Aircraft Cyber Security and Information Exchange Safety Analysis for Department of Commerce

The Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) Next Generation Air Transportation (NextGen) program is a long-term modernization and transformation of the current National Airspace System (NAS) into a more effective and coordinated decision-making system. NextGen provides a more reliable, secure, and dependable aviation capability for both users and operators ensuring more capacity, throughput, and safety. This research delineates a high-level Safety Risk Assessment (SRA) related to NextGen technologies, specifically Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) as well as Aircraft Access to System Wide Information Management (SWIM) network (AAtS). Other communication mediums such as Mode-S or ADS-B transponder are also data exchange and broadcast capabilities in the aircraft can also be prone to lower level safety risks primarily because of an inability to ensure information security

C2 Link Security for UAS: Technical Literature Study and Preliminary Functional Requirements. Version 0.9 (Working Draft)

This document provides a study of the technical literature related to Command and Control (C2) link security for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) for operation in the National Airspace System (NAS). Included is a preliminary set of functional requirements for C2 link security

On the Security of the Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Protocol

Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) is the communications protocol currently being rolled out as part of next generation air transportation systems. As the heart of modern air traffic control, it will play an essential role in the protection of two billion passengers per year, besides being crucial to many other interest groups in aviation. The inherent lack of security measures in the ADS-B protocol has long been a topic in both the aviation circles and in the academic community. Due to recently published proof-of-concept attacks, the topic is becoming ever more pressing, especially with the deadline for mandatory implementation in most airspaces fast approaching. This survey first summarizes the attacks and problems that have been reported in relation to ADS-B security. Thereafter, it surveys both the theoretical and practical efforts which have been previously conducted concerning these issues, including possible countermeasures. In addition, the survey seeks to go beyond the current state of the art and gives a detailed assessment of security measures which have been developed more generally for related wireless networks such as sensor networks and vehicular ad hoc networks, including a taxonomy of all considered approaches.Comment: Survey, 22 Pages, 21 Figure

Security in Digital Aeronautical Communications A Comprehensive Gap Analysis

Aeronautical communications still heavily depend on analog radio systems, despite the fact that digital communication has been introduced to aviation in the 1990's. Since then, the digitization of civil aviation has been continued, as considerable pressure to rationalize the aeronautical spectrum has built up. In any modern digital communications system, the threat of digital attacks needs to be considered carefully. This is especially true for safety-critical infrastructure, which aviation's operational communication services clearly are. In this article, we reverse the traditional approach in the aeronautical industry of looking at a system from the safety perspective and assume a security-oriented point of view. We use the lens of security properties to review the requirements and specifications of aeronautical communications infrastructure as of 2021 and observe that most standards lack cybersecurity as a key requirement. Furthermore, we review the academic literature to identify possible solutions for the lack of cybersecurity measures in aeronautical communications system. We observe that most systems have been thoroughly analyzed within the academic security community, some for decades even, with many papers proposing concrete solutions to missing cybersecurity features. We conclude that there is a systematic problem in the design process of aeronautical communication systems. We provide a list of eight key findings and recommendations to improve the process of specifying such systems in a secure manner

C-Band Airport Surface Communications System Standards Development. Phase II Final Report. Volume 1: Concepts of Use, Initial System Requirements, Architecture, and AeroMACS Design Considerations

This report is provided as part of ITT s NASA Glenn Research Center Aerospace Communication Systems Technical Support (ACSTS) contract NNC05CA85C, Task 7: New ATM Requirements-Future Communications, C-Band and L-Band Communications Standard Development and was based on direction provided by FAA project-level agreements for New ATM Requirements-Future Communications. Task 7 included two subtasks. Subtask 7-1 addressed C-band (5091- to 5150-MHz) airport surface data communications standards development, systems engineering, test bed and prototype development, and tests and demonstrations to establish operational capability for the Aeronautical Mobile Airport Communications System (AeroMACS). Subtask 7-2 focused on systems engineering and development support of the L-band digital aeronautical communications system (L-DACS). Subtask 7-1 consisted of two phases. Phase I included development of AeroMACS concepts of use, requirements, architecture, and initial high-level safety risk assessment. Phase II builds on Phase I results and is presented in two volumes. Volume I (this document) is devoted to concepts of use, system requirements, and architecture, including AeroMACS design considerations. Volume II describes an AeroMACS prototype evaluation and presents final AeroMACS recommendations. This report also describes airport categorization and channelization methodologies. The purposes of the airport categorization task were (1) to facilitate initial AeroMACS architecture designs and enable budgetary projections by creating a set of airport categories based on common airport characteristics and design objectives, and (2) to offer high-level guidance to potential AeroMACS technology and policy development sponsors and service providers. A channelization plan methodology was developed because a common global methodology is needed to assure seamless interoperability among diverse AeroMACS services potentially supplied by multiple service providers

L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS) draft-maeurer-raw-ldacs-06

This document provides an overview of the architecture of the L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS), which provides a secure, scalable and spectrum efficient terrestrial data link for civil aviation. LDACS is a scheduled, reliable multi-application cellular broadband system with support for IPv6. LDACS shall provide a data link for IP network-based aircraft guidance. High reliability and availability for IP connectivity over LDACS are therefore essential

Secure Communications in Next Generation Digital Aeronautical Datalinks

As of 2022, Air Traffic Management (ATM) is gradually digitizing to automate and secure data transmission in civil aviation. New digital data links like the L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS) are being introduced for this purpose. LDACS is a cellular, ground-based digital communications system for flight guidance and safety. Unfortunately, LDACS and many other datalinks in civil aviation lack link layer security measures. This doctoral thesis proposes a cybersecurity architecture for LDACS, developing various security measures to protect user and control data. These include two new authentication and key establishment protocols, along with a novel approach to secure control data of resource-constrained wireless communication systems. Evaluations demonstrate a latency increase of 570 to 620 milliseconds when securely attaching an aircraft to an LDACS cell, along with a 5% to 10% security data overhead. Also, flight trials confirm that Ground-based Augmentation System (GBAS) can be securely transmitted via LDACS with over 99% availability. These security solutions enable future aeronautical applications like 4D-Trajectories, paving the way for a digitized and automated future of civil aviation

L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS) draft-ietf-raw-ldacs-03

This document provides an overview of the architecture of the L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS), which provides a secure, scalable and spectrum efficient terrestrial data link for civil aviation. LDACS is a scheduled, reliable multi-application cellular broadband system with support for IPv6. LDACS shall provide a data link for IP network-based aircraft guidance. High reliability and availability for IP connectivity over LDACS are therefore essential