability (FIIS) of three minority groups: African-Americans, Hispanic-Americans, and Asian-Americans. Results showed the scale’s sensitivity. Participants attributed greater identity (vs. functional) indispensability to African-Americans, whereas the pattern was reversed for Asian-Americans. No differences were found for Hispanic-Americans. Criterion validity was supported by (a) positive associations with competence and warmth, (b) negative associations with negative emotions and with social distance towards all minority group targets. The psychometric properties of the FIIS suggest its potential to be valuable addition to the existing literature on common identities and intergroup relations.info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersio

Explanation and Prediction: Strategies for Extending Scientific Realism to Mathematics

One central question in the philosophy of mathematics concerns the ontological status of mathematical entities. Platonists argue that abstract, mathematical entities exist, while nominalists argue that they do not. Scientific realism is the position that science is (roughly) true and the objects it describes exist. There are two major competing arguments for platonism on the basis of scientific realism: Indispensability and Explanation. In this paper I consider which argument the platonist ought to prefer by comparing their motivations and results. I conclude that, given the current role of mathematics in our best scientific theories, Explanation does not support platonism. Thus, Indispensability is preferable

Mathematical Explanation and Ontology: An Analysis of Applied Mathematics and Mathematical Proofs

The present work aims at providing an account of mathematical explanation in two different areas: scientific explanation and within mathematics. The research is addressed from two different perspectives: the one arising from an ontological concern about mathematical entities, and the other originating from a methodological choice: to study our chosen problems (mathematical explanation in science and in mathematics itself) in mathematical practice, that is to say, looking at the way mathematicians understand and perform their work in these diverse areas, including a case study for the context of intra-mathematical explanation. The central target is the analysis of the role that mathematical explanation plays in science and its relevance to the success or failure of scientific theories. The ontological question of whether the explanatory role of abstract objects, mathematical objects in particular, is enough to postulate their existence will be one of the issues to be addressed. Moreover, the possibility of a unified theory of explanation which can accommodate both external and internal mathematical explanation will also be considered. In order to go deeper into these issues, the research includes: (1) an analysis how the question of what is involved in internal mathematical explanation has been addressed in the literature, an analysis of the role of mathematical proof and the reasons why it makes sense to search for more explanatory proofs of already known results, and (2) an analysis of the relation between the use of mathematics in scientific explanation and the ontological commitment that arises from these explanatory tools in science. Part of the present work consists of an analysis of the explanatory role of mathematics through the study of cases reflecting this role. Case studies is one of the main sources of data in order to clarify the role mathematical entities play, among other methodological resources

Representational Content and the Science of Vision

The general topic of my thesis is how vision science explains what we see, and how we see it. There are two themes often found in the explanations of vision science that I focus on. The first is the Distal Object Thesis: the internal representations that underlie object vision represent properties of entities in the distal world. The second is the Transformational Thesis: the function of the vision system is to transform information that is latent in the retinal image into a representational format that makes it available for use by further perceptual or cognitive systems. The ultimate aim of my project is to show that these two themes are in tension, and to suggest how the tension may be resolved. The tension between these themes is, I argue, a result of their conflicting implications regarding the role of representational content (what a representation is ``about") in the explanations of vision science. On the one hand, the Distal Object Thesis entails that the internal representations that underlie object vision qualify as a form of mental representation, and reflect a sense in which visual perception is indeed ``objective". Furthermore, I argue at length that a commitment to the Distal Object Thesis (and its consequences) is well-founded: mental representations are indeed an indispensable posit for explanations of aspects of object vision. On the other hand, the Transformational Thesis rests on the presupposition that the content of the internal representations in the visual system are fixed by a causally reliable, information carrying relation. The tension arises because carrying information is insufficient for fixing the content of mental representations. Thus the explanations of object vision that assume the Transformational Thesis, but require a commitment the Distal Object Thesis, are seemingly inadequate. Fortunately, some philosophical theories of intentional content, or the ``aboutness" of mental representations, offer some strategies for reconciling these two themes in the explanations of vision science

Special Libraries, April 1945

Volume 36, Issue 4https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/sla_sl_1945/1003/thumbnail.jp